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ABSTRACT 
The meaning which occupation has for the people of the West Bank 
encompasses a diversity of experiences and interpretations, and an 
analysis requires a means of locating experiences and perceptions 
within a framework which allows the complexities. to be understood. 
The thesis begins by considering the construction of such a frame- 
work, in suggesting a historical interpretation of the kinds of changes 
which were restructuring the relationship between Europe and the rest of 
the world during the time of early European industrial expansion, and 
subsequent governmental involvement in the settling of European colonial 
populations in the countries of Africa, Asia and the Americas. The theme 
of the violence of the relationship between coloniser and colonised is 
developed from this general perspective to the specific Palestinian 
encounter with Zionism, and the conceptualisation is of a violence which 
can be economic, social and ideological as well as physical. 
The translation of this conceptualisation into the reality of life 
in the West Bank means that account can be taken of the day-to-day experi- 
ence of colonisation, as well as the wider historical process. The ways 
in which people identify their situation and formulate strategies for 
surviving can therefore be connected to the broader experiences of the 
Palestinians as a people. 
The copyright of this thesis rests 
with the author. No quotations from 
it should be published without prior 
written consent, and information 
derived from it should be acknowledged. 
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INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
The first Prime Minister of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, resisted 
attemptsto define the borders of the state following its proclamation 
in 1948. The significance of this within Zionist ideology has been 
the ability to redefine the boundaries of 'Eretz Yisrael'; the 
significance in practice has been the expansion and contraction of 
the State of Israel from the frontiers it held at the end of the 
1948-9 war. In 1956 Israel, in concert with Britain and France, 
attacked Egypt and occupied Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula in the course 
of the 'Suez Campaign'. Pressure from the United States enforced a 
return to the 1949 borders, but Sinai was invaded again during the 
1967 war. The conclusion of the 1967 war left Israel in control of all 
of Palestine, plus the Sinai Peninsula and the Syrian Golan Heights. 
The 1973 war led to the further expansion of Israeli control on Golan and 
a withdrawal from part of Sinai. The implementation of sections of the 
Camp David Agreements has entailed withdrawal from most of Sinai, although 
twenty. months after the official Israeli withdrawal, 
' 
the final border 
has not been defined. 
In 1978, Israel invaded Lebanon, carrying out the 'Litani Operation' 
which culminated in the sponsoring of the self-styled Major Saad Haddad 
in an enclave along the border between Israel and Lebanon. In 1982, 
Israel invaded Lebanon again and in August 1983 it was reported that a 
E25 million scheme of fortifications was being constructed by the Israeli 
Army along a line some 27 miles north of Israel's 1949 border. 
- 
Israel's interest in Lebanon is of long standing. Ben-Gurion 
wrote in 1948 that the Lebanese Government should be overthrown and 
11 a Christian state ought to be set up there, with its southern 
frontier on the Litani" ('The Guardian': 26.8.82). Implicit in this 
is the idea that Israel's northern border would extend as far as the 
Litani River. A more detailed policy was suggested by Moshe Dayan 
and recorded by Moshe Sharett during his time as Foreign Minister of 
Israel: 
According to Dayan the only thing that's 
necessary is to find a Lebanese officer, 
even a major will do. We should either 
win his heart or buy him with money to 
declare himself the saviour of the Maronite 
population. Then the Israeli army will enter 
Lebanon, occupy the necessary territory and 
create a Christian regime that will ally 
itself with Israel. The territory from the 
Litani southwards will be totally annexed to 
Israel. 
(Jansen: 1982: p. 120) . 
Given the authority vested in Dayan and Sharett, the status of such 
remarks must be seen as more than matters of opinion. 
Parallels between Dayan's 1955 proposal and actual Israeli policy 
towards Lebanon over the past ten years are clear. By the mid-1970's, 
Israel had begun to establish relations with the Maronite Phalange Party 
and during the Lebanese civil war of 1975-76 was supplying them with 
weapons. The value of arms, equipment and technical advice supplied 
by Israel to the Phalange has been estimated at as much as $250 million 
by 1982 (Janson: 1982: p. 121) . 
- 
The background to this cooperation can be seen in the way in which 
French Mandatory rule in Lebanon shaped conditions of power, and it is 
here that the source of Lebanon's internal tensions can be located. 
In sum, Maronite hegemony was ensured by France while it held the 
Mandate, and the Maronite community continued to receive support from 
the West at the end of this period. As Gilmour has pointed out: 
Lebanon's inherent struggle is.... between those 
who want to make the country a psuedo-European 
enclave (i. e. the Maronites) and those who want 
to prevent its alienation from the Arab world 
(i. e. the Muslims, Druses and smaller Christian 
sects). 
('The Guardian': 26.8.82) . 
While this is obviously a simplification of a very complex situation it 
does give some idea of how the political structures built up under French 
rule are related to the wider geopolitical context, and at least begins to 
answer the version of Lebanese history which claims that Lebanon had a 
peaceful society with an institutionalised balance between confessional 
groups until the disruption engendered by the Palestinian resistance 
movement. 
Most of the Palestindans living in Lebanon are refugees and their 
der, endents from 1948, although smaller migrations also took place following 
the 1967 war and after the Jordanian attack on Palestinians in Jordan 
in 1970. The 1980 population estimate is that around 347,000 Palestinians 
were living in Lebanon, and a third of those were in refugee camps 
(Palestinian Statistical Abstract: 1980). 
By the 1970's, Beirut had become the headquarters of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation. For the PLO the choice of Beirut as a base 
was almost by default, as they had lost their few bases in Egyptian- 
coritro-Iled t-e-rritory after the 1967 war, and although Fatah had set up 
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in the West Bank after the 1967 occupation this was short-lived. The 
expulsion of Palestinians from Jordan, and the economic and political 
restrictions placed on Palestinians in other Arab countries led to the 
regroupment of the PLO forces in Lebanon. The way in which the Palestinian 
resistcEnce movement developed is of significance, as it was establishing 
the institutions of a 'government-in-exile'. For example, the Palestine 
Red Crescent was responsible for medical care; educational facilities 
were provided in refugee camps through the offices of the PLO; a central 
archive and research centre was set up in Beirut, and thus a whole range 
of political and social services were established in addition to consoli- 
dating the guerilla bases and building up military support. 
At one level, the Lebanese authorities were concerned to prevent 
Israeli 'reprisal' raids into Lebanon following fighting between Palestinian 
querillas and Israeli troops along the border area. These 'reprisals' 
included the blowing-up of thirteen civilian airliners at Beirut Airport 
in 1968 and a systematic campaign of terror against the population of 
South Lebanon. The refugee camps were subjected to aerial bombardment 
as were villages "suspected of harbouring Palestinians"; bridges, roads 
and houses were destroyed and villagers taken back to Israel for inter- 
rogation (Gilmour: 1982: p. 190). However, even when the PLO agreed in 
1974 to stop all operations along the Israeli-Lebanese border the 'reprisals' 
continued, a scenario which was repeated in the Israeli 'retaliatory' 
invasion of Lebanon in 1982, following a ceasefire negotiated indirectly 
b(, 
-tw(, (, ri 
Ts-rciol and the PLO. 
- 
Al ]-, 
-, vel, lensions within Lebanon had been increasing, with 
challenges by Muslim and left-wing groups to Maronite hegemony 
and the confessional structure of the state apparatus, and in a sense 
this was exacerbated by the presence of the Palestinians. Direct confron- 
tations had taken place between paramilitary forces of the Phalange and 
Palestinians guerillas since the early 1970's, and the Phalangist 
militias were strengthened with consignments of weapons, with the 
approval of the Lebanese President. 
What this means is that the ruling party was setting up an alternative 
to the Lebanese Army, for while the majority of the latter's senior 
officers were Maronite, its junior officers and many enlisted men were 
not, and the loose alliances forged between the Palestinian resistance 
and some of the progressive Lebanese groupings led the Maronite leader- 
ship to question the loyalty of the army in protecting the interests of 
the Maronite community. 
By 1975 tensions within Lebanon erupted in civil war. At this time 
the United States was trying to negotiate a 'peace plan' in the region 
2 
following the 1973 war. As for the Palestinian resistance, a strategy 
based on a diplomatic offensive had been developed to counter attempts 
to place the West Bank and Gaza under Jordanian rule in the search for 
a settlement, and the use of this tactic gained the PLO observer status 
at the United Nations and the affirmation of the right of the Palestinian 
people to self-determination. The civil war in Lebanon strengthened the 
alliance between the Palestinians and the progressive Lebanese groupings, 
and by the spring of 1976 the joint front controlled over three-quarters of 
the country. 
- 
The prospect of a joint front victory clarified interests in the 
re(jion. Israel blockaded the sourthen ports of Sidon and Tyre, 
preventing weapons and supplies from reaching the Palestinian-Lebanese 
front, and continued to supply the Phalange with armaments. The United 
States sent part of the Sixth Fleet to cruise of f Lebanon. In May 1976, 
Syrian troops invaded Lebanon and fought against the Palestinian-Lebanese 
alliance. Operations such as the siege of Tal al Zaater refugee camp 
and the massacre of over 2,000 people were condemned by Arab states such 
as Iraq and Algeria; the invasion of Lebanon was condemned by the 
Soviet Union, but no attempt was made to stop the Syrian advance. In 
November 1976 a meeting of Arab states decreed that an Arab 'peace-keeping 
force' would remain in Lebanon, and this was the Syrian army. 
From this brief outline, some indication is given of the way in 
which power alliances in the region shift and re-align, and the importance 
of considering this historically. A failure to do so results in the kind 
of analysis typified by the presentation of the conflict in Lebanon as 
being a confessional struggle - begging the question of why Syria should 
intervene on the side of the Maronite Christians, and why Israel should 
sporisor Saad Haddad's militia. 
3 
The recognition of Israel's long-standing 
interests in Lebanon and support for the Phalange denies the spontaneity 
of Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and requires an analysis which can 
move beyond the reduction of this complexity to a set of economic, strategic 
or military imperatives. 
Yehoshua Porath has suggested that the successful mediated negotiation 
of a ceasefire by the PLO, and its ability to maintain it for a year, had 
given the PLO credibility as a negotiating force. For Israel, this meant 
that: 
- 
If the PLO agreed upon and maintained a ceasefire 
they may in the future agree to a more far- 
reaching political settlement and maintain that 
too ... Won't there be pressure to include the PLO 
in future negotiations over the future of the 
territories occupied in 1967? 
('Ha'aretz': 25.6.82). 
In addition to increasing credibility as representatives of the 
Palestinian people at an international level, recognition of the support 
for the PLO amongst Palestinians underlies the following statement made 
by General Sharon during his time as Israeli Defence Minister: 
The bigger the blow and the more we damage the 
PLO infrastructure, the more the Arabs in Judea 
and Samaria /the West Bank/ and Gaza will be 
ready to negotiate with us and establish 
co-existence. 
('The Times': 5.8.82). 
When the experience of the Palestinians is juxtaposed with a consider- 
ation of the various alliances and interests both within the region and 
internationally, and when what has happened to the Palestinians is seen 
a(lainst a backdrop of a global restructuring, then we can begin to make 
of Ow meaning of occupation in the West Bank. The Minister of the 
Liberal Jewish Synagogue in Britain has observed: 
Only a fool or a propagandist would still claim 
that the brutal war in Lebanon was launched with 
4 the defensive aim of bringingpeace to Galilee. 
It was designed to smash the PLO militarily and 
politically, in order to accelerate the process 
of colonisation on the West Bank. 
('The Guardian': 14.2.83). 
The construction of an explanation which can identify the connections 
bet. ween the process of colonisation on the West Bank and the meaning this 
ý,, jf; for- Lfw people who have lived under Israeli military rule there since 
1967 irivolves the formulation of a theoretical unity, and this is concept- 
ualised as being the power relation between a colonised people and a 
- 
coloniser. The violence of the colonial relationship is generated by the 
articulation of specific historical circumstances and the way in which 
these circumstances are explained and defined. 
The conception of colonialism is not as an ahistorical descriptive 
category, but rather as a historically specific process of the disruption 
of one social formation by another; thus, the emphasis is on the dynamic 
nature of the colonial relationship rather than on a predefined relation 
between an active coloniser and a passive colonised. The importance of 
this is the assertion of the history of the colonised people, a history 
which has its own ordering and is not merely the response to an external 
stimulus. 
In this way, a distinction is maintained between the level of historical 
experience and the expression of the experience, as while a theoretical 
unity is constructed of violence as a colonial power relation, specific 
forms of violence can neither be reduced to, nor deduced from, this level. 
The way in which colonialism is defined means that it is a relation which 
affects all aspects of the social formation, and expressions of violence 
can therefore be manifested in different forms at different times. Such 
an analysis of moments in the colonial relationship can consider the 
diverse ways in which people perceive and interpret their situation and 
find ways of living with it. In this sense, historical experience can be 
seen as setting parameters within which different sorts of explanation 
and strategy emerge, but the form of the interpretation is irreducible to 
the level of objective experience, and has its own historicity. 
- 
The suggestion that an expression of violence has its own historicity 
which cannot be derived solely from a consideration of the historical 
development of the colonial process allows a coherent explanation to be 
constructed at different levels of analysis. That is, if the same form 
of historicity is attributed to, for example, economic structures, beliefs 
and political organisations, then these would have to be conceived of as 
subject to the same type of transformation. It is suggested that rather 
than adopting a reductionist form in this way, an analysis which can articu- 
late different levels of explanation is more capable of providing a 
comprehensive understanding of the meaning of occupation in the West Bank. 
It can be )r(-jued that it is difficult to talk of a unified Palestinian 
,; it-uation in th(--. face of geographical, experiential and social diversity, 
and this raises questions about the level at which we can talk of a 
collective Palestinian experience. With reference to the preceding 
discussion, it is proposed that at a general level of objective experience 
the Palestinian people have a shared past, and that the unity can be 
located in the relationship between coloniser and colonised. The meaning 
which this has will vary between places, times and situations as a 
diversity of discourses of explanation and definition. 
The generation of analytical connections between the level of 
Palestinian specificity and the context within which Palestinian history 
can be located is reflected in the structure of the thesis. Chapter 
One 
is divided into two sections. The first section adopts a wide perspective 
in considering the kinds of changes which were restructuring 
the relation- 
ship between Europe and the rest of the world 
during the time of early 
I) 
European industrial expansion, and examines how this 
led to governmental 
- 10 - 
involvement and the move to settle European populations in the countries 
of Africa, Asia and the Americas. The establishment of colonial settler 
states is used as a basis for developing the theme of the nature of the C. - 
relationship of coloniser and colonised, and illustrative examples are 
used to indicate the permeation of the colonial relationship through to 
the construction of the idea of the native. 
The second section of Chapter One examines the beginning of Zionism 
as a political movement and relates Zionist ideas to tensions within 
Europe at the end of the nineteenth century. The aspirations of L7jionis-m 
within the colonial project are seen firstly at an ideological level, 
and as Rodinson has pointed out: 
The element that made it possible to connect these 
aspirations of Jewish shopkeepers, peddlers, crafts- 
men, and intellectuals in Russia and elsewhere to 
the conceptual orbit of imperialism was one small 
detail that seemed to be of no importance: Palestine 
was inhabited by another people. 
(Rodinson: 1973: p. 39). 
Secondly, Zionist aspirations were connected to the fortunes of the 
imperial powers at a practical level as the Zionist leadership sought 
support for their settlement plans, and Chapter One concludes by returning 
to the perspective with which it began by discussing the re-alignment of 
global power relations since the First World War, with reference to the 
Middle East. 
International connections are followed through in Chapter Two, and 
the focus is narrowed to concentrate on the place of Israel in the 
historical process outlined in the first Chapter,.. The analysis of the 
relationship between Europe and the Middle East 
is concretised by 
examining the economic foundations of the State of Israel, and questions 
are raised regarding the apparent paradox of Israel's status as an 
- 11 - 
advanced capitalist country, its role as an exporter of military and 
technical aid and the magnitude of its foreign debt and internal economic 
problems. 
The question of the nature of the State of Israel is picked up in 
Chapter Three, which is concerned with the colonisation process in 
Palestine from the time of the British Mandate. It is proposed in this 
Chapter that the ideological negation of the Palestinian 'native' 
population which is an element of Zionist philosophy was transformed 
by Zionist settlers in Palestine under the Mandate into the establishment 
of institutions and structures which were exclusively for Jews. Thus, 
the political vision of a Jewish entity excluded from thought the non- 
Jewish inhabitants of the site where the entity was to be formed; the 
practices of the settlers served to formalise this. 
It is an instance of this formalisation which constitutes the basis 
of Chapter Four, namely the way in which the exproporiation of land and 
implantation of a settler population can be seen as an aspect of domi- 
nation. Land expropriation is considered inside Israel and in the West 
Bank, and while at one level settlement is considered as a symbol and 
strategy of domination, it is held that the multiplicity of rationales 
which underlie Israeli settlement are important for an understanding of 
the wider dimensions of the colonial relationship. 
Chapter Five is organised around an examination of the West Bank 
labourforce since the 1967 occupation, and through this theme attempts 
to draw toUether the main strands of the argument concerning the meaning 
of occupation in the West Bank. Around half the 
West Bank workforce is 
employed inside Israel, and the rapidity of 
this shift is linked to the 
- 12 - 
speed with which the West Bank has become a major market for Israeli 
pro(ltice; it is linked to the changes which are taking place in agri- 
culture, and to employment within the West Bank itself. The situation 
of West Bank labour can be analysed within the matrix of the kind of 
changes which occur when production is reorganised on a transnational 
basis; that is, within the framework of a New International Division of 
Labour. 
However, it is suggested that account must also be taken of the 
specificity of Palestinian workers in a particular colonial relationship, 
and a discussion of the unionisation of West Bank workers elaborates 
this level of analysis by examining the way in which West Bank unions 
constitute a form of resistance to the Israeli occupation. This discussion 
provides an introduction to the examination in Chapters Six and Seven of 
instances in the colonial relationship, moments of violence. The self- 
definition of the West Bank unions and the way in which they perceive 
the relation between problems in the workplace and the problems of living 
under occupation leads to the formulation of a strategy for dealing with 
life under military rule. The instances discussed in Chapters Six and 
Seven indicate the diversity of interpretations and the very different ways 
in which Palestinians have come to terms with their situation. 
Thus, the thesis is structured in a way which permits an analysis to 
shift between levels. Chapter One provides a context for Chapter Two; 
Chi--tpter Three then develops the themes raised in the introductory Chapters 
within the Palestinian constituency and Cha-pters Four and Five concretise 
this by highlighting particular aspects of colonisation. Chapters Six and 
Seven then use this discussion to concentrate on moments of violence in the 
relationship between COloniser and colonised. 
- 13 - 
A final note can be made on the use of source material. In addition 
to library and archival sources, a seven-month period was spent in the 
West Bank. Details of the fieldwork are provided in Appendix 1, but 
it is important to clarify the status of information gathered at this 
time. While the focus was on five particular areas and the data collected 
formed the basis of the 'case studies' discussed in Chapters Five, Six 
and S'even, these cases are designed to advance the central argument of 
the thesis and so do not constitute exhaustive field research in the 
areas of interest. Similarly, the use of illustrative material from other 
countries throughout the thesis does not have the status of a 'comparative 
analysis' in the usual sense of a detailed comparison between societies 
or social structures - it is there to clarify or provide a counterpoint 
to the main' argument. 
- 14 - 
Notes 
1. Israel officially withdrew from Sinai on 26 April, 1982. 
The connection between the attempt to negotiate a 'peace plan' 
and United States oil interests in the Middle East is elaborated 
in Chapter One. 
3. By confessional definitions, an estimated 60% of Haddad's militia 
are Shi'ite Muslims, and Haddad is Greek Orthodox (Middle East 
International: 19.8.83). 
4. The official name of the invasion was "Operation Peace in Galilee"; 
the rationale put forward was that it was necessary to push the 
Palestinians out of artillery range of Galilee. This was estimated 
to be 40 km north of the 1949 Israeli-Lebanese border. 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE MIDDLE EAST 'PROBLEM": 
A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
- 15 - 
Chapter One 
The purpose of this Chapter is to provide a background which will 
set the parameters of the thesis by suggesting the way in which the 
Middle East has developed within a global context. This involves the 
construction of a particular form of historical explanation, one which 
is thematic rather than chronological, in that its organisation is 
designed to advance a theoretical and methodological problematic 
rather than to be restricted to a description of events. 
The first section moves from a general discussion of the way in 
which industrial expansion in Europe generated new kinds of relation- 
ships with the rest of the world, to an examination of how this involved 
governments and later settlers. The section concludes with a concept- 
ualisation of the colonial relationship as one of vLolence, and this 
theme is developed in the second section in considering the sense in 
which tensions within the imperial countries established the conditions 
for the emergence of Zionism as a political movement with aspirations 
for settlement. The final part of this section looks broadly at the 
way in which global power relations have re-ordered and re-aligned 
over the past fifty years, and how the Middle East can be located in 
this process. 
- 16 - 
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP 
Trade as Unequal Exchange 
Writing on Africa, Gutkind and Wallerstein suggest that: 
The indigenous structures came to serve new ends 
as African societies were drawn into new commercial 
and political relationships which during the nine- 
teenth and twentieth centuries were controlled by 
an imperialist outpouring of Western European 
competition for raw material resources, trade and 
markets and for outlets for mercantile and, later 
industrial capital. 
(Gutkind & Wallerstein: 1976: p. 11). 
The essential characteristics of this relationship is that it was 
asymmetrical and unequal, a factor which is often overlooked in 
discussions of "trade". Rodney outlines the nature of trade between 
Europe and Africa as follows: 
Europe exported to Africa goods which were already 
being produced and used in Europe itself - Dutch 
linen, Spanish iron, English pewter, Portugese 
wines, French brandy, Venetian glass beads, German 
muskets etc.... the overall range of trade goods 
which left the European ports of Hamburg, Copenhagen, 
and Liverpool was determined almost exclusively by 
the pattern of production and consumption within 
Europe. From the beginning, Europe assumed the 
power to make decisions within the international 
tracLng system... Above all, European decision- 
making power was exercised in selecting what Africa 
should export - in accordance with European needs. 
(Rodney: 1972: p. 86) 
Similary, Khader notes: 
By the l7th and 18th centuries, products manufactured 
in Europe were flooding the Syrian and Palestinian 
markets. The structure of trade with the West was 
completely weighted to the advantage of the 
latter. ' 
(Khader: 1976: p. 48) 
Thus it is suggested that industrial expansion 
in Western Europe generated 
the underdevelopment of most of the rest of 
the world by destroying 
indigenous social forces and in their place offering 
trade. Thomas sums 
this up as the offer of "participation 
in the global division of labour 
- 17 - 
as providers of raw materials and consumers of manufacturing output. " 
(Thomas: 1974: p. 58). Such a process involved the emergence of a new 
set of relationships between Europe and the rest of the world as well 
as within the constituency of Europe and, importantly, within the 
countries with which it was trading. This latter point should be empha- 
sised, and will be returned to later, as much writing on the theme of 
development/underdevelopment casts the countries of Africa, Asia and 
South America as being passive recipients of historical forces, and 
moreover as constituting a static and immutable unit. As an example 
of the way in which indigenous structures articulate with external 
influences, we can consider the circumstances under which cotton was 
introduced to Egypt. (Owen: 1981) has suggested that the British 
occupation of Egypt was preceded by a period of economic imperialism, which 
involved the transformation of the Egyptian economy. Cotton was introduced 
to Egypt by Mohammed Ali in the eakly 1800's, at a time when 70% of 
Britain's export trade was in the form of cotton cloth sold to the 
Middle East. A rapid progranune was carried out which shifted virtually 
the entire agricultural system from the production of food to the production 
of cotton. Mohammed Ali instituted state control of the land, thereby 
giiining control over Egypt's main source of revenue, and extended this 
to controlling agricultural produce by prohibiting private trading in 
grain (in 1811) and eventually private trading in most cash-crops 
(e. g. rice, sugar, indigo) . The entire Upper 
Egyptian cereal crop was 
sold for export as demand rose in Europe during and after 
the Napoleonic 
wars. 
The shift to cotton production contains several elements which should 
be elaborated. Firstly, it marked the 
incorporation of Egypt into the 
European market system as a producer of cotton as a raw material, and as 
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a market for European-produced goods. The internal structure of Egypt 
as a land-lord economy meant that there was little industry of the type 
which would compete with European goods. Secondly, the coincidence of 
interests between the dominant class in Egypt, i. e. landowners, and 
the European forces can be noted. The transformation to cotton produc- 
tion was not directly imposed on the Egyptians by foreign powers but 
was instigated by themselves. Here we can mention the changes in the 
system of taxation and administrative control brought about by Mohammed Ali. 
01ý In order to pay the required taxes, increased surplus had to be extracted 
from the peasant producers and this is easier when a cash-crop is being 
produced than when it is food. 
Taking these elements together, some general points can be made. 
Owen has suggested that changes in taxation and administration were 
necessary to cover increasing military expenditure, brought on by the 
threat seen during the Napoleonic wars, as well as within the region 
itself (Owen: 1981). Such changes, plus the move to agriculture for 
export, would be necessary: if a decision was taken to import weapons then 
they would have to be paid for. On the subject of the change in the 
system of control, it can be suggested that once a centralised state 
was established, the changing relations of production sustained the need 
for its existence. In other words, that in the shift to cotton production, 
the state operated in the interests of the dominant class in facilitating 
2 
the extraction of surplus from the peasantry. 
An important aspect of a shift to monoculture is that if a cash-crop 
is being grown then food is not, which means a two-fold 
dependency, in that 
a country producing one crop 
for export is dependent on the demand and 
price for that crop remaining 
high and is also dependent on importing 
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food, which it has to pay for by exporting its cash-crop. This is 
explained by Thomas as the productive forces of these countries being 
torn loose from their roots in the domestic market (Thomas: 1974). What 
this means is that a consequence of entry into the European-dominated 
market was the lack of a link between the pattern of domestic resource 
use and domestic demand and also the divergence of domestic demand and 
the needs of the bulk of the population. In other words that the social 
relations of production and the use of productive forces are such that 
there exists a pattern of consumption which does not represent the needs 
of the community and a pattern of production which is geared towards 
neither domestic consumption nor domestic need. 
Merchant Capital and European Intervention 
Samir Amin (Amin: 1974) suggests that from the end of the 19th century, 
the overseas investment of European capital became an essential aspect of 
economic relations between 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' countries. 
The export of capital did not, however, take the place of commercial 
exchange but supplemented it. 
European governments began to actively pursue the interests of their 
merchants. An increasing number of European merchants were resident 
in 
the ports of the Middle East and Africa, and were establishing 
links 
between local retailers and Europe. Transactions were carried out such 
that local crops were purchased in cash - largely 
to secure access to 
supplies of local raw material - and 
imported manufactured goods were 
-sold on credit. 
This system gave increasing importance to the role of 
the merchant moneylender, described by Owen as: 
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... the "hinge" between the world market and 
large-scale commerce and banking on the one 
hand and small-scale peasant and artisan 
production on the other. It was such men iWho, 
very largely, administered the exchange between 
the capitalist economies of Western Europe and 
the pre-capitalist economies of the Middle East, 
using either their own existing capital resources 
or money obtained from Europeans to generate the 
credit required to expand local trade and to 
purchase local commodities. 
(Owen: 1981: pp. 88-9). 
This is one example of how indigenously-created capital was used, and 
Amin argues that local capital was not competing with dominant foreign 
capital, but was complementary and largely concerned with production 
for export. Also, he notes the conceptual and historical inadequacy of 
talking in terms of a transition from subsistence economy to a market 
economy in such a situation, and suggests that there is a major difference 
between the development of capitalism in Europe and North America and the 
development of capital relations in the countries of Asia, Africa and 
S. America, and that is that in the case of the latter countries the 
transition to capitalist economic forms is the creation of a periphery 
within the capitalist system. In other words it is the transition from 
a pre-capitalist social formation to the social formation of peripheral 
capitalism (Amin: 1974: pp. 137-68). Thus the effect of merchants' capital 
is seen by Taylor as the: 
reinforcement of already existing forms of extra- 
economic coercion in agricultural production in the 
non-capitalist mode of production. Merchants' capital 
achieved this either by creating forms of landed 
property and relations of production similar to those 
dominant during the European feudal period, or by simply 
utilising and then perpetuating existing relations of 
production. 
(Taylor: 1979: p. 187). 
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The increasing European government intervention can be illustrated 
by the pressure put on the Ottoman administration by the governments of 
France and Britain to change commercial practices in favour of the 
European merchants. Tax concessions were won which exempted European 
merchandise from tax, while levying 15-20% on local products (Khader: 
1976: p. 48). This served to further inhibit any attempts there may have 
been to set up local production, and made the possibility of competing 
with European goods even more remote. It is an indication of the power 
which Europe exercised, and also perhaps of the class nature of the 
Ottoman regime, in that a policy could be implemented which effectively 
prevented the establishment any industrialisation or manufacturing. The 
system of selling imported goods on credit meant that it was necessary for 
the European merchants to have an effective means of ensuring payment. 
Pressure was applied at governmental level for the Ottomans to adopt a 
system of commercial courts and to conduct business according to European 
business law. The Ottoman Commercial Code of 1850, based on French 
business practice, was the result of this. 
The Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention 
3 
was renegotiated in 1838, 
and increasing Ottoman dependence on British military and political support 
was used to remove 'obstacles' such as the internal duties on the movement 
of goods within the Empire and the Ottoman policy of encouraging monopolies 
of purchase and sale within its domain. In 1854, the Ottoman administration 
signed their first overseas loan. A new form of investment emerged, one 
which drew on the European public to invest savings in "Oriental" bonds. 
In Britain, this was largely small-scale investment by individuals, and 
perhaps had much to do with the imperial ideology of the time. 
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Amongst other things, the Ottoman military campaign against the 
Russians instigated heavier borrowing until bankruptcy was declared in 
1875. In 1881, representatives of the bond-holders reached a settlement 
in Istanbul, but while this meant a lessening of financial difficulties 
for the Ottoman administration, the price was an even greater degree of 
European financial control. This pattern was repeated in Egypt, where 
large-scale overseas borrowing led to bankruptcy when the European 
creditors called in the loans. Again, the resolution was increased 
European control. 
Alliances in the First World War 
The Ottoman Empire had internal problems to contend with as well. 
Owen described its rule in Arab areas as: 
if primarily concerned with the task of maintaining 
military preparedness, preserving urban and rural 
security, and raising revenue. " 
(Owen: 1981: p. 74) . 
In the Arabian peninsula, for example, the armies of the Ottoman Empire 
had driven the Wahhabis from the west of the peninsula, the Hijaz, and 
annexed it to the Empire. At the beginning of the 
20th century, Abdel 
Aziz Ibn Saud's army took over the eastern part of the peninsula. 
4 
The 
ruler of the Hijaz, the Hashemite Sharif Hussein of 
Mecca, requested British 
aid to fight the Ottomans. Although initially refused, 
the outbreak of 
the First World War meant that it would serve British 
interests to 
sponsor an Arab revolt within the Ottoman 
Empire. 
The shifting balance of power during and after the First 
World War 
also brought a change to the relationship 
between Europe and the Middle East, 
resulting in the 
dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires 
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and a redistribution of territories and rewards amongst the victorious 
imperialist Allies of Britain, France and Italy. (The Russian revolution 
in 1917 meant that the USSR was excluded from the territorial claims 
made by the victors at the end of the war. ) 
As fortunes and strategies changed during the course of World War I, 
a series of alliances and treaties was made according to dominant 
interests at particular times during the war. The way in which the 
European powers struck up often contradictory agreements in order to 
advance their war effort has been well documented5 and need not be 
repeated here. Discussion will therefore be limited to events at the 
time of World War I which were to be of direct relevance for the future 
of Palestine. 
Preliminary contacts were established between Britain andthe Hijaz 
in the winter of 1914-15. As was suggested earlier, an initial approach 
by Sharif Hussein to the British authorities had been turned down. Now, 
however, circumstances for the British had changed and Lord Kitchener 
proposed to guarantee Arabia against all exterior aggression. The major 
participants in the negotiations were Sharif Hussein and Sir Henry MacMahon, 
then British High Commissioner to Egypt. A series of letters were exchanged 
and an agreement reached such that: 
.... Great Britain 
is prepared to recognise and 
support the independence of the Arabs within the 
territories included in the limits and boundaries 
proposed by the Sheriff of Mecca. 
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.... Great Britain will give to the Arabs her 
advice and will assist them to establish 
what may appear to be the most suitable forms 
of government in these various territories ... it is understood that the Arabs have decided 
to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain 
only, and that such European advisers and officials 
as may be required for the formation of a sound 
form of administration will be British 
(Yale: 1958: p. 252) 
Thus, the agreement entailed British support for the achievement of Arab 
'national aspirations' as interpreted by Sharif Hussein, in return for an 
Arab uprising against the Ottoman administration. In addition, it should 
be noted that Britain insisted on being the sole foreign influence. 
Various interpretations of the Hussein-MacMahon correspondence have 
been made with regard to both its content and status. 
6 
The implications 
for Palestine can, however, be clearly discerned and are at the root of 
most of the altercation. Firstly, there is a notable vagueness in the 
definition of the 'Arab Kingdom' in the correspondence and of what its 
boundaries may be. Several exclusions were made specifically by the 
British - parts of Syria, and the 'villayet of Bagdad and Basra' where 
"the Arabs will recognise that the established position and interest of 
Grcýat Britain necessitate special measures of administrative control... " 
(Yale: 1958: p. 252) . 
It is noteworthy that Palestine is not mentioned once, neither by 
Sharif Hussein nor by MacMahon. As much of the subsequent contention was 
on the basis of whether or not Palestine was included 
in the 'Arab Kingdom' , 
the peculiarity of this is that other 'exclusions' were explicitly made 
which were of the same order as could have been expected 
to apply to 
Palestine - for example, Beiruti Christians, over whom "France would perhaps 
wish to exercise control". A British Government committee set up 
in 1939 
- 25 - 
to exý-imine the question, later admitted that ". . the lanquage in which 
its /Palestine's7 exclusion was expressed was not so specific and 
unmistakable as it was thought to be at the time". (Cmd. /Command Paper7 
5479: 1939: p. 10) . 
Khader (Khader: 1976) suggests that the three main powers - France, 
Brit. ain and Russia - had interests in Palestine and that these interests 
were irreconcilable. He cites as an example an approach made by France 
to Russia in November 1914, suggesting that Palestine be included in 
'Greater Syria' under French protection. Russia, however, would not agree 
to a Roman Catholic "protectorate" over Russian Orthodox Christians in 
Jerusalem and the Galilee. 
As territories were conquered - and in some cases anticipating the 
victory - new treaties were made. In 1915, for example, the Constantinople 
Agreement provided for the incorporation of Constantinople in the Russian 
Empire, with the consent of France and Britain. In order to encourage 
Italian participation in the war, the Treaty of London signed by France, 
Britian, Russia and Italy made territorial concessions to Italy by giving 
the latter the rights to the Dodecanese Islands and Libya: "... in the 
event of a total partition of Turkey, in Asia, she (Italy) ought to 
obtain a just share of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the province 
of Adalia... " (Khader: 1976: p. 170). 
Despite the agreement made in the Hussein-MacMahon correspondence, 
Britian negotiated an accord with France at the beginning of 1916 which 
contradicted the basis of the agreement reached by Britain and Hussein. 
The accord was negotiated by Georges Picot, a nominee of the French 
Prime Minister, and a British 'expert', 
7 
Sykes, who was called in after 
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preliminary negotiations between Picot and Nicholson, the indersecretary 
of State at the British Foreign Office, failed to reach an agreement on 
what should happen to Syria. The agreement was intended to demarcate 
zones of influence for France and Britain assuming Allied victory in 
the war and the resulting dismantling of the Ottoman Empire. As for 
Arab aspirations, the accord stated: 
"By agreement between France and Britain, the zone 
between the French territories and the English will 
form a confederation of Arab states, or an indepen- 
dent Arab state in which the zones of influence will 
be determined at the time. " 
(Khader: 1976: p. 172) 
Palestine was to be put under: 
".... an international administration, of which the 
form will be decided upon after consultation with 
Russia and after subsequent agreement with the 
other allies and the representatives of the Sheriff 
of Mecca. " 
(HMSO No. IV: 1952: pp. 241-251). 
Neither Hussein nor the Italian Allies were informed of the Sykes-Picot 
agreement, and it was not until the Bolshevik revolution in Russian that 
the accord was made public. 
Settler_Colonialism 
So far, discussion has focussed largely on increasing European economic 
dominance within an evolving world system of economic and political relation- 
ships Such a power can be exercised in different forms, from the sponsoring 
of local "allies" to the enforcement of favourable trading conditions by 
pressure applied at the level of government. Whatever the form, all 
indicate the unequal relationship between the imperial powers of Europe 
and the territories they sought to conquer and dominate. 
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The nineteenth century saw what Emmanuel has called "the scramble 
for colonies", with 90% of the continent of Africa being colonised within 
a period of sixteen years (Emmanuel: 1972). In many cases this involved 
the implantation of a European population into the countries of Africa 
and Asia, and the establishment of "settler states". 
9/ 
// -- 
I There is an extensive literature devoted to the subject of colonialism 
and the theoretical and methodological issues raised in its analysis. As 
was suggested in the introduction, the concern in this work is to develop 
an approach which attempts to answer the problems inherent both in an 
ahistorical conceptual isation of colonialism which collapses specific 
features of colonial relationships in the construction of a general category, 
and a particularistic interpretation which does not take the wider context 
into account. The following discussion of colonialian as violence draws 
on illustrative material from a range of times and places without elevating 
this to an analysis of 'comparative case studies'. In other words there 
is no intention to provide an exhaustive review of what may be described 
as colonialism in particular areas or times, but rather to utilise examples 
in a discussion at a more general level which may then be drawn upon in a 
later examination of specific features of the Palestinian experience in 
the West Bank and Israel. 
British settlement in South Africa was characterised by "the decimation 
of a population by wars of conquest, followed by the domination and 
onslavement of those who survive. " (Magubane: 1979: p. 33). Following 
Dutch settlement of the area in the seventeeth century, the British 
Government annexed the Cape in 1795, after the Napoleonic Wars. In 1820, 
4000 settlers were brought to the eastern part of the region. It is 
important to look at this also in terms of tensions generated within 
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Europe. Marx suggests that, in addition to the 'displaced victims of 
capitalist consolidation' created by the Industrial Revolution: 
The wheel of improvement /was7 now seizing another 
class, the most stationary class in England. A 
startling emigration movement sprang up among the 
smaller English farmers ... who, with bad prospects for the coming harvest, and in want of sufficient 
capital to make improvements on their farms which 
would enable them to pay their old rents, have no 
alternative but to cross the sea in search of a 
new country and new lands. 
(Marx & Engels: 1962: pp. 387-88). 
In applying this to South, Africa, Magubane suggests that the background of 
the settlers and their relationship to the tensions within the "mother 
countryll are essential for understanding colonial practices, (see Section B 
of this chapter). He maintains that the treatment of 'natives' by 'settlers' 
represented the tranfer to Africa of traditional British practices and insti- 
tutions for dealing with the poor. The colonial structures are therefore 
an: 
-imitation of the English class structure and way 
of life .... Race intruded and gave the class structure 
in the colonies a special justification and cruelty, 
but it did not constitute the essence of that structure. 
(Magubane: 1979: P. 35). 
As an example of this he discusses the status of the villein, a hereditary 
form of bondage where limits were set on p rope rty-ho lding and the ability 
to make contracts; the villein could be bought and sold with the land on 
which he worked and was expected to show total obedience to the lord to 
whom he 'belonged'. This status existed in Scotland well into the eighteenth 
century. 
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The 'Kaffir Wars' in the 1800's and the Boer War between the earlier 
Dutch settlers and the British were over land first of all. With much 
loss of life for the African population, the British initiated a process 
of removing the Africans from their land and replacing them with white 
settlers, who then employed the Africans as cheap labour. This was a 
source of friction between Dutch and British as the abolition of slavery 
throughout the British Empire (including the Cape Colony) in 1833 repre- 
sented a threat to the Boer usage of slave labour. 
8 
The Boers' 'Great 
Trek' (1836-54) was an attempt to establish 'free and independent states' 
beyond the borders of the British colony. By 1910, the British Army had 
defeated African and Boer resistance and the British and Boer colonies 
were united in the Union of South Africa. This conquest is summed up as 
"the definitive consecration and consolidation of the whites as a ruling 
and hegemonic class" (Magubane: 1979: p. 52). 
The development of settler colonial institutions in Algeria was to 
a I-arge extent unhindered, as military control over Alqeria had been 
consolidated by the armies of France by the 1870's. Land appropriation 
removed the Algerian peasantry from the land and permitted the formation 
of large estates by the French colons who, as in the case of South Africa, 
then employed the previous cultivators as labour on the estates. Farsoun 
suggests that agriculture was reorganised according to the requirements of 
11modern, large-scale colonial capitalism .... in terms of the needs of 
France as its bourgeois rulers saw them. " (Farsoun: 1975: p. 3). most of 
the land, now owned by Europeans, was planted with cash-crops for export. 
Ov(, r Lh(ý next fifty years, mining works were set up by French corporations 
and transport net-works followed. The relationship 
between France and 
Algeria is described as follows: 
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French investment was largely in extractive 
industries, while most manufactures were 
imported from the metropole. The growth 
of big commerce and finance led to the 
blossoming of an over-large service sector, 
and the burgeoning of a public debt which 
served to make Algeria even more dependent 
on France. 
(Farsoun: p. 3) 
Coloniser and Colonised: a Conceputalisation of Violence 
While the establishment of a British colony in Southern Africa 
and a French colony in Algeria were both preceded by military campaigns, 
the complexity of the colonial relationship is more than a martial 
victory, and this is perhaps best illustrated by considering some aspects 
of what colonialism means for the colonised. Magubane suggests this 
as follows: 
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The conquest of the Africans was not a momentary 
act of violence which stunned their ancestors and 
then ended. The physical struggle against African 
societies was only the beginning of a process in 
which the initial act of conquest was buttressed 
and institutionalised by ideological activities. 
The supremacy of the whites, their values and 
civilization, was only won when the cultural and 
value system of the defeated African was reduced 
to nothing and when the Africans themselves loudly 
admitted the cultural hegemony of their conquerors. 
(Magubane: 1979: p. 55) 
This extends the meaning of colonialism from an initial physical 
subjugation of a people to the breaking down of the entire fabric of 
a social formation. Thus it is more than an act of physical violence: 
it is a violence which has diverse forms and which constitutes the 
relationship between a colonised people and a coloniser. This is 
perhaps best expressed by quoting Fawaz Turki, a Palestinian writer: 
To be without a homeland, to be denied access to 
one's homeland, is violence. To live in refugee 
camps, to be isolated from the mainstream of events, 
of spontaneous activities that govern other mortals' 
lives, is violence. To be occupied, to be dictated 
to by a military governor, is violence. To be given 
epithets and names, to be excluded and reviled, to be 
told that you do not 'exist' is violence. Above all, 
to be robbed of your sense of worth as a human being, 
to be expropriated of your national patrimony and 
national psyche as a people is a form of violence 
that is extreme in its nature. To be a victim as an 
individual and as a peopleý t(-: ) be all this at a time of 
quiescence is to create conditions eliciting a response. 
(Davis et al: 1975: p. 190) 
When violence is conceptualised in this way, the colonial relationship 
need not be reduced to the deliberate process of exploitation suggested 
when only the logic behind European expansion is thought 
to require 
analysis. For example, European Christian missionaries went 
to the 
colonies with the best of intentions and yet 
in many cases played an 
important part in the colonial. process. Perry Anderson explains this 
role as follows: 
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The conversion of the native population represents, 
ovon if only symbolically, its incorporation into 
Hie mental and cultural universe of the white .-- Christianity in colonial areas is a domestication 
of the indigenous population .... A colonial system 
needs a subject population with a certain minimal 
level of Europeanisation, for the purpose of order 
and exploitation. On the other hand, too great an 
assimilation of European culture and techniques would 
directly threaten the inequality on which religion 
offers almost the perfect device for securing the 
fruits of the first without incurring the dangers 
of the second. 
(Anderson: 1962: pp. 102-3). 
A member of the London Missionary Society, writing of missionary 
activity in the Cape Colony, described it in these terms "... the 
missionaries have been employed in locating the savages among whom they 
labour, teaching them industrious habits, creating a demand for British 
manufactures, and increasing their dependence on the colony. " (Philips: 
1828: Vol. 2, p. 227). Thus, within the context of the colonial relationship 
the practices, of missionari-:? s served to reinforce the domination of the 
native population by imposing not simply a religious ethos but a whole 
system of values and beliefs. As Fanon puts it: 
The Church in the colonies is the white people's 
Church, the foreigner's Church. She does not call 
the native to God's ways but to the ways of the 
white man, of the master, of the oppressor. And 
as we know, in this matter many are called but few 
are chosen. 
(Fanon: 1978: p. 32). 
In analysing the way in which missionary activity was situation within the 
colonial enterprise as a whole, Etherington suggests that: 
The clothing which missionaries recommended for the 
sake of modesty was for many of their converts an 
introduction to a new system of production and exchange. 
Whether a convert earned his new clothes by wage labour 
or fabricated them with European looms and needles, he 
was entering new kinds of economic relationships. 
(Etherington: 1978: p. 35). 
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What is being suggested, -then, is that the practice of missionaries in 
the colonial context can be seen as an example of the way in which the 
interests of the coloniser were served in different ways and at different 
levels, and that this need not be a deliberate manoevre. Similarly, the 
movement amongst French settlers in Algeria to stop Algerian Muslim 
women wearing the veil can be cited as an instance of the imposition of 
cultural norms. Gordon has suggested that the French administration had 
an interest in actively supporting groups such as the 'Feminine Solidarity 
Movement' 
10 
which was set up to establish contacts between French women 
and Algerian women in order that the former could advise the latter on 
matters of 'sanitation and education'. Other efforts to'liberate' 
Algerian women included attempts to increase education for women, weekly 
broadcasts on women's rigats, and various welfare and medical care schemes 
(Gordon: 1968) . 
However well-meaning these aims are in isolation, in the conteýkt of 
French colonialism in Algeria at that time they represent firstly, an 
aspect of the French administration's policy of encouraging 'assimilation' 
as a means of frustrating any anti-French feeling, and secondly, the 
negation of Algerian customs and beliefs regarding the position of women. 
The point is not whether it is desirable for women to be veiled 
but rather 
that the attempt to 'gallicize' Algerian women is an example of the way 
in 
which French culture was presented as being infinitely superior. 
Jean-Paul Sartre has observed that colonisation is much more than 
the conquest of a territory: 
It is by its very nature as act of cultural 
genocide. Colonisation cannot take place without 
systematically liquidating all the characteristics 
of the native society; and simultaneously refusing 
- 34 - 
to integrate the natives with the mother country 
and denying their access to its advantages. 
(Sartre: 1968: p. 38) . 
Implicit in the liquidation of 'native' society described by Sartre is 
the denial of the history of the colonised: it is presented as static 
and of little interest until the impetus provided by colonialism sparks 
off a reaction. This denial need not be conscious, but in itself 
constitutes a facet of the colonial heritage and mentality. For example, 
it can be argued that most academic writing on colonialism has treated 
the colonised as solely reactive, and this theme will be returned to later. 
Discussing the relation between 'settler' and 'native', Fanon observes 
that "... the settler is right when he speaks of knowing 'them' well for 
it is the settler who has brought the native into existence and who 
perpetuates his existence. " (Fanon: 1978: p. 28) 
When Fanon speaks of the settler bringing the native into existence, 
he is not however, implying that the native had no identity prior to his 
or her encounter with colonialism, but rather that the impetus of 
colonialism led to the establishment of a particular power relationship 
between coloniser and colonised. An instance of that power relation, an 
instance of violence, is the way in which the coloniser constructs an 
image of the colonised - the way in which the settler brings the native 
into existence. Fanon describes this image of the native as a 'quintessence 
of evil'. Native society is seen as not merely lacking in values but is 
actually the negation of values. It is a process of dehumanisation and 
as such operates at all levels, from the economic to the language used to 
describe the 'native'. Fanon's examples of the latter are drawn from his 
work in Algeria, where he talks of the zoological terms applied to the 
Algerian population, and the references to "those hysterical masses, those 
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faces bereft of all humanity ... that vegetative rhythm of life... " 
(Fanon: 1978: p. 33). The main point about the construction of the 'native' 
is the way in which the image is acceptable to the coloniser. Thus, for 
example, the kinds of attitudes portrayed in fiction written within the 
'mother country' give an indication of a general interpretation of the 
world and one which need not be consciously constructed. For example, 
in Joseph Conrad's. Heart of Darkness, the character of Marlow expresses 
his view of colonialism as follows: 
The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the 
taking it away from those who have a different 
complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, 
is nota pretty thing when you look into it too much. 
What redeems it is the idea only. An idea at the 
back of it; not a sentimental pretence but an idea; 
and an unselfish belief in the idea - something you 
can set up, and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice 
to... 
(Conrad: 1981: p. 10). 
In this sense, it is the entire back-up to the physical process of 
domination which is highlighted: that is, that Marlow's 'idea' is 
constantly explaining and legitimising the conquest. 
Edward Said has noted the way in which Arabs are represented in 
Israeli children's literature, and the way in which a 'character' comes 
to be attributed (Said: 1980: p. 191). At a more subtle level, this 
categOriation can be seen in contemporary fiction such as 
John le Carre's 
The Little Drummer Girl, where in spite of the author's painstaking 
research in the Middle East, his Palestinian characters are one-dimensional, 
ruthless terrorists, while his Israeli characters are much more appealing, 
rounded and believable. Similar examples can 
be drawn from other forms of 
information dissemination, such as media reporting. 
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The significance of this is the way in which assumptions and 
attitudes and beliefs are manifest at many different levels. This is not 
to propose an extreme form of conspiracy theory; simply to suggest that 
we can relate formal aspects of economic and political strategies to more 
diffuse representations of beliefs. To complete the circle, we can note 
the increasing prominence of 'Arabists' in Israel. Their role as Israeli 
Jews who are considered experts on the Arab way of life, culture, 
mentality and so on can be seen as the formalisation of what became 
generally held views about Israeli's Arab population. One Israeli Arabist 
is quoted as describing their position as follows: 
... we have attained a unique position in the State 
as experts, and no one dares to challenge our 
opinions or our actions. We are represented in 
every department of government, in the Histadrut 
and in the political parties; every department 
and office has its 'Arabists' who alone act for 
their minister among the Arabs. 
(Jiryis: 1976: p. 70). 
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B. ZIONISM AND THE MIDDLE EAST: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Colonial Europe and the Roots of Zionism 
The ways in which the colonial enterprise was perceived in Europe 
are interesting indicators of sources of conflict and tension within 
Europe as well as between Europe and its new colonies. It is within the 
context of late 19th Century European colonialism that we can locate 
the beginnings of Zionism as a political ideology and the strategies 
whereby it was translated from a theory and a vision into a set of 
instruments for holding and developing a colonial territory. 
In The Jewish Question, Abraham Leon provides an analysis of the 
way in which capitalist penetration of Eastern Europe established 
conditions which facilitated the development of distinctly Jewish politics. 
In order to provide a basis for considering the strands which make up 
Ziorij-fýt- t-how1hts, it is useful to briefly summarise Leon's argument. His 
. artinq point 
is that the impact of capitalist penetration in Eastern ,; t, 
EuroPe was the destruction of the old feudal forms, and that this had 
a specific effect on the Jewish population who were concentrated in 
occUPati-ons which "appeared as a visible materialisation of monetary 
economy in a society that rested essentially on use-values" 
226) . 
(Leon: 1970: 
This refers to traditional shtetl Jews, who had held a "middle -caste" 
role between the peasantry and the landed ruling class 
in administering 
mercantile interests and leasing trading and estate monopolies. 
As the 
feudal order decayed, the effects of capitalist penetration brought about 
an influx into the cities of enriched as well as proletarianized peasants. 
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However, the lack of opportunity for the placement of capital or labour 
precipitated economic crises and unemployment within the countries of 
Eastern Europe. The shtetl Jews were caught between the hostility of a 
petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry: hostility taking the form of 
pogroms, anti-semitism and discrimination, often inspired or at least 
tolerated by the ruling class. The isolation and impoverishment of the 
Jewish population of Eastern Europe led many to emigrate. 
Leon's argument is based on the notion that Jews constitute an 
identifiable grouping, and are historically a social group with a specific 
economic function. This leads him to define Jews as a particular class - 
a 'people-class'. The extent to which Jews could be seen as a distinct 
grouping within the societies in which they lived was the basis of the 
debate over assimilation, and amongst the Jews who remained in Eastern 
1--airope this was the issue which divided them. 
In the face of increasing anti-semitism, one response was to join 
emerging socialist and communist parties, in the belief that the solution 
to the 'Jewish problem' was indissolubly bound up with the victory of 
12 
socialism. A second response was to 3oin organisations such as the Bund. 
The Bund combined socialist principles with ideas of a non-territorial 
national-cultural autonomy for Jews as being the best means of combatting 
anti-semitism. A third response was to turn towards ideas of some form 
of Jewish 'regroupment'. The form varied. For example, Moses Hess 
(18-12-75) had argued for a 'spiritual regeneration' of the Jewish people 
linked to socialist principles of organisation for agriculture, industry 
and commerce. Leon Pinsker, the first Chairman of Hovevi Sion 
(Lovers of 
Zion) focussed on the need for a homeland for Jews. Auto-emancipation, his 
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1882 manifesto, 
13 
notes the increasing turning towards Palestine as a 
desired homeland following the rise in anti-semitism, but points out: 
We cannot dream about restoring ancient Judea. 
It would no longer be possible for us to begin 
anew there once our political life was brutally 
interrupted and destroyed. -The goal of our 
efforts must not be the Holy Land but a Land of 
Our Own.... which country will permit us to set 
ourselves up as a nation within the confines of 
its territory? 
The principle assumption on which Zionist thought is based is 
explained by Pinsker as the conviction that anti-semitism is both 
inevitable and eternal. Implicit in this is the suggestion that anti- 
semitism confirms the identity of Jews, whether this identity is 
spiritual, as suggested by Hess and Achad Ha'am, or Leon's 'people-class', 
or as a nation. This latter proposition was put forward by Theodor Herzl 
in The Jewish State, published in 1896. With the formation of the World 
Zionist Organisation the following year, the goal of Zionism was defined 
as the creation of a homeland in Palestine for the Jewish people to be 
guaranteed by public law. In order to attain this, the following propo- 
sitions were adopted: 
The promotion on suitable lines of the colonisation of 
Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers. 
2. The organisation and binding together of the whole of Jewry 
by means of appropriate institutions, local and international, 
in accordance with the laws of each country. 
The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment 
and consciousness. 
4. Preparatory steps towards obtaining Government consent where 
necessary to the attainment of the aims of Zionism. 
(Stein: 1932: p. 62) . 
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Given the global power structure outlined earlier, it is no surprise 
that in attempting to bring about such a political transformation, the 
Zionist leadership turned towards the imperial powers. Herzl tried to 
gain support from the German Kaiser, promising to protect German interests 
in the Middle East in return for assistance. In 1901, negotiations began 
with Sultan Abdul-Hamid of Turkey, to be followed by appeals to the Tsar 
of Russia, Pope Pius X, Victor Emmanuel III of Italy and Edward VII of 
Britain (Khader: 1976). Also in 1901 the Jewish National Fund was 
established to act as a focus for funds for Jewish colonisation (see 
Chapter Three). 
In October 1902, the British Government offered the Zionists the 
region of Al Arish in the Sinai peninsula but this was rejected, partly 
because of the difficulty of irrigation, partly because of the oppositon 
of Lord Cromer, then Viceroy of Egypt. In 1903, part of Kenya was 
suggested (the project was known as the "Uganda" project) . However, by 
this time the focus of the Zionist movement was on Palestine and despite 
coir-, ideration of the "U(jandan" offer, it too was rejected. 
In 1917, the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, issued what 
has become known as the 'Balfour Declaration' in the form of a letter to 
Lord Rothschild. The text of this letter is as follows: 
I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of His 
Majesty's Government the following declaration of sympathy with 
Jewish Zionist aspirations, which has been submitted to and 
approved by the Cabinet'ý 
'His Majesty's Government view with favour the 
establishment in Palestine of a National Home for 
the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours 
to facilitate the achievement of this object, it 
being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which 
may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing 
non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and 
political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. ' 
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I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration 
to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation. 
("Report of the Palestine (Peel) Commission": 1937: p. 22) 
The text was ambiguous enough to generate dispute over what was 
meant by, for example, "National Home' and in spite of clarifications 
issued by the British Governemt, 
14 
its importance and contentiousness 
were such that its date of issue is still marked by demonstrations and 
protests by remaining members of the 'non-Jewish Communities' in Palestine. 
15 
moreover, it should be noted that the Balfour Declaration was made by a 
European power about a non-European territory over which, at that time, 
it had no control, and as such provides an illustration of the way in 
which assumptions held by colonial powers became actual strategies and 
practices. The appeal for the assistance of the imperial powers represents 
a deliberate attempt by the early Zionist movement to identify itself with 
the general waýe of European territorial acquisition and occupation. The V 
very idea of overseas colonial settlement for Jews as a means of solving 
anti-semitism is indicative of this, and the way in which Zionist settlement 
was perceived within the European colonial framework was expressed by 
Herzl as follows: 
If His Majesty the Sultan were to give us Palestine, 
we could undertake to regulate Turkey's finances. 
For Europe, we would constitute a bulwark against 
Asia down there, we would be the advance post of 
civilisation against barbarism. As a neutral state, 
we would remain in constant touch with all of Europe, 
which would guarantee our existence. 
(Herzl: 1972: p. 95). 
Herzl's view of colonialism was that it "signified the spread of progress, 
of civilisation and of well-being". The "civilising" effect of colonialism 
brings us to the-most crucial aspect of the colonial enterprise and the 
one where we can locate the nature of the future Israeli state, and 
that 
is the attitude towards the people who already lived in the land to be 
colonised. 
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In 1895, Theodor Herzl wrote: 
We shall have to spirit the penniless population 
across the border by procuring employment for it 
in the transit countries, while denying it any 
employment in our own country. Both the process 
of expropriation and the removal of the poor must 
be carried out discreetly and circumspectly. 
(Herzl: 1960: Vol. 1, p. 88). 
Fifteen years previously, Earl Grey made a statement concerning Britain's 
role as a colonial power in Africa. On its treatment of the 'natives' 
he said: 
The coloured people are generally looked upon by the 
whites as an inferior race, whose interests ought to 
be systematically disregarded when they come into 
competition with their own, and should be governed 
mainly with a view to the advantage of the superior 
race. 
(Magubane: 1979: p. 71) . 
Two years after the Balfour Declaration, Arthur Balfour wrote a Cabinet 
Memorandum concerning the various treaties and agreements made amongst 
the Allies during the First World War. On the case of Palestine, he wrote: 
.... For in Palestine, we do not propose even to go 
through the form of consulting the wishes of the 
present inhabitants of the country... The four great 
powers are committed to Zionism and Zionism, be it 
right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long 
tradition, in present needs, in future hopes, of far 
profounder import than the desire and prejudices of 
the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land. 
(Sykes: 1973: p. 5. ) 
What these quotations indicate is the pervasive notion in 19th Century 
Europe of the superiority of Europeans and of their unquestionable right 
to take over what remained of the world and do with it what they pleased. 
It is within this context that early Zionist plans for a Jewish state took 
shape, and the plans were formulated within the ideology and language 
of European expansion. The reasoning behind British support 
for Zionist 
settlement in Palestin(- was summed up by Winston Churchill as 
follows: 
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The Balfour Declaration must, therefore, not be 
regarded as a promise given from sentimental 
motives; it was a practical measure taken in 
the interests of a common cause at a moment when 
that cause could afford to neglect no factor Of 
material or moral assistance. 
(Hadawi: 1968: p. 20). 
Lloyd George provides the detail, in stating that: 
There is no better proof of the value of the 
Balfour Declaration as a military move than the fact 
that Germany entered into negotiations with Turkey 
in the endeavour to provide an alternative scheme 
which would appeal to Zionists. 
(Hadawi: 1968: p. 20). 
The End of World War 1- Europe's Plans for the Middle East 
Earlier, an outline was given of the various treaties and agreements 
made between Britain, France and Russia in the course of the First World 
War, and of those made between the imperial powers and power blocs in 
the Middle East. At the end of the War, the Supreme Council of the Peace 
Conference decided that the Arab provinces were not to be restored to 
Turkish rule. The Hussein-MacMahon agreement was circumvented, despite 
Arab participation in the War, and the Treaty of Versailles (1919) and 
newly-established League of Nations provided a means of implementing the 
Sykes-Picot agreement. This was the Mandate system, whereby: 
.... certain communities 
formerly belonging to the 
Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development 
where their existence as nations can be provisionally 
recognized subject to the rendering of administrative 
advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time 
as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these 
communities must be a principal consideration in the 
selection of the Mandatory. 
(Article 22, Covenant of the League of Nations) 
Instead of the united independent state which had been promised to Sharif 
Hussein, Arab territory was divided between the "Protectorates" of 
Britain and France; Britain assuming control of what is now Iraq, Jordan, 
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Egypt and Palestine as well as much of the Peninsula, while France took 
Syi, ia and Lebanon. Italian participation was rewarded by allocating 
them Libya. The Arabdelegate to the Peace Conference, Hussein's son 
Faisal, submitted a statement reading: 
As representing my father, who, by request of Britain 
and France, led the Arab rebellion against the Turks, 
I have come to ask that the Arabic-speaking peoples 
of Asia... be recognised as independent sovereign 
peoples.. 
(Antonius: 1961: p. 286) 
Under pressure from the US, ' who had entered the War towards the 
end, an international commission was proposed to visit the area and 
"determine the wishes of the people. " However, the British, French and 
Italian delegates backed out and the remaining American delegates 
submitted the King-Crane Report which recommended an American mandate 
for the area with two provisions. Firstly, that the unity of Syria 
(Palestine, Syria and Lebanon) ought to be preserved in accordance with 
"the earnest petition of the great majority of the people of Syria". 
Secondly, they recommended "serious modification of the extreme Zionist 
programme. " However, the report was ignored and in 1920 France took a 
single Mandate for Syria and Lebanon and Britain took two Mandates; one 
for Iraq and one for Palestine. 
Arab reaction to the contravention of agreements made during the war 
was strong. In 1919, the Syrian National Congress claimed political inde- 
pendence for a 'united Syrian state' covering Palestine, Syria, Lebanon 
and Jordan. Faisal, Hashemite son of Hussein, was proclaimed King. 
A meeting in Iraq named Faisal's brother Abdullah king. The British 
Mandate for Palestine had included a section providing for the implementation 
of the Balfour Declaration. In 1920 a Palestine Arab Congress was set up 
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in Haifa, electing an Executive which issued a statement calling for an 
end to British support for Zionism, an end to Jewish immigration, and for 
the formation of a representative national government in Palestine. An 
indication of the level of opposition from Palestinian Arabs is that the 
British Government felt it necessary in 1921 to appoint a Commission of 
Enquiry into the "disturbances" in Palestine. This Haycroft Commission 
suggested that the cause of the "disturbances" was Palestinian anger at 
increasing Zionist immigration and at the goal of a "national home" for 
Jews in Palestine (People's Press: 1981: p. 37). 
The treatment of Arab objections and protests against Europe's plans 
for the Middle East clearly illustrates how the power relationship operated. 
While the wording of the Mandates may have implied that they had been con- 
ceived of as a means of aiding the transition from Ottoman occupation and 
administration to independence for the Arab territories, the way in which 
they were assumed made the intentions of Britain and France quite clear. 
France issued an ultimatum to the newly-appointed King Faisal of Syria and 
despite its being accepted and Faisal leaving the country, French troops 
marched on Damascus. It has been suggested that the original British plan 
was to establish a series of states under British influence with a member of 
the Hashemite family in each. Despite Britain's refusal to recognise the 
validity of the appointments of Faisal and Abdullah to the thrones of Syria 
and Iraq, their subsequent reorganisation was such that Faisal became King 
of Iraq while Abdullah was made Emir of 'Transjordan 116 suggest that this 
was in fact the British plan. 
In short, the outcome of the shifting balance of imperial power 
brought on by the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires 
after the First World War in conjunction with changes occurring within the 
Middle East itself, created new conditions. As Fred Halliday points out: 
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The number of forms that imperialism took, and the 
divisions between British and French rulers, compounded 
economic and political divisions rooted in the history 
of the region. As a result, separate state structures 
emerged, each with its own ruling class and each with 
a separate state apparatus, whose interests lay in 
preserving their separate identity. 
(Halliday: 1979: p. 20) 
It is important to make the point that divisions and differences were 
not simply the creation of imperialism, and it was not only imperial 
intervention which sustained divisions and has prevented 'Arab unity'. 
While such divisions were undoubtedly manipulated and intensified in 
the encounter with imperialism, it can be argued that they existed before 
imperial penetration of the area. 
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The reasons for stressing this 
point are firstly, it is important to understand why these states had 
"interests in preserving their separate identity"; secondly it is 
important to recognise that the area has its own past and that this 
history was not merely a creation of European dominance; and thirdly, 
given these two points, why the notion of Arab unity should have arisen. 
The Importance of Oil 
In order to draw out these points, we can briefly consider the 
significance of the discovery of oil in the Middle East and the attendant 
shift in spheres of power and influence. In 1933 Ibn Sa-ud sold an oil 
concession for the whole of eastern Saudi Arabia to Standard Oil in 
California (SOCAL) .A subsequent merger with 
three other American oil 
companies led to the formation of ARAMCO - the Arabian American Oil Company. 
Exploitation began in the eastern part of the region, and in 1938, the 
production of Saudi Arabian oil began. By this time Britain 
had already 
acquired a controlling interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company and had 
demanded agreements from the British Colonies on the Gulf that no exploi- 
tation rights would be granted to non-British companies without prior 
. 18 
British consent. 
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After the First World War, concessions were acquired from Iraq which 
amounted to a compromise by American, British and French oil companies, 
and which opened the way for cartel agreements on competition and pricing. 
Since this period, the world petroleum industry had been dominated by the 
same seven or eight companies controlling production, refining and 
marketing. Halliday points out that in exchange for paying for the initial 
concession and a nominal royalty per ton of oil produced, the oil companies 
could do virtually as they pleased: "They were untaxed; they had huge areas 
of concession at their disposal; they staffed their firms with foreign 
nationals; and they exerted political power in the producer countries" 
(Halliday: 1979: p. 405). 
The involvement of Western powers in the Middle East wa! s not 
restricted to isolated efforts on the part of individual companies. 
Tim Niblock notes that: "To achieve his security goals, with the consequent 
economic objectives, King Abd al-Aziz was drawn increasingly into contact 
with foreign interest. " (Niblock, (ed)- 1980: p. 29). Due to declining 
production during the Second World War, the Saudi regime required finance. 
SOCAL requested aid from the US government, suggesting that without it 
"this independent kingdom and perhaps with it the entire Arab world" would 
be thrown into chaos (O'Connor: 1962: p. 327). 
Finance was provided via a loan to the British Government, but by 
1943 the US was providing funds direct to Saudi Arabia. 'Military aid' 
was included, in the shape of training missions and the construction of an 
Air Force base near the oil wells. By 1947, Saudi Arabia had received an 
estimated $100 million in US aid. In 1950, ARAMCO finished construction 
of a pipeline from the oil wells in the eastern part of the peninsula to 
the Mediterranean, an enterprise initiated by the US Navy whose Sixth 
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Fleet operated there. In this period, ARAMCO payments to the Saudi regime 
increased from $44 million to $110 million. However, it was revealed that 
all money paid to the Saudi government was deducted from the company's 
19 
US taxes. 
In the case of Algeria, independence entailed the attempt to develop 
new forms of economic and political relationshps. However, the question of 
the relationship with the former coloniser was channelled into the Evian 
agreements which represent an attempt to maintain French aid and trade and 
in practice operated in the interests of France: 
The Evian agreements had assured France a privileged 
position in independent Algeria in return for a sizable 
amount of aid. The Algerian nationalists had been 
forced to guarantee respect of French interests in the 
Sahara oil fields and protection of all other French 
properties in the country: in addition, they had been 
obliged to accept the presence of French bases, in one 
case for as long as fifteen years after independence. 
For its part, the French government had pledged to 
maintain for three years an aid program equal to the 
one in effect at the time of independence and to provide 
Algeria with considerable technical assistance. 
(Ottoway: 1970: p. 150) 
The military link between the industrial powers and the oil-: producing 
countries can be seen to operate on two related levels. Firstly, the 
provision of weapons and military training. The oil-producing states' 
requirement for the maintenance of a military apparatus is an aspect of 
both the internal structure of these states and their geopolitical context 
in the Middle East, as was indicated by the controversy over the US sales 
of AWACS to Saudi Arabia in 1981. The benefits to the arms industries of 
the industrial countries should also be noted. The scale on which arms are 
sold to the countries of the Middle East amounts to support for local 
allies (see Chapter Two) . 
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Secondly, the direct military presence of Western powers in the area. 
In the first half of this century, British Forces were based along the 
coast of the peninsula, and indeed it was not until 1968 that the British 
Government announced a withdrawal from the Gulf by 1971. The past 20 years 
have seen a strengthening US presence in the area - for example, the agree- 
ment made with Bahrain to increase the US base there, the increasing 
number of US Naval visits to the Gulf and the situating of the Rapid 
Deployment Force. While this must be seen in the context of American 
foreign policy and the generation of a 'New Cold War' it is indicative of 
the way in which Gulf security has become synonymous with assuring Western 
access to Gulf oil. 
Access has not gone unchallenged. For example, in 1951 President 
Mosadeq nationalised Iran's oil supply and expropriated the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company. "The imperialist firms answered with an attempt to sabotage 
the Iranian economy" (Halliday: 1979: p. 401). Following the ousting of 
Mosadeq in 1953, the Shah of Iran came to an agreement with the oil 
companies which gave the Iranian government a share of the profits. In 
1971 Algeria nationalised 51% of the French oil companies' holdings and 
all natural gas concessions, gas and oil transport facilities (although 
compensation was offered), France responded by shutting down oil production, 
boycotting Algerian imports and preventing immigration. Such challenges are 
perhaps best described as the formation of new kinds of partnerships between 
oil companies, the governments of the industrial countries and the oil- 
producing states, and do not represent major shifts in the balance of 
power or of control. 
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The events of the early 1970's are generally presented as a major 
challenge by and victory for the oil-producing states of the Gulf. 
The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which had been 
founded in 1960, began to negotiate for participation in the running of 
the oil industry in their respective menber states. Fred Halliday has 
identified the main issues as being those of prices, ownership, supply, 
and the disposal of revenue. He suggests that while the changing nature 
of these questions coincided with the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 and 
subsequent Arab oil embargo, the war merely precipitated and accentuated 
processes which were inherent in the'developing relations between the 
advanced industrial countries and the oil producers (Halliday: 1979: p. 409). 
The rise in the price of oil and the agreements made as regards owner- 
ship after 1973 can be seen as substantial changes in the allocation of the 
surplus gained from selling oil and its derived products, and in heralding 
a new political role for producer states. The oil companies paid more and 
lost some control but gained security of supply. The impact of this change 
must be seen in the context of the region as a whole. The most immediate 
effect was the increased supply of money available in the Gulf. New types 
of consumption were created, most of which demanded imports from the West: 
luxury items, manufactured goods of all kinds and, as was mentioned 
previously, weapons. 
Within the region, non oil-producing states such as Egypt and Lebanon 
took over 'service' functions. While it can be argued that Lehanon had 
historically been a principal point for the economic penetration of the 
Arab countries, its role as such was magnified with the emergence of the 
Arab oil eaonomy, and the Lebanese services sector operated as a point 
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of contact between the oil-producing states and the international 
capitalist market. The financial collapse 
2o 
of the major Lebanese 
banks in 1966 resulted in increased activity on the part of the multi- 
national banks to buy further into the Lebanese banking sector. Thus, 
the number of Lebanese banks has dropped from 55 in 1966 to 25 in 1974, 
and their relative share of total banking activities decreased from around 
30% in 1966 to 15% in 1975 (Nasr: 1978: p. 4). Over half of the banks' 
resources are invested outwith the area, either by transferring capital 
to the central headquarters or by investing through the international 
financial markets. Credit distribution was allocated largely according 
to the interests of Western finance capital, with the commercial sector 
receiving over twice as many credits as all the productive sectors. It 
should be no surprise that Nasr points out that: "The Lebanese banking 
sector ... behaved, in general, like the foreign banks, 
financing almost 
exclusively the real estate and domestic trade sectors. " (Nasr: 1978: 
p. 4). 
The response of the Lebanese finance sector can be linked back to the 
previous discussion of the formation of new kinds of partnerships between 
oil companies and the oil-producing states, and the point can be emphasised 
that while new alliances can be discerned both within the Middle East and 
between the Middle East and the industrialised countries, this cannot be 
translated into the proposal that such alliances represent major shifts in 
the balance of power and control. 
The kind of historical explanation which has been constructed in this 
chapter has been an attempt to find a way of explaining the 
interplay between 
a changing global situation and the Middle East, and as such 
has raised 
theoretical and methodological problems about how an analysis of this sort 
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can proceed. The adoption of a general perspective on the trade relation- 
ship between Europe and the countries of Africa, Asia and the Americas 
allows the process of increasing inequalities to be traced, and the inter- 
leaving of particular instances of this process leads towards a suggestion 
of the relationship between economic, political and ideological elements 
which does not rely on the reduction of one to the other. In this way, 
the practices and beliefs of missionaries in European colonies can be 
analysed as an instance of the violence of the colonial relationship - 
as an instance which has its own particular logic. In other words, while 
the motivation and even the language of missionaries can be located within 
attitudes and strategies of European expansionism, the simplistic reduction 
which then accords missionary activity the part of colonial conspirator 
could not qrasp the way in which a reality was built up which could 
iricorporate ideas about Christianity, about Europe's position as regards 
the rest of the world, about charity and morality and duty, and which 
could be sustained in practice in newly-colonised areas. 
The use of this example highlights the complexity of the analysis 
which is required, and suggests that an examination of the relationship 
between coloniser and colonised must take into account conditions in the 
'home country' of the coloniser; the colonial relationship 
is a power 
relationship and the logic of the coloniser is therefore an 
intrinsic 
elem. ent. The application of this argument will be seen 
later in considering 
Israel's occupation of the West Bank, and by extension the economic and 
ideological basis of the State of Israel. 
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The discussion with which this Chapter began of trade as unequal 
exchange is as pertinent to-day as it was in the 18th and 19th centuries, 
and its relevance remains as an indicator of forms of domination. For 
example, according to Fr8bel et al., foreign investment originating in 
the Western industrialised countries has been steadily increasing, and an 
ever-increasing share is flowing into the developing countries. The 
world-wide increase in turnover and profits of private companies can be 
contrasted with the crisis being experienced within the industrialised 
countries of high unemployment, low domestic investment and decreasing 
state income (Fr8bel et al.: 1980). 
The investment in the developing countries has been, to a large 
extent, the relocation of certain types of production which can reap the 
benefits of an apparently inexhaustible supply of cheap labour and other 
economic inducements extended by the governments of developing countries. 
Alongside this is the importance of the developing countries as a market 
and this is inextricably entwined with the way in which 'development' is 
being carried out. For example, the growth in the supply of telecommunications 
equipment to the Middle East is almost double the growth rate of the North 
American telecommunications market (OECD: 1983). This indicates firstly, 
a possible saturation point in the industrialised countries; secondly, the 
kinds of industries which are being set up in the Middle East and the 
kinds of consumer 'demands' which are being created; and thirdly, the 
mechanisms of control underlying the transfer of technology, where the 
skill as well as the hardware remains in the hands of the west. 
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NOTES 
Bichara Khader, Histoire de la Palestine is published in French. 
All quotations are my translations. 
The change in production produced serious unintended consequences. 
For example, growing cotton requires irrigation which in Egypt was 
water drawn from the Nile. This slowed the flow of the river with 
a resulting increase in diseases such as Bilharzia, which ultimately 
affects the central nervous system and is carried by a bacteria in 
water snails. The Egyptian Government is still trying to bring this 
disease under control. 
3. The military treaty imposed on Egypt in 1840 after British defeat of 
the Egyptian army was contingent on Egyptian acceptance of the Anglo- 
Turkish Commercial Convention. 
4. During World War 1, the British Government paid the Saudis, in the 
east of the peninsula, a monthly subsidy in order to prevent them 
attacking the Hijaz under the control of Hussein. However, the 
SaudLs attacked after the war ended, and by 1925 had conquered the 
western part of the peninsula and forcod the Hashemites into exile. 
In 1926 Abdel Aziz Ibn Saud proclaimed himself King of the Hijaz, 
and in 1932 announced that the entire territory was to be called 
Saudi Arabia. 
5. For example, John & Hadawi, The Palestine Diary, Vol. 1, (1970); 
Levin, (ed) , The Zionist Movement in Palestine and World Politics, 
1880-1918, (1974); Main, Palestine at the Crossroads, (1937); 
Kimche, The Unromatics, (1968) . 
6. See Ingrams, Palestine Papers 1917-1922, (1972) , and Antonius, 
The Arab Awakening, (1961). 
7. Although Sykes had the authority to negotiate at this level, he had 
no formal status within the government and was not attached to the 
Foreign Office or Diplomatic Corps. 
8. Magubane argues that slavery, as practised by the Boers, would have 
inhibited the developing capitalist relations of production and large- 
scale capitalist exploitation of the land and people of southern Africa, 
and for this reason, slavery was not a necessary condition for the 
success of British colonialism (Magubane: 1979). 
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The process whereby property was expropriated in Algeria is interesting 
in the light of the discussion in Chapter Four of Israeli expropriation 
of Arab lands, and so can be described in greater detail here: 
1830 
1833 
1839 
1843 
1851 
1861 
1870's 
(Farsoun: 1975) 
. 
state lands taken over 
all lands not legally deeded 
the lands of 'several rebellious tribes' 
religious foundation land 
woodlands 
all uncultivated land not used as pasture 
clan and communal lands 
10. As an indication of the extent of French administration support, 
Gordon notes that leading exponents of the movement to 'liberate' 
Algerian women were the wives of high-ranking officers in the French 
army (Gordon: 1968: p. 56). 
See, for example, the discussion of American media coverage of the 
hostages held in the American Embassy in Iran, in Edward Said's 
Covering Islam, (1981). 
12. The 'Bund' was the "General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, 
Poland and Russia". Founded in 1897, it was destroyed during the 
Second World War. 
The quotes from Pinsker's " Au to- emancipation" are reproduced from 
Maxime Rodinson, Israel: A Colonial-Settler State, (1973: pp. 40-1). 
14. In 1922 the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston 
Churchill, issued the following statement: 
Unauthorised statements have been made to the effect 
that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish 
Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine 
is to become 'as Jewish as England is English'. His 
Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as 
impracticable and have no such aim in view .... the terms 
of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that 
Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish 
National Home, but that such a Home should be founded 
in Palestine. "(Cmd. 1700 "The White Paper of June 1922", 
known as The Churchill Memorandum. Cited by Hadawi: 
1968: p. 23). 
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15. In 1981, Balfour Day was commemorated in the West Bank by a general 
strike and demonstrations. After participants were arrested, the 
protest escalated and Bir Zeit University received its first three 
month closure order of that year. 
16. 'Transjordan' was the British Mandatory territory which became the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Its name is in itself an example of 
the colonial attitude. 
17. See, for example, Camille Mansour, Palestine and the Gulf: An 
Eastern Arab Perspective, Khalidi & Mansour, (eds): 1982. 
18. Kuwait acceded in 1913; Bahrain in 1914; the lower Gulf States and 
Oman in the 1920's (Halliday: 1979: p. 399). 
19. During Congressional hearings in 1974, a Former Assistant Secretary 
of State revealed that on orders from the National Security Council, 
the United States Tax Authorities allowed ARAMCO to make this 
deduction. Between 1950 and 1951, ARAMCO's US taxes fell from 
$30 million to $5 million. (Cited by Halliday: 1979: p. 51). 
2o. "Political divisions in the region contributed to the massive 
withdrawal of capital. An international monetary crisis, and a rise 
in the rate of interest in the West, exposed the low level of concen- 
tration of the Lebanese banking sector (33 of the 55 banks had 
deposits of less than LL 10 million), and the short term nature of the 
bulk of deposits. " (Nasr: 1978: p. Q. 
Chapter Two 
ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS 
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Chapter Two 
It has been argued that the construction of an explanation which 
encapsulates the interrelatedness of territorial expansion, the coloni- 
sation of the West Bank and wider regional and global restructuring 
involves the generation of analytical connections between the level of 
Palestinian specificity and the context within which Palestinian history 
is located. The discussion in the introduction of the Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon served as a schematic presentation of the themes which are 
raised in this analysis, and can now be elaborated in considering the 
international setting with which the Palestinian experience of Zionism can 
be juxtaposed. 
Chapter One provided a background at a general level of the way in 
which power relations between the advanced capitalist countries and the 
Middle East have developed, and the following discussion of the place of 
Israel in this historical process can be set against this. 
The starting point is the way in which a territory was carved out to 
become the State of Israel, and the meaning of this at an international, 
regional and local level provides the basis df understanding the nature 
of the Israeli state. Having put forward in Chapter One an interpretation 
of the history of the Middle East as a region, the intention now is to 
move to a more specific examination of how power relations operate, and 
the purpose of this Chapter is to locate Israel in the analysis outlined 
in Chapter One. This begins with the local level which underlies Israel's 
wider relationships, and that is the plight of the people who were 
displaced. 
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The Expropriation of Arab Property 
For the Arab population of Palestine, the conclusion of the 1948-49 
war left an estimated 120,000 within the borders of the new State of 
Isrea ,1 while those remaining in what was left of Palestine - the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip - were placed under Jordanian and Egyptian rule 
respectively. Around three-quarters of a million Palestinians were 
refugees, many of them in camps around the borders of the State of Israel. 
As will be argued in Chapter Three, the Zionist project during the Mandate 
years had been to build exclusively Jewish structures in Palestine, and 
in terms of Zionist ideology the necessity for the physical exclusion of 
the population of Palestine in order to establish a Zionist polity can be 
seen as the next logical step. Thus, in the framework of the development 
of Zionist thought and action about how their sovereignty was to be realised, 
we can trace the notion of exclusivity which can be linked back to the 
colonial roots of the movement discussed in Chapter One. 
However, if we look at how this. related to other concerns of the new 
Israeli state, then it can be noted that over 90% of the land within its 
1.941) Frontiers was owned by Arabs. Of this, the United Nations Concil- 
iation Commission for Palestine estimated that more than 80% of the territory 
governed by Israel in 1949-50 was land owned or otherwise 
held by external 
refugees (Abu-Lughod, ed.: 1971: p. 135). 
The economic importance of this property is 
illustrated in the 
following quotation: 
Abandoned property was one of the greatest 
constributions toward making Israel a viable 
state... of the 370 new Jewish settlements 
established between 1948 and the beginning 
of 1953,350 were on absentee property. In 
1954, more than one-third of Is rael's Jewish 
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population lived on absentee property and 
nearly one-third of the new immigrants 
(250,000 people) settled in urban areas 
abandoned by the Arabs. They left whole 
cities like Jaffa, Acre, Lydda... containing 
nearly a quarter of all the buildings in 
Israel. 10,000 shops, businesses and stores 
were left in Jewish hands ... Arab fruit sent 
abroad provided nearly 10% of the country's 
foreign currency earnings from exports in 
1951. In 1949, the olive produce from 
abandoned Arab groves was Israel's third 
largest export.... 
(Peretz: 1958: pp. 143 & 146). 
It can be suggested that the expropriation of Arab property on this scale 
was a crucial element both politically and economically: politically 
because it was an attempt to wipe out the remnants of the existence of 
the indigenous population and their 'right' to Palestine, and economically 
because it helped to ameliorate the financial difficulties faced by the 
Israeli state. 
An additional dimension is the regional reaction to the establishment 
of the State of Israel. One of the economic problems was the Arab boycott 
of Israel and Western firms trading with Israel. Perhaps the main impor- 
tance of the boycott was that it hindered the development of the role which 
had been projected for Israel, in the words of Chaim Weizmann as the "new 
Switzerland, supplying consumer goods to the untapped markets of the 
Middle East. " (Ryan: 1974: p. 5) . In this context, the economic signif 
icance 
of the Camp David Agreements between Israel and Egypt in 1978, and the trade 
agreements which formed part of the conditions fdr an Israeli-Lebanese 
ceasefire in Lebanon in 1983 can be seen in a new light, as both have 
involved large Israeli export contracts (see Chapter Five). 
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As Joe- Stork has pointed out, the conflict in 1948 directly linked 
the fortunes of Zionism and Western oil interests (Kayyali, ed.: 1979: 
p. 219). * As an indication of how the link operated, he refers to a 
Saudi Arabian blockage of an Arab League plan to cut off all oil production 
following the United Nations decision in 1947 to partition Palestine, and 
a promise made by the Saudis to the American Ambassador that if other Arab 
states broke relations with the US over Palestine, then Saudi Arabia would 
sever relations with those states. The limited nature of economic sanctions 
imposed by the Arab states must be related to the character of the regimes 
in question as well as to their potential economic power, and reference 
can be made to the relationship between oil-producing countries and the 
West outlined in Chapter One. In a similar vein, the treatment of 
Palestinian refugees by Arab 'host' countries 
3- 
for example, only in 
Jordan can they become citizens of the host country, and this can be 
seen simply as a different form of political expediencey - and the reaction 
of Arab states to continuing Israeli expansion in the area, must be 
placed in this context. 
This serves as a brief indication of the complexity of Israel's place 
in the Middle East, and of the conflicting nature of the connections between 
the Palestinians and the Arab countries as well as between Israel and the 
Arab world. It is suggested that a means of understanding these contra- 
dictions may be to examine in more detail the relationship between Israel 
and the western capitalist countries, and this begins by looking at the 
role of foreign capital in Israel's development. 
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Israel and Foreign Capital 
According to a former head of the Bank of Israel, in addition to the 
value of expropriated Arab property, foreign capital in Israel has been 
responsible for financing not only investment, but to a considerable extent, 
consumption (Horowitz: 1972: p. 1313). From the early days of its settle- 
ment programme in Palestine under the Mandate, the Zionist movement has 
been dependent on foreign capital, and its realisation of sovereignty 
strengthened that dependency: according to 1980 statistics, Israel has 
the highest foreign debt in the world (Glick: 1982: p. 108). As a result 
of the economic difficulties faced immediately after its inception, the 
new Israeli state quickly set up facilities to encourage foreign invest- 
ment. For example, in 1950 an Investment Centre was established and 
privileges such as taxation benefits provided (Rodinson: 1982: p. 56). In 
the mid-1970's, a 'Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investments' was 
introduced in the Knesset. This expanded financial incentives and was 
intended to provide similar tax benefits for American subsidiaries in 
Israel as are available in zero-tax countries (MERIP 49: 1976). 
Some foreign investment has been in partnership with Israeli capital, 
notably among Histadrut-owned enterprises (see Chapter Three) , 
but it has 
been estimated that investment by private companies accounted 
for only 
around one-eight of capital imports to Israel between 
1950 and 1967 
(Ryan: 1974: p. 5). It is the form which the remaining seven-eighths of 
capital imports take which provides some 
insight into the links between 
Israel, the Arab states and the industrialised capitalist countries. 
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A considerable proportion of the import surplus has been donations 
from non-Israeli Jews, and as early as 1928 over 60% of foreign donations 
were from Jews in the United States. The major collection agency, the 
United Israel Appeal, estimated that in the late 1970's its contribution 
to Israel was around $220 million per year, and that the raising of this 
sume was facilitated by the willingness of American banks to give prior 
loans should Israel's requirements exceed UIA funds (Glick: 1982: p. 109). 
As well as donations to the Appeal, over fifty charitable organisations 
collecting for specific purposes such as Israeli universities, museums 
and health services are registered in the United States, and contributions 
to these are tax-deductible. 
West German war reparations had a significant economic effect in the 
1950's, being in the form of: 
... goods and services, not foreign exchange, except 
for two yearly German payments of DM75 million due 
in pounds sterling so that Israel could pay for the 
oil delivered by the British company, Shell. 
(Balabkins: 1971: p. 144). 
It was equipment delievered as reparation which was used to establish, for 
example, the Negev phosphates industry and much of the chemical industry. 
The issuance of State of Israel bonds, begun in 1951, has proven to be 
a lucrative source of revenue - 80% of Bonds are sold in the US, and in 
1979 accounted for $394.5 million (Glick: 1982). Revenue from Bonds has 
been used for a variety of purposes, such as building oil pipelines from 
Eilat to Haifa and Ashkelon; establishing 'development towns' (see Chapter 
Four); and developing solar and atomic energy. Glick has noted the 
premarkable popularity' of State of Israel Bonds - only US Savings Bonds 
and issues of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company are held in 
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greater quantities - as the rate of interest is comparatively low. In 
spite of this, corporate buyers include the Coca-Cola Company, Allied 
Stores Corporation and the Michigan National Corporation. In addition, 
the participation of American trade unions in buying Israeli Bonds for 
pension, health and welfare funds is striking. 
The efficacy of the Zionist lobby in the United States is often cited 
as a reason for the strength of US support for Israel. Unquestionably 
this is a well-organised and influential pressure group. For example, 
following the 1975 United Nations Resolution equating Zionist and racism: 
4 
The American Jewish community and the Presidents' 
Conference were so enraged at Mexico's Zionism- 
equals-racism vote .... that individual Jews and 
those Jewish organisations which sponsor tours to 
Mexico through their travel departments stopped 
going there for their vacations and holidays. 
Mexico's tourist industry suffered terribly as a 
result. 
(Glick: 1982: p. 99) . 
However, the power of the Zionist lobby should not be over-estimated, and 
US Government aid to Israel cannot be explained as a result of their 
efficiency alone. 
A former chief of the United States Air Force Intelligence has been 
quoted as saying that Israel's contribution to the United States has been 
worth "$1,000 for every dollar's worth of aid we have granted her. " To 
givan an example, firstly, of the extent of aid given by the United States 
to Israel, between 1970 and 1978 almost 24% of US military aid went to 
Israel (Glick: 1982: p. 154) . Since 1973, US aid 
(in grants and loans) has 
totalled between $1 billion and $2.5 billion per year. In addition, $3 
billion of 'special aid' was made available to help finance the withdrawal 
from Sinai in 1982. Of this 'special aid', $800 million was in the form of 
an outright grant, and the remaining $2.2 billion as military credits 
(Economist Intelligence Unit: 1982). 
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The historical background to American interests in the Middle East 
was discussed in Chapter One and it is in this context that the apparently 
contradictory elements of contemporary US policy in the area can be 
reconciled. The simultaneous support given to Israel and states such as 
Saudi Arabia with which Israel is still 'at war' extends to supplying 
weapons to both, and as an illustration of how these apparently conflicting 
interests are resolved, reference can be made to the dispute within the 
US Government over the provision of a 'package' of jet fighters to Israel, 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia in 1978. 
The arguments put forward by President Carter in favour of the package 
deal are illuminating in the way in which they pose no conflict of interest 
in the supply of weapons. In surveying Congressional debates during this 
period, Bishara (Bishara: 1978) has outlined the main strands. Firstly, 
the notion that a strong Israel is necessary for the survival of 'moderate ' 
Arab regimes - an example of this being the Israeli threat to invade 
Jordan should Hussein's regime have been threatened during the 1970-71 
5 
war with the Palestinians. Secondly, the need for Arab regimes defined 
as 'moderate' to be supplied with weapons as a reward. This was seen as 
necessary for prestige as much as actual combat capability, in the light 
of the Camp David negotiations taking place at that time, and also to 
6 
bolster opposition to the 'radical' regimes in the area. Thirdly, it was 
argued that Arab countries had the means to purchase weapons, and that 
it 
was in both Israeli and American interests for the US to supply 
them as 
conditions could then be attached to the sale. And fourthly, arms supply 
to Israel should continue - "on the sensible principle that it is better 
t(_) Israel to defend itself that to have to intervene with US forces 
on Israel'!: 3 behalf in time of war" 
I 
(Harold Brown, US Defence Secretary, 
quoted by Bishara: 1978: P. 70). 
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The use of aid, in this case military aid, as a means of control is 
indicated in this outline and is clarified in a consideration of what it 
was decided to provide in this arms package deal. Thus, for example, 
while both Saudi Arabia and Israel were provided with F-151s, the Saudi 
version was not fitted with sophisticated electronic equipment such as 
advanced radar nor the special fuel system which extends the range of the 
F-15. Egypt was supplied with the F-5E, described as "a fighter plane to 
be used in a minor local conflict ... It couldn't hold its own at all in 
a large-scale sophisticated war of the Arab-Israeli type. " (Ashkar 
Jaafer: 1978). 
Around one-third of Israel's budget is spent on 'defence' and it has 
been suggested that this proportion is steadily increasing. While US aid 
to Israel is more or less earmarked for military purposes, Israel can 
spend the aid as desired and is not restricted to spending the money in 
the Urtited States alone. Thus, for example, the $3,500 million surplus 
between 1976 and 1980 has been used to finance settlements and their 
infrastructure on the West Bank ('8 Days': 21.6.80). 
As for the part played by the Ministry of Defence in the Israeli 
economy, its control of aid money and status as one of the largest employers 
makes it very influential. The Israel Aircraft Industry employs over 
20,000 people, and concerns such as the Tadiran electronics company come 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence. It can be noted that 
all forms of employment connected with defence are closed to Palestinians, 
whether or not they are Israeli passport-holders 
(see Chapter Five). 
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The distortion arising from the size of the defence sector is 
compounded by the type of products which Israel exports and the market to 
which they are sent. Two qualifications must immediately by made. 
Firstly, indicators point to the increasing importance of the export of 
weapons, but information on this is difficult to come by. 
7 
Secondly, an 
important factor which is seldom taken into account is that when talking 
of Isreali exports and imports, it must be remembered that since 1967 
Israel and the territories occup4ed then in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and 
Golan Heights have to a large extent constituted a 'common market' with a 
single customs barrier. Before discussing the significance of this (see 
Chapter Five), it may be useful to present a brief outline of Israel's 
foreign trade, in the light of the qualifications noted above. 
Around 70% of Israel's exports are shipped to North America and 
Europe, the main products being as follows: 
Table 2.1 
Main Exports (1981) 
Israel's Main Exports 
Polished diamonds 
Chemicals 
Textiles, clothing, leather 
Citrus fruit 
TOTAL (including others) 
Million 
1,397 
736 
395 
247 
5,640 
(Economist Intelligence Unit: 1983) 
As can be seen from this, the main exports require 
the importation of 
raw materials. For example, rough diamonds are 
imported from South Africa 
through the Central Selling Organisation in London. 
Since the diamond 
polishing industry was established in 
1949, the export of polished stones 
has provided from one-third to one-half of Israel's 
total exports (Kayyali, 
ed.: 1979: pp. 288-9). 
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In 1977 the tariffs on Israeli products entering the EEC were removed, 
following a period of progressive reduction. The duties on imports from 
the EEC to Israel are expected to be eliminated by the mid-1980's. However, 
as a RAND study observed: 
... in all cases, competition on the world market 
has been very fierce, partly with other developing 
countries... The most important factor in their 
/i. e. Israeli exports7 past growth was the fact 
that they were promoted by artificial means such as 
bilaterial trade agreements, very high effective 
exchange rates ... and protective market sharing 
agreements on the domestic market. With time, this 
protection was mitigated. 
(Bruno: 1970: p. 51) 
In short, in addition to funding on a huge scale in the form of 
donations from non-Israeli Jews, and US grants and loans for the purposes 
of 'defence', Israel has been afforded special status also in foreign 
trade. The latter has relied to a large extent on importing raw materials 
and exporting manufactured goods, but despite special status the trade 
deficit in 1980 had increased by 43% since 1979 ('8 Days': 21.6.80) and 
8 
the rate of inflation at the end of 1983 was 130.7%. 
Military and Technical Export 
The reason why this state of affairs has been maintained, in particular 
by the United States, must be seen in the context of power alliances and 
interests at both the regional and global levels. Earlier, several reasons 
were suggested for why a militarised State of Israel has been perceived 
as being in the interests of the West. To these can be added Israel's 
role as a supplier of arms. It has been noted that a comprehensive survey 
of arms export which attempted to quantify its share in the export 
trade 
is not possible. However, enough information is available to suggest some 
important aspects of Israeli arm trading. 
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Research by Ignacio Klich into Israeli weapons sales in Central 
America draws information from various military publications and reveals 
the following: 
Table 2.2 
MAJOR ISRAELI MILITARY SALES TO CENTRAL AMERICA 
(exclusive of small arms, artillery and military electronics) 
1973-81 
RECIPIENT AIRCRAFT BOATS ARMOURED 
CARRIERS 
El Salvador 
Gautamala 
18 Ouragan (1) 
6 Magister (1) 
5 Arava 
Helicopters (2) 
10 Arava 10 RBY-1 
Honduras 12 Super-Mystere (1) 
4 Arava Dvora-class(3)14 RBY-1 
I Westwind 
Nicaragua 14 Avara 4 Dabur-class 
? Helicopters (2) 
Panama 1 Westwind 
(1) Ex-IsraeliDefence Forces equipment 
(2) Numbers unknown 
(3) Unconfirmed 
(Middle East International: 23.12.82) 
1982 
NEW 
ORDERS 
Arava 
Kfir planes(2) 
RBY vehicles (2) 
In addition to the supply of military hardwake, it has been claimed 
that Israeli personnel have been active in Central America: in the case of 
Guatamala, questions were asked in the Knesset regarding the part played 
9 
by Israeli electronics experts in counter-insurgency operations. Klich's 
conclusion is that: 
... the disclosure last year 
(1981) by Israel's 
economic coordination minister, Yalacov Meridor, 
that Israel was ready to be Washington's surrogate 
wherever political considerations prevented the US 
from providing all the military assistance that was 
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needed, putsInto context the mounting 
evidence of the presence of Israeli 
military personnel in Central America. 
(Middle East International: 23.12.82). 
An Israeli newspaper exhorted its readers to: 
... spare a thought for the nature of the Israeli 
role in Guatamala: once again, we are the sub- 
contractors for US foreign policy, employed as 
long as the Reagan Administration is being prevented 
by Congress from extending direct military aid to 
Guatamala... I am not claiming that there is some 
signed treaty between Israel and the United States, 
or that the Reagan Administration invited tenders 
from potential sub-contractors and Israel won the 
job. In practical terms, however, that is exactly 
what happened. 
(Yediot Aharonot: 1.6.83) 
The charge that Israel acts as the West's 'policemen'- in the Middle 
East is not new, and in one sense arms dealing of this kind is merely a 
geographical extension of this role. The same newspaper report which 
questions Israel's involvement in Guatamala also cites other cases of 
weapons being supplied by Israel to regimes with which the United States 
finds it too diplomatically sensitive to deal. For example, it is claimed 
that the Reagan administration's unwillingness to create any tensions with 
China led to their proposing that Israel should supply M-48 tanks to Taiwan 
(Yediot Aharonot: 1.6.83). Similarly, the United States Congress rejected 
the Reagan Administration's request for military aid to be allocated to 
Zaire, the reasons given being that country's systematic violation of 
human rights. A few days later, diplomatic relations were established 
between Israel and Zaire, and it has been reported that not only are 
arms being supplied to Zaire but that weapons have been shipped to other 
African countries via Zaire. For example, 'Davar' quotes the American weekly 
'Defence and Foreign Affairs' as claiming that Israel sold weapons captured 
during the Lebanese war to the forces of the President of Chad. 
10 
The 
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report states that this will not result in the opening of formal 
relations between Israel and Chad, since the latter depends on aid from 
Saudi Arabia and Libya ('Davar': 9.5.83). 
As evidence of US approval for Israel supplying aid where the United 
States itself had decided against this policy, Klich cites the case of 
the arms deal with Honduras which included Kfir planes, armoured vehicles, 
missiles and personnel training. The Kfir fighter has American-made 
components, which means that the US could veto the sale. In addition, 
Honduras' reliance on US aid for survival means that the Israeli weapons 
would be purchased with US aid money (Middle East International: 23.12.82) . 
It must be pointed out, however, that Israeli involvement in arms 
dealing is not some philanthropic act on behalf of the United States, and 
that while there does seem to be evidence of Israell. supplying aid in 
countries which may embarrass the US, Israel does gain in certain ways. 
For instance, Israelis are said to be building an electronic surveillance 
sy. stem for Costa Rica on its border with Nicaragua, and Israeli experts 
to be assisting Costa Rica's civil guard in setting up a counter-insurgency 
unit ('Al-Ha'mishmar': 29.5.83). Klich notes that American military aid 
to a country which disbanded its armed forced in 1948 is problematic, and 
that US law bans direct aid to polic. e forces (Middle East International: 
23.12.82) . Israel has no such restrictions, and 
in addition to the economic 
importance of exporting weapons the President of Costa Rica announced on 
entering office that Costa Rica's embassy would be moved back, to Jerusalem 
11 
from Tel Aviv. Following this announcement, the American. Jewish community 
donated $500,000 to Costa Rica for the construction of a new railway line 
('Al-Ha'mishmar': 29.5-83). 
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Diplomatic recognition has frequently been extended to Israel by the 
beneficiaries of its technological or economic aid. Until 1953, only 
Turkey amongst the Asian countries had established diplomatic relations 
with Israel. In 1953 Burma exchanged diplomatic representation and shortly 
afterwards Israel sent teams of medical personnel, engineers and technicians 
to Burma. Joint enterprises were established, such as a public construction 
company formed in partnership with the Israeli Solel Boneh, 
12 
and agree- 
ments were made for Israel to market Burmese products in Asia and Africa 
(Safran: 1963: p. 265). 
The package of aid and diplomatic representation has also taken place 
in Africa. The extent of this has been described as follows: 
... the arrival of Israeli diplomatic missions and 
technicians became almost an integral part of the 
independence ceremonies marking the birth of each 
new Africah State. According to the Israeli Foreign 
Office, over 900 Israeli experts in a score of fields 
were engaged in technical assistance projects through- 
out Africa by the middle of 1962... one thousand 
Africans were at that time undergoing training in 
Israel... three thousand had already completed courses 
of varying duration and returned to their respective 
countries. Altogether, Israel was said to be 
lending assistance of one sort or another to sixty- 
five countries in Africa, Asia, and Central and 
South America. 
(Safran: 1963: p. 266). 
Given Israel's huge foreign debt noted earlier, it must be asked why 
such an extensive aid programme is being carried out. Without denying 
the importance of diplomatic recognition, reference can be made to the 
critical questioning in Chapter One of the nature of aid supplied 
from 
advanced industrial countries to underdeveloped countries. 
In the case 
of Israel, its technical and military aid to other countries 
is a major 
export. The sale of weapons to countries benefitting from Israeli aid 
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has already been discussed and other sectors of the Israeli economy reap 
the rewards of finding a market created amongst the countries of South 
and Central America, Africa and Asia. For example, while the export of 
military electronic and metal products fell by 26.3% in the first four 
months of 1983.13 the export of civilian metal goods and electronic 
equipment rose by 15% in the same period ('Havaretz': 10.5.83). As these 
figures were derived from Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics reports, 
they exclude exports to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and both the economic 
crisis and level of technological development of Israel's major markets in 
North America and Europe suggest it would be unlikely for them to import 
technology from Israel. 
14 
This leaves the only possible market to be 
found amongý; t the recipients of the aid programme. This is borne out by 
the statistics of Israeli export to the. South American sub-continent. 
Excluding military hardware, the volume of which has already been noted, 
Israeli exports have been rising steadily from $23,685,000 in 1973, to 
$48,656,000 in 1974 and $51,139,000 in 1975 (Sharif: 1977: p. 100) . 
In order to draw togq-ther the themes under consideration, relevant 
aspects of the relationship between Israel and the countries of 
Central 
and south America can be briefly summarised. The 
increasing volume of 
Israeli weapons sold in this area has been noted, as 
has the increase in 
the level of non-military exports. At the diplomatic 
level, the United 
Nations Resolution which admitted Israel to membership was passed with 
37 
nations in favour, 12 against and 
9 abstentions and of these, 18 South 
American states voted in favour, none voted against and 
2 abstained. Sharif 
suggests that this reflected both the cohesion of 
the Organisation of 
American States (and the preponderant influence of 
the US in it) and Israel's 
15 
own efforts in South America 
(Sharif: 1977: p. 99). Changing circumstances 
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within the countries of Africa and Asia, as well as within Israel, led to 
many severing ties with Israel during the 1960's and 1970's and former aid 
to Africa was redirected to South America, to the extent that the latter was 
the major recipient of Israeli aid by 1974 (Sharif: 1977). 
Thus,, an analysis of the complexiti6s of the relationship between Israel 
and the countries of the 'Third World' involves a consideration of these 
countries as a market for Israeli produce, both military and non-military, 
which at a general level is comparable with other 'trading links' between 
advanced industrialised countries and developing countries, and at a 
specific level can be seen in terms of the particular nature of Israel. 
It involves the consideration of the influence of the capitalist powers in 
the 'Third World' and the extent to which Israeli interests can be seen as 
part of this. It involves looking at the question of aid to developing 
countries, and the way in which aid can be a form of domination. And it 
involves the way in which all those considerations percolate through to 
support in international forums such as the United Nations and the 
Organisation of American States, to diplomatic recognition, and to the 
decision to defy the United Nations and locate an Embassy in Jerusalem 
rather than Tel Aviv. 
Israel and the EEC 
It has been suggested that European countries have to some extent 
distanced themselves from American policy on the Middle East, and that 
consequently the links between Europe and Israel and 
Europe and the Arab 
countries need to be examined separately. Tatu, 
for example, notes the 
changing perceptions in Western Europe regarding 
the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and suggests that this culminated 
in the EEC's 1980 Venice Summit 
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Declaration on the Middle East (Khalidi & Mansour, eds. : 1982) . Issued 
two years after the Camp David Agreement, the Venice Declaration called 
for the 'recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people' 
and stated that the PLO would have to be involved in peace negotiations. 
This was read as a challenge to the Camp David accords, and as an indi- 
cation of a distinct European initiative on the Middle East. 
The French Foreign Minister, M. Cheysson, has for instance been quoted 
as saying that any future Palestinian state would "necessarily be in the 
occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip" and that he knew of no Palestinians 
who could take part in peace negotiations with the Israelis other than 
the PLO - "the fighting force of the Palestinian people" ('The Guardian': 
24.2.82). The Greek Government has accorded the PLO representative in 
Athens ambassadorial status, and it was reported that immediately after 
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Greek, French and British 
delegations in the EEC favoured strong economic sanctions against Israel. 
While this was not generally approved, the EEC did decide against proceeding 
with the signing of a five-year E22 million financial aid programme for 
Israel ('The Guardian": 14.6.82). 
The historical background to European interests in the Middle East 
discussed in Chapter One and the continuity between the colonial past 
of the region and the current power structures within and between the 
Arab countries provide the basis for an understanding of relations 
between 
Europe and the Middle East. Tatu describes this as "a duality of position - 
close to the Arab position as far as Israel is concerned, close 
to the 
US in regard to the Gulf issues" (Khalidi & Mansour, eds. : 1982: p. 117) . 
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In order to explore this apparent duality, we can look firstly at the 
growing importance of the Arab world in relation to the world economy, 
and pick up some of the points raised in Chapter One. 
According to Papayannakis, in the years between 1970 and 1979, Arab 
countries (with the exception of Lebanon, South Yemen and Sudan) have 
experienced a growth in their imports which has greatly exceeded the 
world average (Khalidi & Manour, eds.: 1982). A general characteristic 
of these imports has been the increasing importance of capital goods, and 
this sort of reorientation opens up possibilities for the countries which 
export these goods - for the most part, the developed capitalist countries. 
Thus, this constitutes an important element of the economies of the capitalist 
countries: it is represented in their employment, trade and overall 
production. In other words, exporting to the Arab world has become a vital 
factors in the attempt to sustain the production of exportable goods; this 
being a decisive part of the struggle taking place in the current world 
crisis. From the data collected by Papayannakis, the member countries of 
the EE. C h1we achieved a general expansion in the area in the period 1970- 
1979, as has Japan, while the relative importance of the United States 
has remained static. 
In sum, at this analytical level, the links can be perceived between 
the economies of the advanced capitalist countries and the oil-producing 
states in the Gulf: links which are seen in terms of the need 
for oil - 
which in itself is a demand created by the nature of advanced capitalism - 
and the desire to enter the Arab market. Against this can 
be set the 
differences within the capitalist countries, and for the purposes of this 
discussion this has focussed on differing attitudes towards Israel, for 
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while the EEC has provided favourable trade terms and financial packages 
for Israel, it has censured actions carried out by Israel in a way in 
which the United States has not. 
Israel's place in this scenario is as an advanced capitalist country, 
which has the highest foreign debt in the world, inflation running at 
over 140% by July 1983 and living on a United States subsidy; while 
Brazil, with half the population living below the poverty line and an 
inflation rate of 120% has its loan called in by the International Monetary 
Fund and causes reverberations through the international banks on 
threatening to de. clare a moratorium on repaying the interest on its loans 
('The Guardian': 22.7.83). Such issues which are apparently paradoxical 
when considered at one level of analysis may be resolved at another, 
suggesting that different levels of analysis encounter different forms 
of conflict and contradiction. 
The consideration of expropriation of Arab lands and property with 
which this Chapter began will be elaborated later in the thesis: the concern 
at this point has been to outline some of the apparent contradictions in 
Israel's external relationships, and the suggestion is that these are 
underpinned by the internal colonial relationship. For example, sense 
can be made of Israel's provision of military and technical aid to countries 
in Africa, Asia and South America coterminously with the large foreign debt 
and domestic economic problems at the general level of Israel's role as 
an advanced capitalist country and the place which capital interests have 
in the 'Third World'. The role of foreign capital in Israel's development 
and the continuing support of the United States, can also be seen in this 
light - 
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However, it can be argued that this explanation in itself cannot 
provide a comprehensive understanding, and that the situation is too 
complex to be explained solely in terms of global economic imperatives. 
In this sense, more attention must be paid to the particular nature of 
the State of Israel and to the way in which that level of analysis can 
be linked up with the level of regional and international relations, and 
Chapter Three will go on to consider how Palestine was colonised. 
In 1981, Moshe Dayan, who had been Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
the Likud Government until a few months previously, expressed some of 
the contradictions in Israel's regional and global position as follows: 
Israel - government and opposition - has seized 
every opportunity to announce that it sees in the 
US a faithful ally, and that it will be ready, at 
any time, to put its facilities at the disposal 
of the US, if and when the latter requests that... 
Israel wants very much to gain a slice of American 
military products, as well as perform the required 
management, maintenance, and repair work-However, 
the emphasis, the headlines, and some plans of the 
strategic cooperation glide far beyond this. Joint 
ground, air and sea exercises are definitely intended 
to secure joint military action. Where would such 
action take place? In defence of Israel or of 
Saudi Arabia? Are we a party to an alliance with 
the Americans to defend the Persian Gulf? ... where 
is the alliance? 
(Yediot Aharonot: 18.9.81) 
In this article on 'strategic cooperation', Dayan summed up 
his concern 
by asking "The mighty, serious and central question 
in the whole matter, 
which is - what is Israel? " 
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NOTES 
As estimates obviously vary, those used here are from the 1980 
Palestinian Statistical Abstract, produced by the Central Bureau 
of Statistics of the Palestine National Fund. 
2. The Jewish population of Israel more than doubled between 1948 and 
1952, and the cost of bringing new immigrants to Israel, receiving 
them and housing them has been estimated at $2,250 per head 
(Rodinson: 1982: pp. 39-41). 
3. See, for example, Helen Lackner, A House Built on Sand -a Political 
Economy of Saudi Arabia, (1978). Also, Walid Elias Moubarak, Kuwait's 
Quest for Security: 1961-1973, (1979). 
4. November 10,1975, the General Assembly of the United Nations determined 
that 'Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination'. The 
'Presidents' Conference' referred to in the quotation is the Conference 
of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organisations, which acts as an 
umbrella organisation in the USA. They had sent letters requesting UN 
delegations to vote against this resoltuion. 
5. It can be noted that the current situation is very different, and 
according to sectors of the Likud coalition, Jordan in fact constitutes 
the 'Palestinian State' - all that is required is the replacement of 
King Hussein ('The Guardian': 8.4.83). 
For example, Syrian and Libyan opposition to the Camp David process. 
7. The difficulty is in guaging what proportion of Israel's exports can 
be classed as military, for while instances of arms sales can be found 
there is obviously no itemised list. one instance is arms exportation 
to South Africa, revealed in United Nations Resolution 31/6E of 
9.11.76, condemning the sale of warships and other war materials. 
According to newspaper reports, this refers to the sale of Gabriel 
sea-to-sea missiles to South Africa in 1974 
('The Daily Telegraph': 
8.9.74) and sales of Reshef missile boats and the Israel Aircraft 
Industry's Kfir fighter ('The Middle East': June 1976). Other examples 
are discussed in the context of Israel's relationship with 
the 'Third 
World'. 
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8. According to the 'Quarterly Economic Review of Israel', No. 1,1983 
(Economist Intelligence Unit: 1983). 
9. The claim was made by Civil Rights Movement Knesset member Shulamit 
Aloni (allied to Labour in the Alignment coalition), who also asked how many Israeli military advisers were in Guatemala. Although the 
President of Guatamala had told an ABC television reporter that the 
coup which brought him to power was successful due to many of his 
soldiers having been trained by Israelis, Aloni's enquiry was dismissed 
(Middle East International: 23.12.82). 
10. The "New Statesman" quotes the director-general of Israel's Foreign 
Ministry as proposing that Israel should "sell back to the United 
States its obsolete and surplus equipment for possible third country 
transfer". This concerns America financing the Central American 
purchasing of weapons captured in Lebanon - as the report says: 
" ... this type of US financing is a back-door 
way of increasing US aid to Central America. 
It can substitute for direct US aid if 
congressional opposition succeeds in reducing 
or cutting it off altogether. " 
("New Statesman": 4.8.83). 
Israel's annexation of Jersualem has not been recognised by the 
United Nations nor by most of the countries with which it has 
diplomatic relations, so that in spite of Israeli declarations that 
Jerusalem is the capital city, the embassies remain in Tel Aviv 
(see Chapter Four) . 
12. Solel Boneh is the Histadrut-owned construction company (see Chapter 
Three) . 
13. Israeli military exports decreased immediately after the 1982 
invat. ion of Lebanon, and have continued to decline. it is not clear 
whether this is due to an international reluctance to purchase 
Israeli weapons, or to an increase in domestic demand. 
14. Israel's new science-based industries are being sited in the West Bank, 
and the Minister of Science and Development has reportedly revealed 
plans to create an Israeli 'Silicon Valley' there. He announced 
financial incentives for the establishment of technologically advanced 
research and development projects, and plans to create a 'science city' 
near the settlement of Ariel ('Davar': 7.12.82). 
15. It has been suggested that Israel has a demographic interest in South 
America, as the Jewish communities there provide a relatively untapped 
source of immigration, and one which is 'Western-oriented' and easily 
absorbed, therefore economically attractive (Sharif: 1977). 
Chapter Three 
THE COLONISATION OF PALESTINE 
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Chapter Three 
The complexity indicated in the examination of how Israel fits into 
the changing pattern of global and regional conflicts and contradictions 
suggests that Israel's position cannot be simplified to that of an actor 
mechanically operating in the interests of the West. In order to answer 
the question raised at the end of Chapter Two regarding the nature of 
Israel, it is necessary to move from the broad perspective which has 
been used to provide a historical backdrop, to a narrower focus on how 
the Zionist aspiration came to be fulfilled in a sovereign state. 
In Chapter One, the roots of Zionism as a political philosophy were 
identified within nineteenth century Europe, in the context of the 
historical relationship between the European imperial powers and the 
countries of Africa, Asia and the Americas which they sought to dominate. 
It would be misleading to present the range of ideas and beliefs defined 
as 'Zionist' as unchanging encompassing as they do a multiplicity of 
interpretations, interests and assumptions which developed in particular 
ways at particular historical conjunctures. The concern of this chapter 
is to examine the way in which the visionary theory which was nineteenth 
century Zionism was translated into what Said has called "a matrix of 
organisations ... a set of 
instruments for holding and developing a Jewish 
colonial territory ... " 
(Said: 1980: p. 97). In order to elucidate the 
processes of the colonisation of Palestine, an instance will be highlighted 
of the relation between interpretations generated within one strand of 
Zionist thought, that of 'labour-zionism' and the operation of Zionist 
practices in Palestine. 
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The Organisation of the Zionist Movement 
The aims set out by the First Zionist Congress, described in Chapter 
One, served as a general outline which the movement would follow. The 
Second Zionist Congress in August 1898 began to detail the form in which 
the aims would be PUrsued by setting up interconnecting organisations 
which would implement the drive for Jewish emigration to Palestine. 
The first organisation set up by the Second Zionist Congress was the 
Jewish Colonial Trust Ltd., with a subsidiary, the Anglo-Palestine 
Company, being set up in Jaffa in 1903. Out of the Colonial Trust came 
the Jewish National Fund (Keren Keymeth), founded in 1901 with the 
objective of acquiring land in Palestine. The first land purchases were 
made in 1905. As an agency of the World Zionist Organisation, the JNF 
was responsible for buying, developing (through the offices of the 
Palestinian Land Development Company) and leasing land in Palestine. In 
1920 the Palestine Foundation Fund (Keren Hayesod) was created to organise 
Jewish immigration and colonisation. 
Thus, by the time Britain assumed the Mandate for Palestine in 1922, 
the Zionist movement had established institutions which were engaged in 
acquiring land and promoting Jewish immigration. The importance of this 
lies in the status of land purchased by the Jewish National Fund. It is 
stipulated in the JNF constitution that: 
... land 
is to be acquired as Jewish property and ... 
the title to the lands acquired is to be taken in the 
name of the Jewish National Fund, to the end that the 
same shall be held as the inalienable property of the 
Jewish people. 
(Hadawi: 1968: p. 28) 
One of the conditions on which land was leased to settlers stated: 
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Agency shall promote agricultural Colonisation 
based on Jewish labour, and in all works or undertakings 
carried out or furthered by the Agency, it shall be 
deemed to be a matter of principle that Jewish labour 
shall be employed ..... 
(Article 3, Section (e) of the Jewish National Fund 
Constitution, quoted by Hadawi: 1968: p. 28) 
What this meant was that non-Jews were totally excluded from land purchased 
by the Jewish National Fund. The way in which this organisation formulated 
its land-holding was that it secured land 'for the Jewish people in 
perpetuity'. Once a lease contract had been signed, the settler had 
undertaken not to hire or employ non -Jewish labour, under the penalty 
of a fine and fore-closure. The lease could not be passed in any way to 
a non-Jew, and if the heir to a lease-holder was not Jewish then the 
Jewish National Fund reserved the right to repossess the land and cancel 
the lease. 
As early as 1930, J. H. Simpson observed that the land acquired by 
the JNF was ". .. extra-terri toriali zed. It ceases to be land from which 
the Arab can gain any advantage either now or at any time in the future. " 
(Said: 1980: p. 98). This extra-territorial aspect is a cornerstone of the 
ideological underpinnings of the State of Israel, a peculiarity of which 
is that it defines itself not as the state of its citizens, but as the 
state of a people most of whom live outwith its area.. It is behind the 
idea of a national home to which all Jews have the right to belong, 
1 
institutionalised, for example, in the Law of Return. Thus, the territory 
which was designated as a national home for the Jewish people was to 
have 
as its constituents Jews all over the world. The complementary aspect 
within the territory itself was the need for the creation of exclusively 
Jewish structures and institutions, and the nature of the Jewish National 
Fund is one example of how this was to be implemented. 
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The desire for Jewish exclusivity in Palestine is consistent with the 
assumptions which underlie Zionist thought, and it can be suggested that 
the various means whereby this exclusiveness could be secured, and the 
accompanying rationales, reflect the differing tendencies within the 
Zionist movement. In discussing difficulties faced by 'labour-Zionists' 
on their emigration to Palestine, Flapan maintains that: 
It was against this background /of the demoralization 
arising from the exploitation of cheap native labour7 
... that new concepts of colonization took shape: tiýe 
conceptofthe Jewish economy as a closed circuit, in 
which Jews would fulfil all the functions and would 
become independent of Arab labour and food supplies 
(Flapan: 1979: p. 200). 
This 'new concept of colonisation' is linked to what Theodor Shanin has 
called the aim of 'productivisation', which was initiated mainly by the 
left-wing of the Zionist movement 
2 
according to their analysis of the 
Jewish population in Europe, and their programme of how emigration should 
proceed (Davis et al., eds: 1975: p. 25). 
The starting-point was the conception of the social structure of 
Jews in nineteenth century Europe as being over-weighted in particular 
strata such as merchants and intellectuals, and under-weighted in the 
number of 'productive' workers. Thus, the imaginary transfer of European 
Jews to a 'national home' in which they retained their previous class 
position in Europe would mean a form of society which was described as an 
inverted pyramid, with a disproportionate number at the top. In order to 
overcome this and create a 'normal' society, it would be essential for 
emigrating Jews to engage in some sort of productive labour. 
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The vision of pioneers returning to build a new society with their 
own hands gained support from outwith 'labour-Zionism', as it served to 
confirm the doctrine of the Chosen People returning to the Promised Land. 
The idea of a 'return' rather than conquest is an important element of 
Zionist ideology, often used to indicate the legitimacy of the Israeli 
state. As Khader points out, it is based on a perception of Palestinian 
history which erases all but the times when Palestine was ruled by the 
Hebrews (i. e. until the destruction of the Temple in 70 A. D. ) or by the 
Israelis (Khader: 1981: p. 2). 
Feeding into the developing 'labour-Zionist' tendency were attempts 
made by theorists such as Borochov and Syrkin to synthesise elements of 
Marxist theory and Zionist thought. Borochov's argument was that the 
Jewish working class was handicapped by the 'abnormal' Jewish social 
structure described previously. Because of this the Jewish proletariat 
was unable to engage in class struggle and the petit bour, geois masses 
could not see the need to join a proletarian struggle. In proposing a 
means of creating a 'normal' Jewish society, Zionism therefore appeared as 
a 'historical necessity' (Khader: 1976: p. 113). The first priority 
suggested by Borochov was the creation of a Jewish agricultural and 
industrial proletariat; a situation which could only be brought about by 
having political autonomy within a territory. Unlike many Zionist theoreti- 
cians, Borchov recognised that the territory in question was already inhabited. 
However, he viewed the Palestinian population as having no particular economy 
or cul(-ure and as not constituting a nation. He concluded that the Arab 
population was not to be subjugated or colonised but would be assimilated 
culturally and economically as the Jewish initiative launched new 
'conditions 
of production'. 
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On emigrating to Palestine, the European Zionists were faced with 
the reality of its Arab inhabitants. To give some idea of the scale on 
which early Jewish migration took place, the total number of migrants 
between the years of 1882 and 1914 is estimated to be 60,000. In terms 
of land--holding, the number of Jewish settlements increased from 14 in 
1895 to 71 in 1919, an increase from 0.5% of the land to 2.5% (Palestinian 
Statistical Abstract: 1980). 
Zionist settlement had no immediate economic impact on the population 
of Palestine. Land which was acquired by the Jewish National Fund was 
placed under Jewish ownership in perpetuity and could only be worked by 
Jewish labour. In 1920 the General Federation of Hebrew Labour (Histadrut) 
was established as an over-arching union for Jewish workers in Palestine. 
The central tenets of the Histadrut are indicated by the nature of the 
two compulsory levies - one for 'Jewish labour', which collected funds 
for organising against the employment of Arab labour, and the second to 
fund a campaign for 'Jewish produce'. This was, in effect, a systematic 
boycott of Arab produce. 
Organising around the principles of Jewish land, labour and produce 
was not seen by the 'labour-Zionists' as being inconsistent with socialist 
principles. The major difficulties facing the realisation of a socialist 
society in Palestine was stated by Tabenkin 
4 
as being "foreign capital, 
private enterprise and cheap Arab labour. " (Flapan: 1979: p. 202). 
Attention was focussed on existing Jewish settlements in Palestine which 
employed Arab labour at low wage rates and with poor conditions. Condemning 
this exploitation, the 'labour-Zionists' argued that the exclusion of 
Arabs from a Jewish sector would serve two purposes. Firstly, Jewish 
workers would be able to organise without competing against cheaper and 
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non-organised labour, and secondly, by forcing Arabs to seek employment 
only in the Arab sector, class conflict within Arab society would be 
stimulated. This is explained as the need to 'insulate the Jewish 
economy' from the cheaper Arab labour supply until Arab rates had risen 
to the same level as Jewish (Lucas: 1974). What this meant for the 
Arab labour supply was that they were excluded from owhing renting or 
being employed on any land once it had passed into the hands of the JNF; 
as the Histadrut gained strength, they were increasingly excluded from 
Jewish enterprises so that those who had lost land could not find employ- 
ment in Jewish concerns, and the Histadrut campaign for 'Jewish produce' 
meant that those who remained on the land could not sell their produce 
on the Jewish market. 
For the 'labour-Zionist' settlers, their criticism of settlers 
exploitinq native labour, and their insistence on the necessity for Jews 
to perform manual labour led to the impossibility of working out a 
relationship with the Arabs in Palestine once 'exploitation' had been 
rejected. In other words, at an ideological level the need for the 
separation of Jews and Arabs in Palestine was necessary for 'labour- 
Zionism' because the assumptions underlying the theory could not conceive 
of a relationship between the two which would be consistent with the ways 
in which socialism and Zionism were formulated. The only solution was the 
conception of a socialism which would be internal to a Jewish sector. 
A similar kind of rationale underpins the kibbutz movement. Here, 
too, there is agenuine attempt to implement thinking about socialist rela- 
tions, but the attempt is confined to the kibbutz in itself and cannot take 
account of the wider social system within which the kibbutz is located, nor 
of the means wherebY kibbutzim were established. 
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'Ph(' W, 'Y irl Which the doctrines of 'labour-Zionism' came to be 
translated into practices in Palestine has been summed up as follows: 
The Jews who gloried in the name of Socialist 
worker interpreted brotherhood on a strictly 
nationalist, or racial basis, for they meant 
brotherhood with Jew, not with Arab. As they 
insisted on working the soil with their own 
hands, since exploitation of others was anathema 
to them, they excluded the Arabs from their regime... 
They believed in equality, but for themselves. They 
lived on Jewish bread, raised on Jewish soil that 
was protected by a Jewish rifle. 
(Abu Lughod, ed: 1971: p. 220). 
Palestine under the British Mandate 
The Mandate for Palestine granted to Britain differed from the other 
Mandates being assumed by the victorious powers after the First World War. 
The Balfour Declaration was recognised in Article 2 of the Mandate, which 
charged the British Administration with the responsibility for "placing 
the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions 
as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home". Article 4 
of the Mandate made provision for the establishment of a 'Jewish Agency' 
which would be recognised as "a public body for the purpose of advising 
and co-operating with the administration of Palestine in such economic, 
social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish 
national home. " The participation of the Jewish Agency in the admini- 
stration was set out in Article 11 as the construction and operation 
"upon fair and equitable terms of any public works, services and utilities, 
and to develop any of the natural resources of the country. " (Hadawi: 1968: 
26) . 
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Following the British entry into Jerusalem in 1917, a provisional 
structure had been set up by the Zionist settlers to operate as a means 
of government. The provisional committee gave way to Valad Haleumi 
(Assembly of Deputies) in 1920, and was formally ratified by Mandatory 
Regulation in 1927. The level of organisation is described by Quandt et al., 
as follows: 
The Zionist Organisation developed autonomous 
executive institutions in Palestine which 
paralleled the government departments, as well 
as a separate elected general assembly and 
executive .... for the Jewish 'millet' (religious 
community) 
(Quandt et al: 1973: p. 13). 
For those who recognised its authority, Va'ad Haleumi could, for example, 
levy taxes, organise social, religious and educational life and acquire 
major economic concessions. Among the latter were the provision of 
hydroelectric power from the Jordan and Awja Rivers, extraction of mineral 
salts from the Dead Sea and drainage and settlement of the Hulah marshes. 
In 1922-23, the Palestine Arabs rejected the British Mandate 
Administration's offer of a similar facility, and it has been suggested 
that this was because they hoped the Mandate would still be rescinded 
(Quandt et al: 1973: p. 21). When the Arab leadership decided in the 
late 1920's to support the establishment of a council, it was opposed 
both by the Mandate Administration and by the Zionist organisations. The 
stumbling block was Arab opposition to the Mandate. The British Administration 
had already refused to recognise the Arab Executive and later, the Arab 
Higher Committee 
6 
as official representatives of the Arab population, in 
effect because neither could accept the stipulation that no resolution or 
statement would be issued which was contrary to the principles embodied in 
the Mandate, including the Balfour Declaration. 
- 89 - 
David Waines has suggested that the Palestinian response to the 
Mandate showed "unity of purpose, unity of goal, but never unity of 
action. " (Aruri, ed: 1970: p. 28). In order to explain why this was the 
case he considers the nature of the Palestinian leadership at the time of 
the Mandate. The leadership was mainly drawn from the large, urban-based 
land-owning families and mirrored factional rivalries, this being a contin- 
uation of the situation under Ottoman rule. Waines suggests that it was: 
natural that the nationalist movement should 
reflect the perspective of its leadership, 
and hence the particular class interests it 
represented .... The Palestinian leadership 
was a product of the times and was therefore 
no more or less reactionary or progressive 
simply because it failed than the leadership 
in other areas which succeeded. 
(Aruri, ed.: 1970: P. 28). 
Opposition to the Mandate during the 1920's was expressedin petition 
to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, and by 
dispatching delegations to bodies such as the British Colonial Office. 
There were occasional bouts of street fighting such as that in Jaffa in 
1921 which prompted the appointment of the Haycroft Commission, and the 
anniversaries of the Balfour Declaration and of Briti sh entry into 
Jerusalem in 1917 were marked as days of mourning. 
The rioting which took place in 1929 was ostensibly sparked off by the 
"... long-festering difficulties between the Muslim and Jewish communities 
over the Wailing Wall, which was legally Muslim property and sacred to 
Muslims ... 
" (Quandt et al.: 1973: p. 30). Fighting broke out in several 
towns in the country and left around 250 people dead. It can be suggested 
that the rioting was related both to the inability of the Mandate 
authorities to deal with the grievances of the peasant population, and 
to the failure of the Arab leaders to obtain any meaningful concessions 
from the Administration. 
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The representation of the mandate period in terms of the political 
confrontation of -two national communities 
7 
is both misleading and 
analytically problematic, and Asad has identified some of the difficulties 
inherent in such an approach (Asad: 1976). In addition to basing an 
analysis on the criteria by which groups define themselves - thereby 
taking as given precisely that which requires explanation - such a 
representation is problematic in its treatment of 'national communities' 
as homogenous and undifferentiated entities. 
The nature of the Palestinian Arab response to the Mandate Administra- 
tion indicates the specific structure of the Palestinian social formation 
-it that time, and the existence of classes with contradictory interests. 
Thus, for example, the rioting in 1929 was condemned by the Arab Executive. 
The inability and unwillingness of the Arab leaders to co-opt the full 
support of the peasantry in order to oppose the Mandate has been noted, as 
has the continual selection of the option of non-violent resistance by 
the Palestinian leadership. When the choice of violent protest was forced 
on them, the Arab leadership opted out of the struggle. This is clearly 
indicated in the part they played in the 1936 General Strike, where the 
promise of a British Royal Commission of Enquiry, and the intervention (by 
British request) of King Abdullah of Transjordan and King Ghazi of Iraq 
persuaded the Arab Higher Committee to call an end to the 6-month strike 
(People's Press: 1981) . 
While an understanding of the way in which different class interests 
operated within the Palestinian Arab community is important in considering 
why certain forms of protest emerged and not others, an explanation for 
the ineffectuality of this protest must be located in the developing power 
relations of Palestine under Mandatory rule. The political domination 
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of both Arabs and Jewish settlers by the Mandate authorities has led 
most writers to characterise the Mandate period as a struggle between two 
autonomous and mutually exclusive communities seeking independence from a 
colonial apparatus. The tendency to assume homogeneity has already been 
mentioned. A second problem arising from this conceptualisation is the 
assumption that the exercise of power has only one form - in other words 
that relations between the Mandate authorities, the Jewish settlers and 
the Palestinian Arabs can be reduced to the nature of the British Mandate 
Administration, and its treatment of two competing groups of equal status 
under its domination. 
The first point to be made is that British interests in the region 
did not diminish with victory in the First World War. Khader considers 
the strategic importance of Palestine in the context of British foreign 
policy as being situated in the "hinterland of the Suez canal and on the 
transit route of the Iraqi Petroleum Company" (Khader: 1978: p. 10). This 
latter point refers to the construction of a pipeline from the Iraqi oil- 
fields to Haifa, on Palestine's Mediterranean coast. As for the importance 
of the Suez canal, Hobsbawm has pointed out the relationship of Britain 
with its imperial possessions, whereby the 'Empire' was a set of economies 
dependent on and complementary to that of Britain itself. Each colony was 
to exchange its primary products: thus, wool for Australia, wheat and 
beef for Canada, gold and diamonds for South Africa. The importance of the 
Suez Canal within this system was as a major trade route (Hobsbawm: 1966: 
112) . 
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The second point is the way in which the British Administration 
attempted to implement its obligations under the Mandate; in particular 
the implementation of the principles embodied in the Balfour Declaration. 
In a confidential memorandum, Lord Balfour had stated: "In Palestine we 
do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of 
the. -present inhabitants of the country ... The Four Powers are committed 
to Zionism ... " (FO: 371/4183/2117/132187: 19.9-19). Zionism meant 
Jewish settlement. In 1918, Palestine had a population of about 700,000. 
of these, 644,000 were Arabs, and 56,000 were Jews. A census was taken 
in 1922 which numbered the total population as 757,182 of whom 83,794 
or 11.1% were Jewish. By the time of the second census in 1931, the 
total population was 1, )035,821. The Jewish population was 174,610, or 
16.9%. The 1944 population figures are estimates based on "Survey of 
Palestine" figures and the population growth rates, and indicate that 
the total population had reached 1,764,000, of whom 554,000 (30%) were 
Jewish (Government of Palestine: 1946: p. 144). 
The White Paper of 1939 marked a change in British policy. It stated 
that the obligations contained in the Balfour Declaration had been fulfilled 
and the Jewish National Home had been established. The White Paper then 
suggested that after a final quota of 75,000 Jewish immigrants over five 
years, immigration should stop, and that within this time the acquisition 
of land by Jews should be restricted. At the end of the five-year period, 
self-governing institutions should be set up. (Cmd. 6019: 17.5.39: p. 34). 
The White Paper was issued during a wave of immigration (5th Aliya) 
8 
which 
brought over 200,000 immigrants to Palestine in 7 years. The 1935 Nuremburg 
laws had codified anti-Jewish legislation in Germany and played a large 
part in provoking the large-scale emigration of German Jews. The choice 
- 93 - 
of Palestine as a destination was facilitated by the restrictive 
immigration policies of many Western countries. Thus, for example, in 
1935 the United States granted visas to 6,252 Jewish immigrants while 
the number entering Palestine was 61,854 (Khader: 1978: p. 13). 
The fifth Aliya was more than quantitavely important, however. The 
Mandatory system of classifying immigrants according to wealth indicates 
how immigrants in this period differed. 
Table 3.1 
Jewish Immigrants According to Wealth 
YEAR NUMBER OF CATEGORY 'A'* 
1932 727 
1933 3250 
1935 6309 
1937 1275 
1939 1626 
1941 314 
Category 'A' described those in possession of LP (Palestine 
pounds) 500 which was later raised to LP 1000. The figures 
shown above exclude dependents (Khader: 1978: p. 14). 
Investment of Jewish capital in industrial projects in Palestine amounted 
to LP 2,500,000 in the years 1930-32. Between 1933 and 1939 the amount 
invested reached LP 7,000,000. To give some idea of scale, 
investment 
in Arab enterprises during that decade never went above LP 
704,000, which 
given the proportionate representation in the population 
is a large 
disparity (Khaýder: 1978: p. 18). 
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The importance of this lies in the distortions resulting from the 
representation referred to earlier, whereby power relations in the Mandate 
period are reduced to the nature of the Mandate Authorities in the 
treatment of two competing groups, the equal status of which is taken 
as given. Asad has suggested that a different set of ooncep . ts is necessary; 
namely that with the establishment of European rule over Mandate Palestine, 
the preconditions were set for the implantation of a European capitalist 
sector, and that it is in terms of the articulation of a capitalist with a 
non-capitalist mode of production mediated by the colonial state that 
developing power relations can be understood (Asad: 1976). 
The domination of the non-capitalist mode was expressed in the 
systematic flow of surplus from the Arab peasantry to the growing European 
community, and the political tension both within the Arab community and 
between it and the Zionist settlers and Mandate state. The process of 
surplus extraction was mediated by the Mandate apparatus and the non- 
productive Arab classes - in the case of the former via the maintenance 
of a fiscal structure which facilitated this process; in the case of the 
latter, as a result of the pattern of income and expenditure. 
If this argument is extended, it may be possible to explain why, 
despite the efforts of the Jewish National Fund and its agencies, the 
area of land in Palestine held by Jews at the end of the Mandate in 1948 
amounted to only around 6% of the total. 
9 
In 1940, the Mandate authorities 
restricted Jewish land-ownership to certain areas, comprising 35% of 
Palestine. However, it is certain that illegal land purchases and sales 
were made, as when the United Nations partition plan of 1947 was promoted, 
it included land held "illegally" by Jews in the Mandate-designated Arab 
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areas within the borders of the proposed Jewish state. In 1946, the 
Ptilestine (, overnment estimated that while Jewish land-holding amounted to 
around 6%, "the Jews held over 15% of the cultivable area of Palestine. " 
(Government of Palestine: 1946). 
The form of Arab land-holding is of significance. The Royal Commission 
Report of 1937 
10 
indicates that the Zionists were aware that one of the 
obstacles in the way of land purchase was the pattern of communal land 
tenure among Arab peasants. (Report of the Palestine (Peel) Commission: 
1937: p. 268). Asad has discussed the importance of the Ottoman attempt 
to register titles in land for tax purposes as an instance of the intensi- 
fication of the extraction of surplus from peasant producers, as the Land 
Code served to institutionalise and reinforce pre-existing relations of 
dependence. He quotes Smilianskaya on the actual way in which the Land 
Code was implemented: 
The villagers fearing that the registration was 
a preliminary to a call for military service, 
or for taxation purposes, falsified the returns, 
registering the property either in the name of 
the head of the tribe or in the name of a member 
of the family who would not be liable for military 
service. In practice they disregarded the titles 
granted ... and continued to 
farm on the 'musha'a' 
system, recognising the customary quota-holders 
as the real owners. 
(Asad: 1976: p. 4) 
It is interesting to note how legal forms originating in the capitalist 
industrialised countries come to be imposed. While the question of land 
registration and ownership makes sense, for example, given 
the requirements 
of the British socio-economic system, in Palestine earlier this century 
it is appropriate mainly as a means of implementing certain kinds of 
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Policies consistent with the domination by a colonial state. In other 
words, it has no relevance to the internal dynamic of Palestinian society. 
A similar procedure was noted in Chapter One in the way in which Algerian 
land was expropriated by the French, and again Palestinian land in the 
West Bank under Israeli occupation. The latter case will be discussed 
in Chapter Four; for the time being, it is sufficient to note the 
application of a legality outwith the context within which it has developed. 
The kind of fiscal structure set up by the British Administration 
contributed to increasing peasant indebtedness, whether through the 
imposition of direct rural property tax or through indirect taxation, 
the burden of which fell on the poorer population. This resulted in 
increa,.:: ed dependence on the Administration as a source of credit, and 
constituted both a heightened dependence on the land as a means of paying 
off debt and a considerable incentive to sell the land. Khader notes that 
up until the early 1930's, of the total land sold to Jewish settlers, 88.6% 
was sold by absentee landowners. However, after 1932, the majority of 
land acquisitions were purchases from resident landowners (accounting for 
62.7% of sales) or from indebted peasants. Of the total land acquired in 
the period 1933-36,22.5% was acquired from peasants who were in debt 
(Khader: 1978: p. 17). 
Hadawi has argued that it is an indication of how strong resistance 
to Zionist settlement was, that land "was mostly purchased from Lebanese 
and Syrian absentee landowners living outside Palestine... in spite of the 
high prices offered and the legislation that was designed until 1939 to 
facilitate transfer of land to Jews. " (Hadawi: 1968: p. 28). On the 
meaning of land loss for a peasant population under colonial rule, Fanon 
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has said: "For a colonised people the most essential value, because the 
most concrete, is first and foremost the land: the land which will bring 
them broad, and, above all, dignity. " (Fanon: 1978: p. 34). Where land is 
the source of livelihood, to sell it to an organisation which precludes 
even the possibility of future employment on the land would mean the loss 
of the means of survival. As Stork has pointed out: 
For the peasants and poor workers of Palestine, 
the political conflict with the Zionists was felt 
most acutely and most frequently on an immediate 
economic level. It was not an abstract or mystical 
'love of the land' that motivated the Palestinians 
to struggle against great odds, but their utter 
dependence on the land which was only reinforced 
by the pauperisation and sub-proletarianisation 
of the Zionist project. 
(Kayyali, ed.: 1979: p. 216). 
The worsening economic position of Palestinian Arabs under the 
Mandate was not restricted to agriculture. For example, Himadeh points 
out that: 
real wages of Arab labour, in September 1937, fell 
by 10 per cent as compared with wages in 1931, while 
wages of Jewish labour increased by 10 per cent ... 
Actual earnings in 1935 and 1937 decreased more 
than is shown by the index numbers of the daily wage 
rates, because of periods of unemployment and reduced 
hours of work... 
(S. B. Himadeh, quoted by Asad: 1976) 
As the rural areas were depressed, unemployment rose in the towns - in 
1935, in Jaffa alone, out of a population of 71,000,2,270 were out of 
work. By 1936 this had reached 4,000. This was linked to decreasing 
Jewish unemployment. "The Jewish Frontier" noted: 
-unemployment among Jews at the end of 
1938 was 
much reduced owing to the replacement of Arab 
labour in plantations..... This year for the first 
time only Jewish workers are employed in Jewish 
owned orange groves. 
(Cited by Asad: 1976) 
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In 1947 the Report of the United Nations Special Commission on 
Palestine (UNSCOP) was issued. 
12 
As part of its summary, it stated: 
"There are considerable differences between the rates of wage for Arab and 
Jewish workers in similar occupations, differences in the size of invest- 
ments and differences in productivity and labour costg'(UNSCOP: 1947). 
Khader notes that on average, a Jewish worker earned around one and a half 
times as much as an Arab worker. In some cases, such as for women employed 
in the manufacture of clothes, wages in the Jewish enterprises were as 
much as four and a half times higher (Khader: 1978: p. 19). 
The UN report maintains that this situation was the result of a lack 
of direct competition between the two groups. However, several points 
should be made. Increased capital investment in the 'industrial sector' 
during the 1930's was noted earlier, and this was facilitated by favourable 
tax concessions for large-scale enterprises, which were mainly Jewish. 
However, the definition of what constitutes an 'enterprise' may lead to the 
obscuration of important differences in the comparison of Jewish and Arab 
workers and enterprises during the Mandate. For example, it could not 
distinguish between the manufacture of clothes as craft manufacture supple- 
menting the domestic peasant economy, and a factory mass-producing clothes 
for export. 
In addition, such a comparison veils the kinds of changes which were 
taking place; changes which are illustrated by the following quote: 
A great transformation has taken place in the 
structure of enterprises, methods of production, 
and character of production. Home industries 
producing articles for trade have almost disap- 
peared. What remains of these industries is 
limited practically to needlework in all its forms. 
The relative number of independent craftsmen in 
workshops or factories has increased. Traditional 
methods of production are giving way to machine 
production. 
(S. B. Himadeh, quoted by Asad: 1976) 
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This differentiation applies also to agricultural production. 
Point 3 of the UN Report indicates this clearly: 
Arab agriculture is based to a considerable 
extent on cereal production and tends to be 
of a subsistence kind. Only about 20%-25% of 
Arab agricultural produce (excluding citrus) 
is marketed - Jewish agriculture is largely 
intensive and cash crop farming. About 75% 
of Jewish agricultural produce is sold on the 
market. 
(UNSCOP: 1947). 
In arguing that while certain features of Israeli-Arab relations 
since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 have resembled a 
'colonialist pattern', such a pattern was not evident during the Mandate 
period, Flapan compares land ownership in Palestine with several countries 
in North Africa which were subject to colonisation. Thus, for example, 
figures for Algeria in 1955 show that 10.3% of the population were 
European, and of the cultivated land, 40% was owned by Europeans. In 
Morocco in 1955, comparable figures indicate 6.7% of the population being 
European and owning 18% of the land. The figures for Palestine in 1946 
show 34% of the population being European, owning 12% of the cultivated 
land (Flapan: 1979: p. 195). 
The extent to which Zionist settlement in Palestine depended on the 
acquisition of land and development of agriculture must therefore 
be 
questioned. Ruedy has suggested that the "... physical possession of, and 
intimate relationship to, the land by Jewish colonists were seen by them 
/i. e. Zionist settlers/ as the only certain method of possessing 
Palestine... " 
(Abu-Lughod,, ed.: 1971: p. 127). 
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As was suggested earlier in the discussion of Ilabour-Zionism', 
this was an important ideological component of the way in which Ilabour- 
Zionist' doctrine sought to establish settlement. However, in the same 
article Ruedy points out that most Jews actually settled in the cities, 
and there were never more than 19.3% of them on the land. 
'Conquest of Labour' - the Histadrut 
Having discussed the development of industrial enterprises and the 
increased investment of capital during the 1930's, we can now consider the 
way in which the Histadrut grew during the Mandate. The part it was to 
play was explained by Ben-Gurion as being "not only to organise the working 
class, but to create it, mould it and settle it in Palestine" (Weinstock: 
1979). The campaign for "Jewish land, Jewish labour and Jewish produce" 
described earlier intensified during the 1930's. Flapan's explanation is 
that: 
The paradox of the situation was in the fact that 
Arab labour in the Jewish colonies increased ... due 
to the shortage of Jewish labour, in the rural sector 
in particular. The economic boom in towns... dre-. w- 
thousands of Jewish workers away from agriculture 
and no moral appeal to Zionist ideals and national 
interest could persuade the workers in the colonies 
and the new immigrants to renounce a higher standard 
of living and lucrative employment offered by the 
economic boom in the cities. 
(Flapan: 1979: p-205). 
In 1933, the Histadrut organised a-campaign to evict by force if 
necessary all Arabs employed in town-based Jewish enterprises. At the 
same time a nation, wide picket of citrus groves employing Arabs took 
place. Through the 1920's proposals had been put forward within the 
Histadrut by parties such as Poalei Zion Left and Hashomer Hatzair for 
some form of joint Jewish/Arab trade union, originally based on a union 
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of separate 'national sections'. However, after 1929 the issue of '100% 
Jewish labour' was presented as an aspect of the need for increased Jewish 
immigration. At the Histadrut National Council in 1929, Ben-Gurion attacked 
the advocates of joint Jewish-Arab organisation by proclaiming: "... we 
do have to exploit this moment /after the riots of 1929/ for the consoli- 
dation of the Hagana /militiaý-/ for speeding up our enterprise, and for 
the imposition of Jewish labour. " (Flapan: 1979: p. 204). Histadrut control 
of the labour exchanges ensured that policies for the hiring of exclusively 
Jewish workers in Jewish concerns were followed. As noted in the above 
quote, in 1929 the Histadrut was responsible for establishing an illegal 
militia, the Hagana, which by the time of the 1948 war had become an under- 
ground army. According to Lucas, the greater part of Histadrut finance 
during the Mandate came not from its members but from the labour movement 
of the United States (Lucas: 1974: p. 123). 
The Histadrut did not restrict itself to representing its members. 
During the Mandate years it began to establish an economic infrastructure 
according to the policy of a separate and autonomous Jewish sector in 
Palestine. Thus, for example, Tnuva was set up to market agricultural 
produce. This in turn provided more jobs for new Jewish immigrants as well 
as revenue for the Histadrut. The range of Histadrut activities is summed 
up by Maxime Rodinson as serving as "capitalist entrepreneur, banker, 
insurance agency, and landowner, and /-It 
7 operated a kind of social 
security. " (Rodinson: 1973: p. 64). 
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As Nikitina has pointed out, Histadrut enterprises were patterned 
on joint-stock companies. The workers take no part in the management of 
Histadrut enterprises and have no share in the distribution of profits, 
although all Histadrut members are members of Hevrat Ovdim (The Workers' 
Commonwealth), as the economic branch is known (Nikitina: 1973: p. 247). 
The Secretary-General of Hevrat Ovdim is reported to have described its 
philosophy as follows: 
We believe in socialist ownership - but a capitalistic 
way of management... (the workers' role is as) .... laymen; they do not grasp the wider implications of 
running a business ... But they contribute mightily 
in another field: they understand management's view- 
point much better and they pass this message on... 
generally without even thinking about it, to their 
fellow workers... The result? Strikes in our enter- 
prises are few and far between... 
(Lockman: 1976: p. 7). 
By the time the State of Israel was proclaimed in 1948, the Histadrut 
13 
was a major employer. It has been described as "the state within a state" 
clue to the diversity of economic interests and the control it has of 
important sectors of the Israeli economy. Appendix 2 details the various 
Histadrut holdings. Several of the enterprises characterised as 'partially- 
owned' are joint Histadrut-State concerns, for example Mekorot Water 
Company. The Solel Boneh Construction Company carries out over a quarter of 
all building in Israel, and engages in partnership in mixed enterprises. 
Nikitina notes that of 30 such enterprises, 15 were partnerships with 
private capital on a 50-50 basis; 7 were partnerships with state finance, 
where Solel Boneh invested over 50%; and 8 were jointly financed with 
foreign capital where Solel Boneh invested less than 50% (See Chapter Two). 
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Palestinian Arab Opposition to the Mandate 
Thus, the Histadrut sought to achieve the exclusively Jewish 
structures proposed by the Zionist theorists by not only organising 
Jewish labour, but establishing enterprises in keY sectors of the economy 
and setting up a network of educational, health and social facilities for 
the Jewish community in Palestine. It is ironic that the campaign for 
Jewish labour was strengthened by the Arab strike in 1936 and the subse- 
quent Arab revolt. 
14 
Flapan has pointed out that for the Arab population, 
the strike was a political weapon used as a protest mainly against continuing 
Jewish immigration, and it did not reflect the economic interests of the 
Arabs: "It spelled economic ruin for the landowners citrus growers and 
merchants. It brought unemployment for Arab workers and caused great losses 
to the peasants... " (Flapan: 1979: p. 220). The strike lasted for six 
months, during which time a total boycott of Jewish goods in the Arab 
sector was imposed and all other forms of economic contact between Arab 
and Jew were broken. A programme of civil disobedience began, including 
the non-payment of taxes and the stoppage of municipal government. The 
Mandate authorities reacted by announcing an increase in the immigration 
quotas, cutting all telephone and telegraph wires from Palestine to the 
surrounding Arab countries and initiating collective punishment. Two 
months after the strike began, Palestine was placed under martial law, and 
Zionist settlers were formed into night patrols, patrolling Palestinian 
villages. 
As was suggested earlier, opposition to Zionist immigration had served 
to unite the Palestinian Arabs during the Mandate, although as Waines has 
noted, for the landowners this represented an attempt to resolve 
the question Of Political power whereas the peasantry struggled to alleviate 
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their economic problems (Aruri, ed.: 1970). At the end of the strike, 
the Arabs had gained the promise of a Royal Commission. Most of the Arab 
Higher Coimittee were deported. However, it was noted by a British Official 
that this served merely to eliminate all the 'responsible' local leaders who 
had been relied on to "control mobs, cool passions, and articulate grievances" 
(Kirkbride: 1956: pp. 100-1) . 
The Royal Commission (Peel Commission) Report publishedin 1937 
recommended the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and a Palestinian Arab 
state, both of which would remain under British control. It was later 
revealed that dicussions had taken place with Zionist leaders as to what 
boundaries would favour the Jewish community. As a measure of how this 
was done, Acre subdistrict was included in the Jewish sector. Its Jewish 
rural population was 0.001% (Quandt et al.: 1973: p. 37). The Arab 
insurrection continued until 1939, despite measures taken by the Mandate 
authorities such as the destruction of 5,000 houses within a four month 
period, mass deportations and the execution of 148 prisoners in Acre prison 
alone (People's Press: 1981: p. 49). 
As an indication of how the Arab strike was seen by the Zionist 
settlers, Flapan quotes statements made at Mapai 
/Labour Party/ Political 
Committee meetings in July and August 1936. A strong current of opinion 
was against the return of any Arab workers to the Jewish sector and against 
the normalisation of economic relations. The General Strike 
had served to 
realise the Zionist aim of a 'closed' economy. Baur 
describes the economic 
benefit as follows: 
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The strike led to a paradoxical development in 
the Jewish community. Its economic independence 
was strengthened. The port of Tel Aviv was built, 
and the expansion of the port of Haifa was speeded 
up. Strategic roads were built, which were very 
useful to the Jewish community. Jewish agriculture 
no longer had to face the competition of abundant 
and cheap agricultural products, which the Jewish 
sector could not meet. 
(Quoted by Zureik: 1979: p. 62) 
Arab jobs in sectors such as the railroads and shýpping were taken over 
by Jewish workers, and an end to the renting of Arab houses had boosted 
the Jewish construction industry. The Zionist position is summed up by 
Ben-Gurion: 
Boycott was never our policy - Zionism is in favour 
of Jewish-Arab co-operation and a (declaration) of 
boycott will harm us abroad. The Arabs prepare 
now to declare an economic boycott against the Jews - 
I pray to God that they should do it... 
(Flapan: 1979: p. 221). 
The Nature of Zionist Settlement 
It is due to the specific nature of Zionist settlement that by the 
mid-1940's under 10% of the land was owned by Jews. Flapan is correct 
in his comparison of the colonisation of Palestine and the colonisation 
of countries in the Maghreb in that Zionist settlement did not initially 
depend on land or 'native' labour. The final point in the United Nations 
report on Palestine in 1947 states that: 
The occupational structure of the Jewish population 
is similar to that of some homogenous industrial 
countries, while that of the Arabs corresponds more 
nearly to a subsistence type of agricultural society. 
(UNSCOP: 1947) 
The sense in which Zionist settlement in Palestine represents a colony 
is in its position as an extension of European-centred capitalism as a 
production system and a power structure. It is for this reason that 
it is important to clarify the nature of enterprises set up by Zionist 
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settlers, and the nature of the agriculture which was carried out. The 
example of the manufacture of clothes was given earlier in order to 
highlight the difference between 'industry' as a supplement to a non- 
capitalist economy, and 'industry' as the introduction of capitalist 
forces and relations of production. 
The establishment of kibutzim- and moshavim are frequently used as 
examples of alternative forms of agricultural production. The kibbutz 
has been described by an Israeli Government-sponsored publication as: 
11 a voluntary socio-economic association founded on common property, 
production and work, on the one hand, and on common living arrangements 
on the other" Hashomer - Hatzair: 1960: p. 2) . While social relations may 
be communal, ki, -)butzim are an integral part of the development of 
capitalist agriculture in Palestine and later in the State of Israel. 
15 
The land on which kibbutzim and moshavim were established was land leased 
from the Jewish Agency; the significance of this is pointed out by Warriner 
as follows: 
... the farmers on the cooperative settlements are 
not free to cultivate or invest or sell except as 
dictated from above ..... Minor details of the farm 
operations are decided by a committee of the settlers, 
but every major decision as to production, technical 
methods of cultivation, and finance is taken by the 
experts of the Jewish agency... 
(Issawi, ed: 1966: p. 68) 
The aim of Zionist settlement in Palestine was the establishment of 
Jewish sovereignty, and it is through an examination of the particular 
historical circumstances of which this settlement was part that subsequent 
developmentsmay be explained. The basis on which settlement was carried out 
has been summed up by Arthur Koestler as follows: 
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... one nation promised another nation the 
territory of a third nation: the nation 
to whom the promise was made was not a 
nation but a religious community, and the 
territory, at the time of the promise, 
belonged to a fourth nation... 
(Quoted by Khader: 1976: p. 201) 
Thus, a peculiar feature of Zionist settlement in Palestine was that the 
occupying forces and state administration were not the Zionists themselves 
but the British Mandate Authorities. Earlier, it was suggested that the 
fiscal policies implemented by the British administration served to 
facilitate the development of capitalist structures, which were Jewish, 
at the expense of non-capitalist, which were Palestinian Arab. It must 
be emphasised that this represents a coincidence of interests rather than 
a deliberate policy, and it is important not to reduce conflict at the 
level of the political to conflict arising from the articulation of a 
capitalist and non-capitalist mode of production. 
The Mandate State 
As has been suggested, the need for exclusively Jewish structures 
formed the basis of Zionist thinking and this was translated into organi-- 
sations such as the Jewish National Fund, the Histadrut, Va'ad Haleumi - 
all designed to maintain a Jewish entity in Palestine. The way in which 
the native Palestinian Arab population was excluded, both as a 
factor in 
the original settlement proposals and in Palestine as settlement progressed 
has been discussed within the context of the colonial mode of thought of 
19th century Europe and within Zionist discourse itself. 
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The conditions which permitted this exclusion to continue can be 
explained, to a large extent, by the fact that conflict arising, such as 
Arab protest at immigration, and peasant grievances, had to be managed 
by the Mandate State apparatus. In other words, the Zionist settlers 
did not have to conquer the native population and did not have to concern 
themselves at all with that population as that was the task of the 
'Government' . Thus, for example, in a discussion of the 'land situation' 
by the Jewish Agency Executive in 1936, Ben-Zvi is quoted as saying that 
they should not be arguing to improve the conditions of the fellahin - 
that was the job of the goverment (Flapan: 1979: p. 222). 
The cost of this for the Mandate Administration is evident in the 
expenditure on defence. This reached as much as 36.6% of the total 
expenditure of all government services in the year of the Arab General 
Strike. Between 1933 and 1937 defence spending constituted 43.1% of 
the total increase on all items. It should be noted that this expenditure 
is concerned with maintaining an apparatus for 'defence' solely within 
Palestine (Asad: 1976: pp. 5-7). 
While it is argued that the operation of the Mandate State repre- 
sented an important condition for the growth of exclusively Jewish economic, 
social and political concerns through its management of the native popula- 
tion, the operation of the Mandate apparatus must be seen in accordance 
with the interests of British Foreign Policy. British interests in the 
Middle East and their confluence with those of the Zionist movement at 
the b(-, (jinnj-ng of this century were discussed in Chapter one. The discovery 
of oil and the need to ensure favourable conditions for its extraction 
sustained interest in the area and the outbreak of World War 
2 made the 
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protection of the oil resources of the Gulf and the security of shipping 
routes imperative for the British war effort. In addition, an estimated 
one-third of all British troops had been drafted to Palestine during the 
Arab strike and rebellion. 
The 1939 White Paper which attempted to impose a ceiling on Jewish 
immigration in preparation for the introduction of 'self-governing insti- 
tutions' can therefore be seen not as British acquiescence to Arab demands 
made during the 1936-39 rebellion, but in consonance with the needs of the 
British State at that time. The Arab rebellion had been economically 
beneficial for the Jewish settlers and, as was noted, military aid had 
been given to the authorities in attempting to crush the insurrection. 
However, with the threatened curtailment of immigration contained in the 
1939 White Paper and the announcement in 1940 that Jewish refugees would 
be diverted "to an alternative place of refuge in the Colonial Empire" 
(Sykes: 1973: p. 223) , British policy seemed directly opposed to Zionist 
aims. 
Initially, Arab reaction to the White Paper was mixed, but the terms 
were eventually rejected. Zionist reaction was unanimously condemnatory. 
A general strike was called for the day after the publication of the 
White Paper and in the "Survey of Palestine" it is reported that Arab 
t shops in Jerusalem were looted, the police were stoned when trying to 
maintain order and a British constable was shot 
(Government of Palestine: 
1946: p. 54). 
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In May 1942 the 'Biltmore Conference' was convened in New York. 
The conference served to establish a programme for the Zionist movement 
and to issue a series of demands to the British Government as a means of 
rejecting the 1939 White Paper. The most important resolution was that 
which demanded "the immediate establishment in Palestine of a Jewish 
Commonwealth as an integral part of the new democratic world". It was 
made clear that this was a thinly-veiled call for a Jewish state in all 
of Palestine. As for immigration, it was to be placed under the control 
of the Jewish Agency, and an autonomous Jewish military force was to be 
established under its own flag (Hadawi: 1968: p. 12). 
Flapan has suggested that the Biltmore Programme marked a change in 
Zionist policy: a change which was based on the assumption that the 
war would leave millions of Jews destitute and ready to emigrate to 
Palestine, as the Programne was issued before the horrors of Nazi genocide 
had become known (Flapan: 1979: p. 282). With the conflict with the 
British administration in Palestine, Ben-Gurion stated: 
For my part, I had no doubt that the center 
of gravity of our political efforts had 
shifted from Great Britain to America, who 
was making sure of being the world's leading 
power and where the greatest number of Jews, 
as well as the most influential were to be 
found. 
(Bar-Zohar: 1968: p. 69). 
The End of the Mandate 
The background to American interests in the Middle East has already 
been discussed, and the aim of US policy in the immediate post-war years 
has been describedas an attempt to "push Britain out of the area without 
inflaming Arab nationalism in the process" (People's Press 1981: p. 61) - 
Of the top five American corporations which had reaped the economic 
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benefits of j wjr economy, three were oil companies involved in the 
Middle East. In the course of the war, Britain had borrowed extensively 
from the United States to finance the war effort and had, in effect, 
mortgaged what remained of its empire. By the end of the war, US oil 
companies controlled 42% of the known oil reserves in the Middle East, 
the strategic and economic importance of which had become evident. 
As was discussed in Chapter Two, American oil interests have not 
precluded American support for Israel, and the extent of this support 
is indicated in a 1944 Congress Resolution, when 411 of the 534 members 
called for America to back the establishment of a Jewish state (Halpern: 
1961: p. 325). Pressure was put on Britain by the US government to accede 
to Jewish Agency demands and permit unrestricted immigration to Palestine. 
During the war, military insurrection and sabotage had been carried out 
by the Hagana and groups such as Irgun and Lehi (the Stern Gang). The 
British authorities had detained around 2000 people from the Zionist 
community and refused to agree to Zionist demands. However, in 1947 Britain 
announced that the problem of Palestine would be taken to the United Nations. 
The United Nations Special Commission on Palestine recommended 
partition such that 57% of Palestine would be a Jewish state inhabited 
by 498,000 Jews and 497,000 Arabs and 42% would be an Arab state whose 
population of 735,000 would include 10,000 Jews. Jerusalem was to be 
declared an international zone. While the partition plan was approved 
by the required two-thirds vote at the United Nations on 29th November, 1947, 
no plan for implementing partition existed. In December 1947, 
Britain announced that its troops would be withdrawn from Palestine by 
15th May 1948 and this precipitated a Civil War between Zionist Settlers 
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and the Palestinian Arabs The latter had rejected partition on the grounds 
that the Jews constituted around one-third of the total population and 
owned around 6% of the land, yet under partition they stood to gain over 
half of Palestine including the most fertile lands. 
Zionist acceptance of the partition plan has been represented as a 
compromise of the Biltmore Programme, as indicated by the readiness to 
accept less than the total area of Palestine. 
16 
However, by the beginning 
of May 1948 Jewish forces controlled most of the territory assigned to a 
Jewish state by the United Nations, and were moving into Arab areas. By 
April 1948, an estimated 30,000 Palestinians had left the country and an 
unknown number were refugees inside Palestine itself. 
In 1943, General Hurley (Personal Representative of President Roosevelt 
in the Middle East) had reported that: 
The Zionist organisation in Palestine has indicated its 
commitment to an,, )enlarged programme for: 
A sovereign Jewish State which would embrace Palestine and 
probably eventually Transjordan. 
An eventual transfer of the Arab population from Palestine 
to Iraq. 
3. Jewish leadership for the whole Middle East in the fields of 
economic development and control. 
(Government of the United States of America: 1964: Vol. 4., pp. 776-7) 
In this report, the territorial ambitions of the Zionist movement are made 
clear, as is the part which the future Jewish state was expected to play 
in 
the Middle East. As for the 'transfer' of the Arab population, the idea 
had been revived in Jewish Agency discussions about Mandate proposals to 
introduce legislation in 1936 which would preserve minimum land-holdings 
for Arabs. Before this, the idea of transference had retained some notion 
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of a voluntary abandonment. However, in 1940 the head of the Jewish Agency's 
Colonisation Department wrote: 
There is no room for both peoples together in this 
country... We shall not achieve our goal of being an 
independent people with the Arabs in this small 
country. The only solution is Palestine, at least 
Western Palestine /i. e. west of the River Jordan7 
without Arabs ... And there is no other way but to 
transfer the Arabs from here to the neighbouring 
countries, to transfer all of them: not one village, 
not one tribe should be left. 
(Weitz: 1965: Vol. 2, P. 181) 
Within one week in A: p; ril 1948 the Arab population of Jaffa (which had 
been included in the UN proposed 'Arab state') was reduced from 80,000 to 
3,000. Following the flight of the population, it was reported that: 
the soldiers commenced to loot in wh6lesale fashion... Everything that 
was movable was carried from Jaffa... What could not be taken away was 
smashed .. ." (Kimche: 1950: p. 
233). By 15th May 1948, when British troops 
were withdrawn from Palestine, an estimated 300,000 Palestinians were 
refugees (People's Press: 1981: p. 71). The State of Israel was proclaimed 
on the date of British withdrawal and was rapidly recognised by both the 
United States and the Soviet Union. As was noted in the introduction, it 
was a state without fixed frontiers, and the offensive continued. 
O'Ballance describes this as follows: 
The Arab inhabitants were ejected and forced to flee 
into Arab territory, as at Ramleh, Lydda and other 
places. Wherever the Israeli troops advanced into 
Arab country, the Arab population was bulldozed out 
in front of them. 
(O'Ballance: 1956: pp. 171-2) 
The newly-formed League of Arab States took a decision to send Arab 
armies to Palestine. Flapan notes that the: 
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... David and Goliath legend surrounding the birth 
of Israel ... 
/was based on the belief that7 one 
community of 600,000 with local defence confronted 
five regular armies of the Arab states. This image 
was to a large extent deceptive... 
(Flapan: 1979: pp. 317-8). 
Quandt et al. describe the: 
... intervention of a small number of regular army 
troops from surroundLng Arab states, most notably 
Egypt and Transjordan. In no sense was this a 
massive, coordinated onslaught. In fact, inter- 
Arab rivalries seriously affected the conduct of 
the war. 
(Quandt et al.: 1973: p. 48). 
The Transjordanian Arab Legion was still under British command - 45 of 
its 50 office . rs were British. 
17 
It has been suggested that a series of 
agreements had been reached between Emir Abdullah and the British; between 
the Arab Legion and the Hagana; and between Abdullah and Golda Meir, 
which arranged for the annexation of part of the designated 'Arab' area 
of Palestine by Transjordan, conditional on the Arab armies not attacking 
18 
Jewish settlements. In any event, formal armistice agreements were 
concluded in July 1949 leaving Israel in control of over 77% of the area 
of Palestine instead of the 57% allotted to the 'Jewish state' under the 
UN partition plan. An additional 450,000 Palestinians were now refugees, 
brincjiM the total number to 750,000 (. Hadawi: 1968: p. 61). Around 120,000 
Palestinian Arabs remained in what was now the State of Israel. The 
West Bank was occupied by the Arab Legion and formally annexed in 1950 
in the creation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, while the Gaza Strip 
was occupied by Egypt and placed under Egyptian administration. 
A great deal has been written about the Palestinian 
'exodus' during 
the 1948 war, and explanations of it range from propositions that Arab 
leaders ordered mass flight, to emphasising the mood of failure and terror 
due to the relative lack of Arab organisational response to Zionist 
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effectiveness. 
19 
What is inescapable is that at the conclusion of the 
armistice agreements, a territory which had had an Arab population of 
over V-4 million was virtually emptied of that population, and machinery 
was quickly established for sustaining this. Joseph Weitz recounts a 
conversation with Moshe Shertok (Sharrett) of the Israeli Foreign 
Ministry: 
Transfer - post factum: should we do something so 
as to transform the exodus of the Arabs from the 
country into a fact, so that they return no more?... 
His /Shertoks7 answer: he blesses any initiative 
in this matter. His opinion is also that we must 
act in such a way as to transform the exodus of 
the Arabs into an established fact. 
(Weitz: 1965: Vol. 3, p. 293). 
The Palestinian exodus took the negation of the Palestinian 'natives' 
to the level of physical exclusion. The creation of political, social 
and economic institutions which were specifically for Jews had entailed 
the exclusion of the non-Jewish population, and formalised the ideological 
negation of the Palestinian people which was implict in the political vision 
of a Jewish entity. This formulation encapsulates the violence of the 
Palestinian encounter with Zionism. It is a violence which in different 
moments has meant ideological non-existence and physical displacement. 
Chapter Four will examine the particular issue of land and settlement as 
an instance of the colonial relationship in operation, and the way in 
which the expropriation of Arab lands and properties has served to institu- 
tionalise the exclusion of Palestinians from the State of Israel. 
116 - 
NOTES 
While the idea of the 'return' had always had a religious significance 
for Jews, the Zionist movement was attempting to make it into a 
political reality. This was not unanimously approved by Jewish 
populations. Khader quotes a statement issued by the Conference of 
Orthodox Jews in Pittsburgh in 1885 stating: 
We no longer consider ourselves a nation, 
but a religious community. Thus, we are 
awaiting neither a return to Palestine, 
nor the restoration of the sacrificial 
cult of the sons of Aaron, or anything 
else concerning the Jewish state. 
(Khader: 1976: p. 109) 
The Law of Return, passed in the Israeli Knesset in 1953, provides 
for any Jew to claim immediate Israeli citizenship and residence 
without necessarily relinquishing previous citizenship. However, 
opposition has continued, and the Jewish Neturei Karta movement, 
for example, are opposed to the very idea of a Jewish state, 
arguing that "... the creation of a secular, so-called Jewish 
state is treason to the Jewish people ... the Holy Land is and 
always has been beloved by religious Jews and that land, and the 
city of Jerusalem, are mentioned innumerable times every single day 
in prayers said by Jews everywhere ... they have nothing to do with 
the atheists who founded the State of Israel or with their state... " 
(Printed from a radio broadcast on Station WBAI - FM New York, 27.8.69) 
2. The importance of 'labour-Zionism' is that it provided the ideological 
frame within which the institutions were established which were to 
become the backbone of the State of Israel, and also was the political 
tendency which provided Israel's leaders for the first forty years. 
3. Borochov's concept of 'conditions of production' was intended to 
supplement Marx's 'relations of production'. 
4. Itzhak Tabenkin was one of the founders of the Legion of Labour 
(Gdud Avoda) which envisaged the immediate realisation of Zionism 
as a socialist society through the establishment of 
kibbutzim. 
5. Flapan suggests that competition was made more difficult in that the 
new immigrants were generally unaccustomed to manual 
labour and to 
conditions in the continent they had come to settle. 
(Flapan: 1979: 
p. 200). 
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6. The Arab Higher Committee was established in April 1936, with 
Hajj Amin al-Husseini as president. It served to loosely unite 
the political groupings which had divided on the dissolution of 
the Arab Executive in 1934 and acted as a coordinating body for 
the organisations and societies participating in the 1936 General 
Strike. 
7. See, for example, Israel, Palestine and Socialism by Mervyn Jones 
(1970), where his definition of Zionism as a nationalist ideology 
and subsequent conceptualisation of 'nationalist ideologies' lead 
him to argue on the question of whether the Jewish people constitute 
a nation. The answer, however, is implicit in the way in which he 
defines his terms. 
'Aliya' is literally 'ascension' and was used to describe Jewish 
immigration to Palestine, and later to the State of Israel. 
9. Hadawi's estimate, calculated from Government of Palestine statistics 
is 5.67% (Hadawi: 1968: p. 28). Ruedy has calculated the percentage 
of cultivable land as 9-12% (Abu-Lughod, ed.: 1971: p. 134). 
10. A Royal Commission on Palestine, known as the Peel Commission, was 
appointed in May 1936 to investigate the causes of unrest. Its 
findings, published in July 1937, declared that the Mandate's 
obligations were irreconcilable and recommended partition into a 
Jewish state and an Arab state, the latter to be united with 
'Transjordan'. The plan failed, but the principle of partition was 
established (Cmd. 5479,1937: cited by Flapan: 1979; p. 239). 
Noting the application of the Israeli tax system to East Jerusalem 
after the 1967 war, Hirst points out that it was inapplicable to 
East Jerusalem: 
"Israel, unlike Jordan, has a high-taxation 
economy - high wages with a high rate of 
fiscal recovery. Were the librarian in 
Saladin Street, the little grocer in the 
Old City, the civil servant from Shaikh 
Jarrah really the same, for tax purposes, 
as their counterparts in Western Jerusalem? 
Could the Arab citizen who had no assistance 
for educating his children or building his 
house on an instalment plan be put on the 
same footing as the Israeli who enjoyed 
welfare services from the cradle to the 
grave? " 
(Hirst: 1977: p. 239). 
- 118 - 
12. This report picked up the idea of partition after Britain had 
announced its intention to relinquish the Mandate, and was the 
basis of the United Nations 1947 Partition Plan, voted on 
29th November, 1947. 
13. See Elia T. Zureik, The Palestinians in Israel: a Study in Internal 
Colonialism, pp. 60-64, for a discussion of Histadrut activities 
during the Mandate. 
14. For an account of the 1936 strike, see Barbara Kalkas, The Revolt 
of 1936: A Chronicle of Events in Abu-Lughod, ed.: 1971. Also, 
Ghassan Kanafani The 1936 Revolt: Details, Analysis and Background, 
PFLP Bulletins, 1974-75. 
15. Settlements have been engaged in the production of exchange-values, 
which has led many to expand into manufacturing, labour often being 
supplied by the Arab population. 
16. The 22nd Zionist Congress in Basle in December 1946 rejected the 
idea of participating in negotiations with the British over partition, 
and deposed Weizmann as leader (Flapan: 1979: pp. 289-95). 
17. 
18. 
'Fnr an account of the 1948 war 
Commander of the 
with the Arabs, 
Arab legion, 
(1957). 
from the memoirs of a British 
ee Sir John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier 
For an account of the agreements which were struck at this time, see 
Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians. 
19. Rodinson suggests that the main cause for the exodus was similar to 
that operating in Spain during the Civil War - simply to get away 
from the theatre of military operations (Rodinson: 1982: p. 45). 
The fear of Jewish terrorist groups also played a major part, 
for 
example after the massacre of Deir Yassin, although 
the Jewish 
ruling bodies condemned such acts. 
Chapter Four 
LAND & SETTLEMENT AS A FORM OF DOMINATION 
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Chapter Four 
It was argued in Chapter Three that during the Mandate years the 
rr)ýj-c, concern of the Zionist enterprise was the building of exclusively 
Jewish structures in Palestine, and that the Mandate apparatus facilitated 
this process, for reasons which must be located in the conjuncture of 
British interests in the area and the interests of the settlers. A 
suggested means for the ideological and practical exclusion of Palestinian 
Arabsby the Zionist settlers was that the responsibility for governing lay 
not with the settlers but with the Mandate Authorities, so that conflict 
arising from colonisation, such as the Arab General Strike of 1936, did 
not have to be dealt with by the settlers but by the state. 
Britiýýh withdrawal Irom Palestine and the Zionist successes in the 
19/1(", -, 4() w, ir permitted, with the establishment of the State of Israel, the 
coriso-Lidation of the exclusionary fabric as the Zionists realised their 
ispirations. for sovereignty in Palestine. Instances of the ways in which F 
aspects of visionary Zionism were translated into organisations and 
strategies have been discussed; vision, however, is more than an idealistic 
dream in this context. The vision of a sovereign Jewish entity in 
Palestine incorporated a view of the native population in the way in which it 
negated that population. Thus the significance of the vision is that the 
exclusion of the Palestinian Arabs becomes the policy for dealing with 
the Palestinian Arabs - for example, when Weitz says "There is no room 
for both peoples together in this country", in speaking from within the 
Zionist concensus at that time, and holding the position of Director of the 
Jewish National Land Fund (see Chapter Three), his comments can be seen 
both as constituting elements of policy and as indicating the way in which 
the Zionist constituency conceived of its relationship with the indigenous 
population. 
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The logic of the Zionist thesis that the colonisation of Palestine 
was to be accomplished for and by Jews can be seen in the way in which 
Israel developed as a polity. The attention paid to Jewish self-betterment, 
the need for safety after the horrors of Europe during World War 2, the 
concern to fuse a 'national identity' and an 'Israeli culture', Ben-Yehuda's 
work on forging Hebrew as a common language - all have entailed the 
nullification of non-Jews - As Edward Said has noted: 
There are Zionism and Israel for Jews, and 
Zionism and Israel for non-Jews. Zionism 
has drawn a sharp line between Jew and non- 
Jew; Israel built a whole system for keeping 
them apart ...... 
(Said: 1980: p. 107) 
Mechanisms of Expropriation 
The political and economic significance of property belonging to 
Arabs who had fled in the course of the 1948-49 War was discussed in 
Chapter Two, and the magnitude of Arab property-holding in what became 
the State of Israel was noted. The mechanism whereby Israel ensured that 
this property could not revert to its owners was the formalisation of 
procedures which had been operating since before the establishment of the 
state, by incorporating these procedures into new legal statutes. For 
example, the Absentee's Property Law of 1950 provided legislation to 
continue the work of the Committee for Arab Property in the villages which 
had been set up at the beginning of 1948 to deal with Arab possessions 
which fell into Zionist hands in the course of the 1948 war. In July 1948 
this function was taken over by the appointment of a General Custodian of 
Absentees Property, the office of which marked the beginning of large- 
scale land expropriation and the use of legal instruments to promote this. 
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To give one example of this process, Sabri Jiryis has described 
the operation of the Development Authority (Transfer of Property) Law, 
passed in 1950, which stipulated that: 
.... the authority could release property in 
its control.... on condition that it be offered 
for sale first to Keren Keymeth /Jewish National 
Fund/. While these formal arrangements were 
being made, ownership of the land was transferred 
from one Israeli organisation to another ... On 
September 29,1953, the custodian of absentee 
property signed over his 'rights' to all the 
land he was responsible for, in return for a 
'price' to be paid by the development authority. 
This sum, was then returned to the authority in 
the form of a loan. 
(Jiryis: 1976: p. 78). 
These complicated transactions are an indication of the concern in 
the new Israeli state to develop 'legal' procedures to deal with the 
Arab population and the property they left behind. However, the 
definition of 'absentee' on which the laws were based backdated the 
time from which absentee status could be conferred to the date of the 
United Nations decision on partition - 29 November, 1947. Peretz explains 
the effects of this as follows: 
Every Arab in Palestine who had left his town 
or village after November 29,1947, was liable 
to be classified as an absentee.... The thirty 
thousand Arabs who fled from one place to another 
within Israel, but who never left the country, 
were also liable to have their property declared 
absentee. Any individual who may have gone to 
Beirut or Bethlehem for a one-day visit during 
the latter days of the Mandate, was automatically 
an absentee. 
(Peretz: 1958: p. 152) 
simili-ir construction of legality has taken place on the West Bank,, 
wf, j_ch (-is i militarily-occupied territory is technically still under the 
jurisdiction of the previous Jordanian legal system. Jordanian law can 
be amended by order of the Israeli. Military Governor, and Military Order 
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No. 10 of July 23,1967 is virtually identical to the Absentees' Property 
Law enacted inside Israel. This order, entitled "Abandoned Property of 
Private Individuals Order" defines as abandoned property all where "the 
legal owner or occupier of which left the Region Ffor any reasoný/- on or 
before the appointed date /operative date of 7.6.19677 or subsequently 
thereto... " (Report of the National Lawyers' Guild: 1977: p. 6). As 
under the Israeli law, Military Order No. 10 created a 'Military Custodian 
of Absentee Property' under the aegis of whom the classification of those 
to whom this law can be applied has been further expanded. In the initial 
form, property was taken to be abandoned if the owner was in a 'hostile' 
country. According to the Report of the National Lawyers' Guild, the 
working definition now includes all property owned by persons resident 
outwith the area -a considerable amount, as it has been estimated that 
the holdings of West Bank Palestinians who are living neither in the West 
Bank nor in a 'hostile' Arab country amount to over 100,000 acres of land 
and ll,. 000 houses (Report of the National Lawyers' Guild: 1977: p. 6). 
Once- property has been passed into the hands of the Military Custodian 
then it is very difficult for it to be regained, largely because of the 
difficulty for West Bank residents who left during the 1967 war to re-enter 
the area. Immediate application to return was made to the Israeli 
Government by 150,000 people out of an estimated 420,000 who left, and of 
these only some 14,000 have been permitted to return. Gerson has noted 
that: 
Repatriation of refugees to their homes, once 
in possession of the Custodian of Enemy Property, 
/ sic / has been permitted only in very limited 
circumstances.... the military has not excluded 
the use of absentee property for its own purposes. 
(Gerson: 1978: p. 141). 
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One of the limiting circumstances has been previous residence in 
Jerusalem. The detail of the way in which the status of Arab Jerusalem 
was changed following its annexation at the conclusion of the 1967 war 
will be discussed later in this chapter; for the time being, it can be 
noted that no application to return has been accepted from a citizen of 
Jerusalem (Schleifer: 1972: pp. 218-9). The same strictures have been 
applied to refugees who had already been displaced in 1948. According to 
a report by the International Red Cross, none of the 1948 refugees who 
had been displaced for a second time in 1967 were permitted to return to 
the West Bank (International Committee of the Red Cross: 1971: p. 448). 
Expropriation of Land 
While similar practices can be seen in colonisation inside Israelafter 
1948 and in the West Bank after 1967, it can be misleading to overrate 
Israeli exceptionalism. Salim Tamari has suggested that the extension 
of what may have been true in one epoch to succeeding epochs is commonly 
presented in the depiction of Jewish colonisation as having a fixed character; 
namely, that the impact of Zionism can be reduced to the displacement of 
pol-isants from their land (Nakhleh & Zureik, eds.: 1980). Such a reduction 
treats the Palestinian population as constant objects of a process, and 
ignores the changing conditions and realities within which Israeli policies 
are formulated. 
An instance of the latter is given in a consideration of the expropri- 
ation of property from Arabs remaining within Israel after 1948 and expro- 
priation of land in the West Bank since 1967. Institutionalized means of 
property deprivation were not restricted to 'abandoned' property after 
1948 and a series of laws were passed which effectively provided for the 
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dispossession of Arabs remaining in Israel. 
documented and will not be reproduced here. 
1 
These have been fully 
As an illustration of how 
the various laws operate, the village of Ikrit in Western Galilee was 
occupied by Israeli forces in October 1948 with no opposition from its 
inhabitants. A week later, Emergency (Security Zones) Regulations were 
applied and the villagers ordered to evacuate to Central Galilee for 
two weeks. After two years of negotiation, the Ikrit villagers appealed 
to the Supreme Court and in 1951 were granted permission to return to 
their villages. This was followed by a month of referral between the 
military governor and the Minister of Defence leading to a second appeal 
in the Supreme Court. However, before the case could be heard, the 
Israeli army blew up all the houses in the village. The expropriation 
of the village's lands - 15,650 dunums - was announced shortly afterwards 
(Jiryis: 1976: p. 92). The case of Ikrit is no isolated example. 
2 
According 
to research carried out under the auspices of the Israeli League of Human 
Rights, of the 475 Palestinian villages existing before 1948, some 385 have 
3 
been destroyed. 
Areas classified as 'security zones' included a strip along the border, 
almost half of Galilee, the entire Triangle and a corridor along the 
Jerusalem-Jaffa railway line. This covered much of the remaining Arab 
population. In addition, areas could be declared 'closed' and entry 
forbidden except by the permission of the army Chief of Staff or the Minister 
of Defence. As land in 'closed' areas necessarily remained uncultivated, 
the Minister of Agriculture, under the Emergency Regulations (Cultivation 
of Waste Lands) Ordinance of 1949 was empoweredto "assume control of the 
land in order to ensure its cultivation". The final step was the official 
4 
transfer of land and property to the State of Israel and its various agencies. 
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The basis for the laws providing for land expropriation and for the 
continuing military government to which the Arab population were subjected 
until 1966 were the Defence Regulations promulgated by the Mandate 
Administration: regulations which were strongly condemned by Zionists 
living under them. It is ironic that the application of Defence Regu- 
lations by the Mandate Administration elicited the following response from 
the Hebrew Lawyers' Union in 1946: 
The powers given to the ruling authority in the 
emergency regulations deny the inhabitants of 
Palestine their basic human rights. These 
regulations undermine the foundation of law and 
justice, they constitute a serious dangerto- 
individual freedom and they institute a regime 
of arbitrariness without any judicial supervision 
(Zureik: 1979: p. 120) . 
Of the Mandate Regulations, Article 125 has been applied in Israel, 
and continues to be applied in the West Bank. It states that: 
A Military Commander may by order declare any 
area or place to be a closed area ... Any person 
who, during any period in which any such order is in 
force.... enters or leaves that area or place without 
a permit in writing issued by or on behalf of the 
Military Commander shall be guilty of an offence 
against these regulations. 
5 
On the West Bank, Article 125 is incorporated in Article 90 of the Security 
Provisions Order. It has been used in a similar way to the Israeli 
"Cultivation of Wastelands" law, in that under Jordanian law, land which 
is not used for cultivation for three consecutive years must be re-registered 
with the government. Areas can therefore be declared 'closed' and then 
confiscated by applying Jordanian law (Report of the National Lawyers' 
Guild: 1977: P-5). As for land pur. chases in the West Bank, after 1967 
the Israeli Government delegated authority to the Jewish National Fund 
and the Israel Land Authority to purchase land in the Occupied territories. 
There is no official information on how much land has been purchased. 
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According to the Jerusalem Post, in April 1973 the ILA reported that it 
had acquired a total of 30,000 dunums in the West Bank excluding Jerusalem, 
with an additional 18,000 dunums inside Jerusalem municipality. 
6 
The JNF 
reported 10,000 dunums purchased in the West Bank ('Jerusalem Post': 
9.4.73). David & Lehn have reproduced an announcement made on Radio Israel 
quoting the claim of the Director of the JNF that during 1975-6, the JNF 
had spent IL 50 million ($6.6 million) on land and occupied territories. 
7 
Land purchase in the West Bank on behalf of the Jewish National Fund 
is carried out by a wholly-ýowned JNF subsidiary, Hemnutah Company. The 
latter was registered as a company in Palestine in 1938 in order to provide 
a means of investment in Palestine for German Jews, (Davis & Lehn: 1978: p-3l)- 
Tn 1971 Hemnutah was registered as a "private company limited by guarantee" 
under the Jordanian Companies Law, with a head office in Bethlehem and the 
minimum required share capital. Daviz and Lehn point out that the device 
of registering as a foreign company utilised by Hemnutah, with registration 
in both Israel and the West Bank, was also employed by the JNF which 
registered in England and in Israel (Davis & Lehn: 1978: p. 32). 
In the early years of the occupation of the West Bank, private purchase 
of land by Israeli citizens or companies was illegal. However, it has 
been pointed out that, many sales took place especially around Jerusalem. 
This was done either by granting an irrevocable power of attorney and 
postponing the registration of the transfer until such time as the government 
would permit private land transactions and may retrospectively authorize 
them, or by using intermediaries. In the case of the former, Davis and 
Lehn suggest that land purchased by Hemnutah has not been registered, 
and that under Jordanian law No. 51 an irrevocable power-of-attorney 
is valid and binding only if notarized and exercised within 5 years of the 
0 
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date of notarization (Davis & Lehn: 1978: p. 30). In the case of the latter, 
Ruedy has stated: 
The government often uses intermediaries to 
cover its purchases so that the seller does not 
know he has sold to Israeiis. Transactions are 
not publicly recorded... As a result of this 
quieter program of acquisition, Israelis own 
propoerty in Ramallah, Hebron, Nablus, Tulkarm, 
Jericho and all over the populated heartland 
of the West Bank. 
(Report of the National Lawyers' Guild: 1977: p. 7). 
The area of land registered in the name of "Arab agents" has been estimated 
as several hundred thousand dunums: (Gerson: 1978: p. 142). In spite of the 
punishment for illegal land transactions having been five years imprisonment 
or a fine of IS 14 '000 
8 it was reported that: "... it seems that the 
Military Goverment ignores all these illegal transactions ... as far as 
is known not one of the thousands who bought land has been brought to 
trial. " ('Halaretz': 4.4.73). 
Military Order 59 (1967) gives the Military Custodian of Absentee 
Property the authority to declare any plot of land state property, it 
being "the responsibility of the owners to prove the opposite" (-IAl Fajr': 
4.2.83). The NLG Report describes the way in which Israel has denominated 
miri land as 'public domain'. This is land held under Ottoman law for 
common cultivation by villagers, and in addition could be subdivided to .'I. 
village families for cultivation. 
9 
Its status is explained as follows: 
"Although technically state land, the state has no rights of usage to 
miri land. Such land passes by inheritance to heirs but cannot be trans- 
ferred by will. " (Report of the National Lawyers' Guild: 1977: p. 7). 
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As an example of how MO 59 has been implemented, in February 1983 
43,000 dunums in the village of Yatta (near Hebron) were declared 'state 
land' and expropriated under this order. The land in question had been 
registered during Ottoman times in the names of 64 residents of Yatta, 
each representing a village family. In addition, the land was re-registered 
in 1951 on an individual basis under a Jordanian land registration scheme. 
('Al Fajr': 11.2.83). According to other sources, by 1973 730,214 dunums 
of ', cultivated public land' in the West Bank had been expropriated under 
this order (Gerson: 1978: p. 189). 
It was suggested in Chapter Three in discussing the application of 
law on Arab land ownership and tenure by the Mandate Administration that the 
logic of such application can be understood only as a feature of domination, 
as the legal forms are not consonant with the form of property ownership 
to which they are being applied. Inside Israel this dissonance is evident 
in, for example, the treatment of Waqf property. 
10 
The definition of land 
in the West Bank as 'state land' as proposed by Military Order No. 59 
is further complicated by the system of land registration in the area. 
A spokesman for the World Zionist Organization, Ze'ev Ben-Yosef, has been 
quoted as describing WZO activities in the West Bank as "making order out 
of chaos" (The Guardian: 4.2.82). His contention is that due to the 
corrupt inefficiency of the Ottoman empire, only half of the West Bank 
land is registered and therefore Arabs are cultivating and building on land 
which does not belong to them. Unregistered plots can be declared 'state 
land' and unless documentary evidence of ownership can be produced there 
is no recourse to the courts and no right to compensation. 
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According to Shehade: h, land was registered in the West Bank only 
if the title was disputed - the procedure of settling land disputes 
was by a settlement court which recognised the right of one of the 
parties to the land. Only about a third of West Bank land has been 
registered in this way (Shehadeh: 1980). In addition, Military Order 291 
abolishes this system so that, in ef f ect, there is no means whereby West 
Bank land can be registered. The point is that the demands made by the 
Military Government for proof of 'ownership' of land represent the 
transplantation of legal definitions - such ownership does not exist 
11 
in terms of West Bank (Jordanian) law, or practice. 
Perhaps the most common means of land expropriation in the West Bank 
is to declare it necessary for reasons of 'security'. The discretionary 
powers of the Military Governor in interpreting what constitutes security 
requirements are wide, and it is part of the nature of security that a 
definition need not be given. 
Earlier it was suggested that it was important not to reduce Israeli 
policies and rationales to an action having an ahistorical character. 
While 
the similarities in Israeli treatment of Palestinian Arab property in 
Israel after 1948 and in the West Bank after 1967 can be seen in, 
for 
example, the way a form of legality is constructed to provide 
for the 
expropriation of property, the context within which this occurs may 
differ 
as may the meaning it has for the people against whom this particular 
legality operates. In order to illustrate this, we can consider how 
settlements were established inside Israel and on the West 
Bank. 
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Settlements 
.... there exists in the JNF a method for legally 
metamorphosing 'neglected' land into the property 
of the Jewish people. Once Jewish settlements are 
built and peopled, and once they are hooked into 
the state network, they become properly extra- 
territorial, emphatically Jewish, and non-Arab. 
To this new land is added as well a strategic 
rationale, that it is necessary for Israel's 
security ..... their effectiveness lies in how they 
Judaize territory coterminously with de-Arabizing 
it. 
(Said: 1980; p. 99) 
This quote illustrates what was commonly called in Israel the 
"creation of facts". While it has been argued that before 1948 the 
establishment of settlements was not a necessity for the Zionist movement, 
"creating facts" has been an important strategy for the Zionist state, 
both inside Israel and in the territories occupied in 1967. 
Inside Israel post-1948, the "strategic rationale" behind the settle- 
ment Programme can be seen in their location in border areas and in the 
remaining centres of Arab population - Galilee, the Triangle and the Negev. 
The meaning of strategy and security can be illustrated by the kind of 
functions settlements were supposed to perform. In proposing rapid 
settlement in Galilee, the head of Keren Keymeth pointed out in a memorandum 
to the then Minister of Defence, Ben-Gurion, that this would involve: 
creating faits accomplis which will make it impossible for the 
government, for all its good intentions, to give up any of the uncultivated 
land for the Arabs to live on" (Jiryis: 1976: p. 106). According to his 
reasoning, it was important to build settlements in areas which did not 
have a Jewish majority in order to remove any future question regarding 
12 
, 
jhts to sovereignty. ric 
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The "security" aspect of settlement at this time was as a means of 
controlling the remaining Arab population. The "Project for the Develop- 
ment of Galilee" (originally called "Project for the Judaization of Galilee") 
was intended to "... break up this concentration of Arabs through Jewish 
settlements... The Arab minority centred here presents a continual threat 
to the security, of the nation... " (Quoted by Jiryis: p. 105), and in 
the late 1950's a decision was made to 'graft' a Jewish town onto Arab 
Nazareth with the aim of eventually creating a Jewish majority. In 1962-3 
land belonging to the villages of Deir al-Asad, Bi'na and Nahaf were 
confiscated for the construction of the city of Karmiel, a city in which 
non-Jews are not permitted to purchase apartments nor to invest in its 
Industrial Park (Amun et al.: 1977: pp. 46-8). As Davis has noted, the 
designation of development areas in Israel, graded W, 'BI and 'Others', 
cover most of the Arab villages in Galilee and the Triangle, yet no Arab 
village has been classified as a development settlement and so cannot 
benefit from the privileges this bestows (Davis & Mezvinsky, eds.: 1973). 
For example, investors in KarmýLel are granted subsidies and tax concessions 
as inducements to establish business in the town. The following quotation 
indicates the encouragement given to prospective residents in 'development 
I. areas . 
Upper Nazareth is a development city, with all 
the financial benefits this entails. Its estab- 
lishment is aimed at giving a 'Jewish answer' to 
empty Galilee, to populate it by Jews. Among the 
benefits given to those who want to settle in the 
city are special housing terms. Young couples 
who come to settle in this city receive loans at 
advantageous conditions and special mortgages. 
Such housing for young couples is limited by 
several conditions. one of them ... is that 
only those who have served in the Israeli army 
are eligible .... 
('Al-Ha'mishmar Supplement': 8.12.78) 
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In spite of these benefits the target populations have not been 
reached. Karmiel, for example, was expected to have a population of 
20,000 by the early 1970's, but by 1975/6 it remained slightly less 
than 10,000. However, the plans for 'Judaization' continue, being 
particularly clearly expressed in a report prepared for Prime Minister 
Rabin by the 'Arabist 113 District Commissioner for Galilee, which was 
leaked and published by 'Al-Ha'mishmar' in 1976. Known as the 'Koenig 
Report', it proposes several solutions for the demographic problem posed 
by the higher birth rate among the Arab population. In Galilee, it 
suggests the necessity to: 
... expand and deepen Jewish settlement 
in areas 
where the contiguity of the Arab population is 
prominent, and where they number considerably 
more than the Jewish population; examine the 
possibility of diluting existing Arab population 
concentrations. Special attention must be paid 
to border areas in the country's northwest and 
to the Nazareth region..... the state law has to 
be enforced so as to limit 'breaking of new ground' 
by Arab settlements in various areas of the 
country. 14 
(Quoted by Said: 1980: p. 108) . 
Security was the reason given for the initial settlement of the 
territories occupied in 1967. This was done by the establishment of 
'Nahal' outposts, described by Gerson as 'paramilitary agricultural centers' 
(Gerson: 1978: p. 135). The Israeli Government position at the end of 
the 1967 war was that civilian settlement in the occupied territories was 
illegal, as it contravened Article 49(. 6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
which states: "The occupying power shall not 
deport or transfer parts of 
its own civilian population into the territory 
it occupies. " Under the 
Convention, however, the establishment of 'security outposts' are permitted. 
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Arab Jerusalem15 had a different status under Israeli law, as a 
series of three bills passed in the Knesset on 27th and 28th June 1967 
served to annexe it, 
16 
the entire area being proclaimed the 'eternal 
capital' of the State of Israel. Settlement in the Old CitY of Jerusalem 
was announced with an expropriation order published in April 1968. This 
provided for the confiscation of about 28 acres, and included over 1,000 
apartments with a total of 6,000 inhabitants and 437 shops and workplaces. 
Of the 700 buildings involved, 465 were Islamic waqf. Around 600 homes 
were reallocated to Israeli families, on the site of what had been the 
'Jewish quarter' (Al-Abid: 1969: p. 134). Those around the Western 
(Wailing) Wall were demolished to make a piazza and car park. 
Outside the Old City walls, a chain of settlements has been built 
which encircles East Jerusalem. As MK Sharon has stated: 
Jerusalem will not be the capital of Israel if 
it does not have a Jewish majority. The answer is 
to establish "satellite towns" around Jerusalem - 
in Gush 'Ezyon, Teqo'a, Ma'ale Ha'adumin, Rimonim, 
Kokhav Hashahar, Bet El, GivIon Within 20 to 30 years 
we must reach the point where there will be a million 
Jews in greater Jerusalem, with the towns surrounding 
it. 
('"Ha'aretz': 20.10.79) 
As has been pointed out in the National Lawyers' Guild Report: "The 
', military disguise' /of settlements/ is not an innovation of the Likud 
Government which came to power in 1977 ..... The Israeli Government's 
encouragement of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza is not a Likud 
innovation. " (Report of the National Lawyers' Guild: 1977: pp. 10-12). 
In 1973, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan stated that Israel should 
remain forever in the West Bank "because this is Judea and Samaria, this 
is our homeland" (Jerusalem Post': 15.5.73). However, as will be argued 
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later, the policy of the Labour Coalition until 1977 and the Likud since 
then has been the annexation of the resources of the West Bank without 
annexing its Arab population. The differences in the detail and emphasis 
of their policies reflect changes taking placing within the Israeli 
political sphere and in Israel's global relations rather than indicate 
fundamentally different attitudes towards the occupied territories. For 
example, the Allon plan orchestrated by the Foreign Minister of the time 
provided for a belt of Nahal settlements along the Jordan Valley, with a 
parallel belt along the 'Allon Road'. 
17 
This was intended to divide the 
more populated areas of the West Bank from Jordan. Harris has pointed out 
that of the two north-south dissecting lines, the belt along the valley 
f loor would appear to have no military use whatsoever. "The chief raison 
d'etre of the valley-floor line appears to be economic. Valley temperatures, 
with a midwinter mean of 14 
0 C, allow the production of lucrative out-of- 
season crops for the European market. " (Harris: 1977: p. 325) . 
The classification of all government-initiated settlement as military 
posts may partly be explained by the need, in the uncertainty 
following 
the 1967 war, to appease international opinion, particularly that of 
the 
United States. However, 11 years after the occupation of the West Bank 
the Israeli Ambassador to the U. S. wrote that: 
... out of regard_to 
the delicate negotiations 
/i. e. Camp David/ ... the government of 
Israel 
itself decided, and so conveyed to the President 
/of the U. S. 1 in September 1977, that new settle- 
ments within the next year would be confined to 
military camps. We have fulfilled that promise. 
(Quoted in Report of the National Lawyers' Guild: 
1977: p. 10) 
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Of the 48 settlements established in the West Bank between 1967 and 1977, 
Lesch's classification indicates that 20 were originally set up as Nahal 
posts and 12 of these are now agricultural, either kibbutzim or moshavim 
(Lesch: 1977). 
Under the Likud Government there has been little ambiguity as regards 
the status of the West Bank. Yitzhak Shamir, Israeli Foreign Minister, 
addressed the Knesset on 2nd March 1983 as follows: 
We did not conquer the territories from their 
legal owners but liberated them from countries 
that conquered them in 1948. We have not 
'annexed' them and we shall not 'annexe' them. 
They are parts of Eretz Yisrael, and what is part 
of your country, you do not annexe. 
('The Times': 4.3.83). 
Prime Minister Begin has spoken of the 'perfect and inalienable right' of 
Israelis to live in the West Bank, and asks: 
'What is a nation without its history? We were 
born as a nation in Judea and Samaria. Will any 
Israeli government forbid Jews to live there? 
It is utterly fantastic. ' 
('The Times': 31.1.83) 
Hirst has described recent Israeli attitudes towards settlement in 
the occupied territories as: "... a torrent of biblico-strategic, clerico- 
military antics and innagery... " (Hirst: 1977: p. 219). However, under- 
lying the 'antics and imagery' is a strategy for the development of Israel 
and the occupied territories which has its own logic. The apparent change 
in settlement policy following the election of a Likud government in May 
1977 can be explained in terms of a changing -relationship between Israel 
and the occupied territories and of shifting alignments within Israel 
itself. The nature of the relationship between Israel and the West Bank 
is the subject of Chapter Five; for the purposes of an examination of the 
importance of settlement in the West Bank after 1967, the intention is to 
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highlight the basis of one of the most active extra-governmental initiators of 
settlements, Gush Emunim, and the relationship of this organisation to 
changes taking place within Israel. 
The imagery of both Likud rhetoric concerning the West Bank and the 
philosophies of Gush Emunim have their roots in Jabotinsky's brand of 
'revisionist Zionizm' and his elaboration of a militant concept of Zionist 
realisation. A detailed analysis of the development of the 'revisionist' 
branch of Zionist thought is outwith the scope of this work, and 
comments will be restricted to a brief general description of the principal 
tenets. 
Firstly, the notion of 'Eretz Yisrael' embodies the idea of a Jewish 
state on both banks of the River Jordan - that is, covering the territory 
of Palestine and Jordan. After 1967, this became a campaign slogan for 
g roups such as the Land of Israel Movement which argued for the retention 
of all territories occupied in 1967 irrespective of conditions which were 
seen by, for example, Begin's Herut party, as grounds for compromise. 
The Land of Israel Movement, which was ostensibly organised on a non-party 
basis, joined the Likud grouping in 1973. An instance of the importance of 
what is taken to constitute 'Eretz Yisrael' is the way in which Israeli 
withdrawal from Sinai and the dismantling of the town of Yamit was cited 
as evidence of how far Israel would go in pursuit of peace. That is, that 
an Israeli settlement in an occupied territory was given up and Israeli 
forces were withdrawn, the argument being that further colonisation on the 
Ww. t Bank need not necessarily be an impediment to a 'Peaceful solution'. 
flowever, in terms of Likud thinking, Sinai was not necessarily part of 
historical 'Eretz Yisraell and therefore compromises could be made. As 
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was illustrated in the statements of the Likud Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister quoted earlier, neither envisages any ideological 
compromise over the West Bank. 
A second tenet of 'revisionism' was its slogan of "social justice 
without class struggle". This in effect was a challenge to the hegemony 
of the 'labour-Zionist' tendency during the Mandate years (see Chapter 
Three). Flapan notes: 
The Revisionists consistently demanded the 
endorsement of the principle of private land 
ownership, the revision of the Zionist budget 
in favour of industry and commerce, the encour-j- 
agement of private initiative in agricultural 
colonisation, subsidies and loans to artisans, 
the prohibition of strikes and lock-outs... " 
(Flapan: 1979: p. 110). 
The settlement strategy of Gush Emunim, described as being"... based 
on a fundamentalist religious viewpoint.... a radical extension of /the 
Likud/ view.. . (Newman: 1982: p. 7), adopted a method of establishing 
settlements which involved squatting until evicted by the Military 
Authorities, and persistently returning (Hitnachalut) . In spite of 
apparent blatant disobedience of governmental demands, Gush Emunim 
established three settlements in the West Bank between the official 
funding of the organisation in 1974 and the end of Labour rule in 1977. 
These were Ma'ale Adumim (1974) on the Jerusalem-Jericho road, Kaddum 
(1975), on the Nablus-Qalqilya road, and Ofra (1975), east of Ramallah. 
In the cases of Kaddum and Ofra the settlements underwent "gradual, but 
unofficial development" (Newman:,. 1-982: p. 34). 
The application of the revisionist demand for privatisation can be 
seen in the type of settlement which was established. Newman notes the 
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', new private enterprise type of settlement" known as Yishuv Kehillati 
(community villages) where many of the settlers are in fact commuting to 
work inside Israel's 1949 borders (Newman: 1982: pp. 39-40). 
The settlement of Ma'ale Adumim is an interesting example of the way 
in which various group interest; have meshed. At the end of 1974, the 
Israeli Cabinet had allocated $1.4 million towards the construction of 
facilities such as roads, drainage and electricity for a proposed industrial 
complex on a site 7 km from Jerusalem. This was in line with the Labour 
Government's Allon plan, in that the site was defined as strategic, being 
on the main Jerusalem-Jordan road. The situation of Ma'ale Adumim on the 
outskirts of Jerusalem also fitted with the interpretation of security 
requirements as including territorial control by encircling Arab residential 
areas. An initial 70,000 dunums were declared 'closed' in 1972 and additional 
expropriations have taken place since then. Plans for the site included 
the construction of a 'work camp' to house employees of the industrial 
complex (Lesch: 1977: p. 45). Gush Emunim attempted to establish a 
settlement by squatting in the area in March 1975, and the Israeli Cabinet 
reached a compromise on who was entitled to live in the 'work camp'. By 
December 1974 settlers had begun to move in, and, as Newman notes, this 
included: 
... a group associated 
to the Histadrut... and 
interested in eventually settling in the proposed 
urban quarter... 
(Newman: 1982: p. 45). 
Given the relationship between the Mapai-dominated Labour Government and 
the Histadrut (see Chapter Three), this amounts to tacit governmental 
support - 
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The success of the venture can be judged by the text of the 
advertisement which appeared in the "Jerusalem Post" in February 1983. 
Following the success of the earlier stages, 
the Ramet company is building another stage - 
at the top of the hill ... Modern luxury apart- 
ments, with coordinated landscaping. Join those 
who have already decided to enjoy the special 
advantages of Ma'aleh Adumim. 
.... For those with housing rights: mortgages 
plus loans up to IS 1,720,000 /prices start at 
IS 1,150,000/. 
The complex includes schools, kindergartens, a multi-level shopping mall, 
municipality buildings and a planned "Israeli Studios for Film and 
Television Inc. " complex, which will incorporate an amphitheatre ('Al Fajr': 
4.2.83) . 
It can therefore be suggested that while the complexion of government 
in Israel may affect the means whereby settlements are established, and the 
type of settlement whidh is set up, the principle has remained constant. 
Although the Labour Government did not officially 'recognise' Gush Emumin 
settlements established illegally under its jurisdiction, this is perhaps 
more to do with the fact that they lay outwith the strategy of the Allon plan 
than that they represented a contradiction of Government policy. Benefits 
offered to Israelis willing to settle in 'development areas' such as Galilee 
were noted earlier. In spite of the official Labour Government view of settle- 
ment after 1967, tax exemption for Jewish settlers in the occupied territories 
averaged $1,500 per year by 1975, and Government loans for lauilding expenses 
were accorded on 'very good terms' (Report of the National Lawyers' Guild: 
1977: p. 11). Government finance was also used to construct basic amenities, 
prepare land and in some cases buildings. For example, it has been estimated 
that the settlement of Sadot in Northern Sinai which was established as a 
Labour moshav in 1971 required an initial Government/Jewish Agency contri- 
bution of around $275,000 per family (Lesch: 1977: p. 28). 
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Following the Likud election victory in 1977, financial encouragement 
was most commonly done by direct subsidy to the settlement. Having 
'recognised' the existing Gush Emunim settlements and the right of 
Gush Emunim to be considered as a settlement organisation 
18 
the Likud 
Government provided considerable funds directly for an increased settlement 
programme in the occupied territories. It has been claimed that in its first 
month of office alone, this amounted to $400 million (Report of the National 
Lawyers' Guild: 1977: p. 11). 
In October 1978 the World Zionist Organization's Department for Rural 
Settlement published its "Master Plan for the Development of Settlement in 
Judea and Samaria 1979-1983". This plan, known as the 'Drobles' plan, 
called for the establishment of 46 new settlements in the West Bank with a 
total of 16,000 families, plus 11,000 families to 'thicken' existing 
settlements. The estimated cost of implementing this plan was IL 54 billion 
(Will: 1982). 
The 'Jerusalem Post' reported in 1979 that the Ministerial Committee 
on Settlement had passed a settlement budget of IL 150 billion - an amount 
which was almost half the entire state budget ('Jerusalem Post' : 16.11.79). 
While this covered expenditure on all Israeli settlements, the importance 
attached to settlement in the West Bank is indicated by an update of 
the Drobles plan, published in September 1980. Titled "Settlement in 
Judea and Samaria - strategy, policy and plans", this report proposed that: 
In light of current negotiations on the future 
of Judea and Samaria, it will now become necessary 
for us to conduct a race against time .... the state- 
owned lands and uncultivated barren lands in Judea 
and Samaria ought to be seized right away, with the 
purpose of settling the areas ..... There mustn't 
be 
even the shadow of a doubt about our intention to 
keep the territories of Judea and Samaria for good. 
(UN Document A/36/341: 23.6.81) 
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The settlement goal was now set at establishing between 60 and 75 new 
settlements with a total population of 120,000-150,000 (Will: 1982: p. 45). 
Israeli Settlers in the West Bank 
In discussing settlements established in Galilee, the link was noted 
between the location of settlements and means of controlling the remaining 
Arab population. Thus, for example, the creation of 'development areas' 
designed to increase Jewish habitation in areas with a relatively large 
Arab population can be seen as a means of ensuring that the Arab population 
in Israel would remain a minority even on a regional basis. The construction 
of towns such as Karmiel and Upper Nazareth serve to confirm this, as they 
are intended to be restricted to Jewish residents and investors. While the 
same restrictions obviously apply to Israeli settlement in the West Bank, 
the specific conditions under which colonisation is being carried out 
require elucidation. 
In Chapter One it was suggested that colonialism is more than the 
initial subjugation of a people, in that it involves the generation of a 
power relation between coloniser and colonised. The way in which this 
relation is expressed will differ with time and circumstance, and it is for 
this reason that the problems arising from an ahistorical conceptual isation 
of the colonisation process were noted. As an instance of the meaning of 
occupation for the occupied, we can consider the way in which settlement in 
the West Bank constitutes more than the implantation of a physical presence, 
by focussing on the tensions between Israeli settlers, the local population 
and the Military Authorities. 
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To give a specific example, we can consider the case of settlers in 
Kiryat Arba, which is the oldest and largest Israeli settlement in the 
West Bank. Kiryat Arba was founded in 1968 and many of the original 
members were active in the establishment of Gush Emunim. The settlement 
was intended to be urban and was built on the edge of Hebron, on land 
expropriated from Hebron and Halhoul (Lesch: 1977). Like all the settle- 
ments in the West Bank it is heavily fortified, including a high perimeter 
fence and patrolled entrance --a-id exit. 
In 1979 settlers from Kiryat Arba occupied the Daboya (Hadassah) 
building in the centre of Hebron, and according to a petition brought 
before the High Court of Justice have since engaged in a campaign of 
harrassment in an attempt to force people living around the area to leave. 
It has been claimed that settlers have been responsible for breaking 
windows, stone-throwing, setting dogs on passers-by and breaking into 
businesses on the ground floor of the Daboya building and in adjoining build- 
ings. On 29 March 1980 a petition'9 was filed on behalf of eleven Hebron 
appellants, headed by the acting Mayor, to request the Court to compel the 
Military Commander of the area and the Minister of Defence to give reasons 
for not having evicted the Kiryat Arba settlers from the Daboya building. 
In addition, questions were asked in Court about the deferring of complaints 
made by inhabitants of Hebron against the settlers. In summing up, the 
judge noted: "The Appellants have no preferential judicial status, as to 
occupying the place, than the settlers, and it is not the concern of the 
appellants whether the settlers' occupancy is legal. " The final ruling 
was that the petition should be rejected. 
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In addition to the occupation of the Daboya building, Kiryat Arba 
settlers have constructed a gift shop in the market area of Hebron and like 
the settlement itself this is surrounded by steel fencing. The shop is 
intended to take advantage of the tourist trade and specifically for 
visitors to the Ibrahimi Mosque (Tomb of the Patriarchs), where the prophet 
Abraham is said to be buried. An official of Hebron Municipality claimed 
that plans were being made to demolish the buildings between the shop and 
the Mosque, the reason being that the security of tourists could not be 
guaranteed in an enclosed area. The buildings in question are Arab houses 
and businesses in the old part of Hebron, and these would be replaced by 
gardens and a car park (Interview: 27.9.81). 
The initial justification behind Israeli settlement in Hebron was 
that Jewish families had owned property there before 1948, and present day 
20 
settlers in the city itself claim that they are repossessing this property. 
A similar rationale underlay the permission granted in 1967 for the establish- 
ment of a settlement at Kfar Etzion (between Bethlehem and Hebron) . Kibbutz 
Kfar Etzion was one of the few Jewish settlements outwith Israel's 1949 
borders, 
21 
and it was families of original members of this kibbutz who 
applied for permission to form a new settlement there, as a "redemption of an 
obligation to their parents". Gerson notes that in evicting 200 Arab 
farmers and requisitioning 1200 dunums (300 acres) of land for the settlement: 
"The stated reason was that a large number of terrorist incidents had 
occurred in the area, although it was not denied that the settlement may 
have been the cause of terrorist activity. " (Gerson: 1978: p. 137). Despite 
appeals by the Mayors of Hebron, Bethlehem, Beit Jalah and Beit. Sahour the 
requisition order was not rescinded, and by the mid-1970's Kfar Etzion had 
a population of around 200, their livelihood largely being based on poultry 
breeding (Lesch: 1977). 
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An unofficial curfew is frequently imposed on Hebron by settlers from 
Kiryat Arba, who can be seen patrolling the streets, shouting slogans and 
occasionally - firing in the air. One slogan heard regularly was translated 
as "This land is ours". The difference between such confrontation and the 
tactics of exclusion and negation discussed previously is illustrated in 
the following comment about the way in which Palestinian Arabs are 
considered within the framework of revisionism: 
Of all the Zionist formations, the Revisionists 
were the least interested in the Arab question. 
The Arabs concerned them only as enemies, and 
as enemies they had to be treated without pity. 
In other words to be smashed as there was no 
room for compromise. 
(Flapan: 1979: p. 114). 
The notion of settlement as a means of territorial and population 
control has been discussed with reference to settlements inside Israel. 
In this context, however, control has been of a small minority - the Arab 
population is now around 17% of the total population living in Israel. For 
Israeli settlers in the West Bank, it is they who are the minority. Excluding 
the settlements encircling East Jerusalem 
22 
the number of settlers was 
estimated as 25,000 at the beginning of 1983 (Economist Intelligence Unit: 
1983). There are some important differences between the settlements 
around East Jerusalem and those in other parts of the West Bank. The East 
Jerusalem settlements are not fortified in the way of those outside the 
city and resemble large housing estates made up of 3 and 4 storey blocks of 
apartments. Apart from the type of settlement, the settlers who have moved 
into the East Jerusalem "satellites" tend to be recent immigrants taking 
advantage of the favourable terms offered by the government, and the 
proximity to the main Israeli centres of employment. This difference can 
be explained within the Israeli government perspective as regards the 
annexed status of Jerusalem, such that the East Jerusalem settlements are 
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seen as Israeli towns. 
Of great significance for the Palestinian Arab population of the 
West Bank is the way in which Israeli settlers constitute a paramilitary 
presence, and their relationship with the Israeli Military Authorities. 
report in the 'Jerusalem Post' in 1980 stated that: 
'West Bank settlers are preparing to fight the 
Arab terrorists with or without the army's help... 
Settlement leaders have decided to form 'regional 
security committees' which will obtain arms, train 
settlers and collect information on Arab riots, 
stone-throwing and incitement .... well-informed 
settler sources indicated they would act if the army 
should be curbed by political factors. 
('Jerusalem Post': 11-17 May, 1980). 
The disturbing aspect of the last part of this report is that the settlers 
are also part of the Israeli Defence Force, carrying out reserve duty in 
common with other Israeli citizens. However, West Bank settlers are 
organised within a framework of 'area defence' which means that they 
serve in the occupied territories. Ramallah, for example, is patrolled 
primarily by settlers from Ofra, Beit Horon and Beit El. 
Apparent conflict between the settlers and the Military Authorities 
has taken place. It was reported that: "When the governor of Ramallah 
demanded the arms back from the settlers from Ofra following their 'police 
action' last year, the settlers simply refused. " (. 'Halaretzl: 16.5.80). 
However, nothing came of this refusal. There have also been cases of the 
Military Authorities carrying out enquiries into the mistreatment of 
civilians, and the settlers accused of mistreatment being seen patrolling 
the West Bank in uniform, on reserve duty. A notable example is Meir 
Kahane, whose 'Kach' movement was described by 'Newsweek" as 
". 
.a dumping 
ground for young thugs. Some of them never bother to 
learn Hebrew and they 
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often return home /i. e. USA/ after a few months of hell-raising on the 
West Bank. " ('Newsweek', International Edition: 16.6.80). 
The imposition of an unofficial curfew on Hebron by Kiryat Arba 
settlers has been mentioned. It has also been claimed that during demon- 
strations and strikes in Hebron, groups of armed settlers have broken up 
the protest and taken prisoners back to Kiryat Arba. A Hebron resident 
said that on one occasion the local people had erected a roadblock in 
protest at the military occupation. "The settlers forced the Sheikh, who 
is an old man, to clear the stones by himself, all the while shouting 
insults at him and pushing and pulling him... " (Interview: December 1981). 
The dividing line between military and para-military in the West 
Bank is confused by the fact that Israeli settlers are both protected by 
the occupying army and serving in it. In addition to this, they retain 
their civilian status. 
Ott has suggested that in the wake of the Camp David Agreements, 
Israeli settlement in the West Bank was increased in order to pre-empt any 
political option of autonomy for the occupied territories (Ott: 1980) . He 
describes a case in the Israeli High Court in autumn 1979, when a ruling was 
made that the Gush Emunim settlement of Elon Moreh, near Nablus, contravened 
international law. The distinction drawn in the judgement was between 
military settlements established under political pressure and Gush Emunim 
settlements motivated by political goals. However, as Ott points out: 
"... these aspects are clearly two sides of the same coin. The ultimately 
political repercussions in the occupied territories are 
implicit in both 
instances. " (Ott: 1980: p. 76). 
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Uri Davis has noted that the 'successful' Israeli settlements are 
those which are linked to the economic centres of Israel, and where the 
settlers can commute to work inside Israel. He describes the motivations 
behind settlement as: 
... idealism supported by very strong material 
benefits. When you talk with people it is first 
of all the idealism, the promised land in the 
fundamentalist Biblical sense of the term, and 
th. an, of course, ecology, less taxes - all kinds 
of environmental and material considerations. 
(Davis: 1979: p. 15) 
However, in spite of these incentives, it has been suggested that the 
number of Israelis who have gone to new settlements in the occupied 
territories has fallen far short of expectations, 
23 
and Ott has related 
this to renewed Israeli efforts to attract immigrants, suggesting that 
a motive for large-scale immigration is the provision of necessary 
manpower for territorial e--, -, pansion through settlement (Ott: 1980: p. 78). 
This illustrates very well the sense in which the interests of 
sett-A-ers in the West Bank are interwoven with governmental strategy 
to implement a settlement drive, and the shades of ideological and material 
considerations which underlie this. While at one level Ott's point can 
be upheld in that all settlements in the West Bank represent the implan- 
tation of the coloniser, at another level it is important to maintain the 
multiplicity of rationales which underpin Israeli settlement. 
This is important also in explaining what settlement means for the 
popjjj-ý-ILion of the West Bank. Tamari argues that while the issue of settle- 
rrient has been one of the most explosive aspects of the Palestinian- I srae li 
conflict, settlements themselves have had a marginal impact on structural 
124 change, due to their revivial of the notion of 'Jewish labour (see 
Chapter Three) and to their unsuccessful attempts to attract settlers 
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(Nakhleh & Zureik, eds. : 1980: pp. 88-9) . This leads Tamari to conclude 
that the mechanisms of Israeli control must be sought elsewhere, and 
Chapter Five of this thesis will be concerned with an examination of the 
nature of the relationship between Israel and the West Bank. 
However, while the settlers in the West Bank may be numerically weak, 
and the 'exclusive' nature of the settlements precludes a strong direct 
impact on the West Bank economy, their importance as a symbol and as a 
strategy should not be underestimated, and their very location is an 
indication of this. The role of the settlers as a flexible paramilitary 
force is also becoming more significant, and supportsýthe thesis that the 
expropriation of land and establishment of settlements in the West Bank 
represents an instance of a colonial power relationship. 
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NOTES 
In The Arabs in Israel, Sabri Jiryis describes the series of laws 
passed following the establishment of the State of Israel, and the 
way in which they served to institutionalise the expropriation of 
Arab property (Jiryis: 1969). 
2. Appeals against expropriation continue to be made. For example, 
villagers from Bir'am, a Maronite Christian village in Upper Galilee, 
petitioned the Israeli Prime Minister, the Pope, the Ambassadors of 
Britain, USA and France, and the United Nations when they were removed 
from their village in 1948. As with Ikrit, they took their case to 
the High Court which decided in favour of their return conditional on 
the approval of the Military Authority. This was refused, and in 1953 
the village was destroyed by the Israeli army. Two-thirds of the 
original land held by the village is now a kibbutz; the remaining third 
is unused and fenced off to prevent trespassing. Bir'am villagers are 
still requesting permission to return to the third of their land which 
is unused, and have pressed no claims for the rest. 
An attempt to document the destroyed villages has been made by 
Aref el Aref and Israel Shahak, as frequently no trace remains 
(Khader: 1981) . 
4. This was the Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts and Compensation) 
Law of 1953, which served to legalize the process of expropriated 
land being transferred to the State or to the JNF via the Development 
Authority. 
5. Article 125 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations 1945. 
6. The total land area of the West Bank is 5.5 million dunums, 1.4 
million acres (Abu Ayyash: 1981). 
7. The money had been spent through a subsidiary company 
jointly owned 
by the Jewish National Fund and the Israel Land Authority. Purchases 
included buildings, public institutions and church property. According 
to the report, the purchases had to remain secret, as "many of the 
Arab 
inhabitants, living on the acquired lands, do not yet know these lands 
are in the possession of the Israel Land Fund 
/i. e. JNF7" (International 
Organisation for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: 
1976: p. 86). 
8. Under Jordanian law, the death penalty can be invoked 
for Palestinian 
Arabs selling land to Israelis (see also Chapter Six). 
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In The Land Law of Palestine: an Analysis of the Definition of State 
Lands, Shehadeh notes that of the five categories of land ownership 
the Ottoman land code, the basis of miri matrouk and mawat 
holdings to the Sultan. However, thi§ gives him no rights to land 
usage. In describing this separation of legal rights to ownership 
and to usage, Shehadeh suggests that the nearest equivalent under 
English law is the idea of a trust (Shehadeh: 1982). 
10. Waqf property is regarded as belonging to God, and income derived from 
this property may only be used for charitable ends. Under the Mandate, 
the British Administration had authorised the leaders of the Islamic 
community to manage the Islamic waqf. According to Jiryis, the Israeli 
government simply declared waqf property to be absentee property (Jiryis: 
1976: p. 118). 
In terms of Israeli law there are four categories of land-holding: 
state, Development Authority, JNF and private. The conditions attached 
to leasing land owned by the JNF were noted in Chapter Three. Davis & 
Lehn point out that these restrictions in fact apply to all 'publicly- 
owned' land in Israel and indeed to an unknown proportion of privately- 
owned land. The significance of this is that of a total 20,255,000 dunums, 
18,775,000 (92.6%) is designated as 'national lands' (Davis & Lehn: 1978). 
As was explained earlier, national in Israel means Jewish rather than 
Israeli. 
12. In addition to its Arab majority, Galilee did not fall within the 
boundaries allocated to Israel under the original partition plan, and 
it was felt that Israel's 'right' to it may be questioned on these 
grounds. 
13. The role of the Israeli "Arab expert" has been examined by Said 
(Said: 1980: pp. 106-7), and the power which the "Arabists" wield through 
their representation on government bodies, Histadrut committees and 
so on. In effect, it is an acceptable form of Arab representation with- 
out the Arabs, and is perhaps comparable to the part played by European 
'experts' in the 19th Century (see Chapter One). 
14. In addition to the proposals to increase settlement, Koenig recommended 
changes in areas such as Arab education; changes which would encourage 
either emigration or acceptance. For example, to make it easier for 
Arabs to study abroad and more difficult to return; to channel Arab 
students into subjects such as natural sciences which "leave less time 
for dabbling in nationalism and the dropout rate is higher. " 
15. As used here, 'Arab Jerusalem' refers to the Old City within the 
walls and the area known as East Jerusalem ; in other words, those 
parts of Jerusalem which remained outwith Israel's 1949 
borders. 
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16. The first bill authorised the Government of Israel to apply Israeli 
law and administration 'in any part of Palestine to be determined by 
decree'. The second concerned freedom of access to and protection of 
the Holy Places. The third authorised the Government of Israel to 
extend the jurisdiction of municipalities without the existing lengthy 
procedure, and to appoint additional councillors ('Keesings Contemporary 
Archives': 1967-8: Vol. XVI). United Nations Resolutions 2253 (4.7-67) 
and 2254 (14.7.67) condemning the annexation were adopted by 99 votes 
to 0, with 20 abstentions. The status of Jerusalem as capital of Israel 
remains largely unrecognised (see also Chapter Two). 
17. The 'Allon Road' is an unpaved 25 meter wide highway, officially known 
as the 'Road of the Country of the Manhunts' (Davis: 1979: p. 13). 
18. This put Gush Emunim on the same footing as the established kibbutz 
and moshav settlement organisations, in that they could be represented 
on national settlement committees and were eligible for the same 
proportion of grants and loans. 
19. Details from the petition filed by Acting Mayor Al Natshe andlO other 
Hebron residents are from unpublished papers of Advocate Felicia Langer 
who, with Advocate Abed al Asali, presented the petition. 
20. Advocate Langer quoted a statement 
Hebron, Fahd Kawasmeh, which asked 
applied and settlers permitted to 
Jews before 1948, then would the s 
by Arabs in Israel before 1948. 
made by the expelled Mayor of 
that if this reasoning was to be 
occupy houses which were owned by 
ame reasoning apply to property owned 
21. Kibbutz Kfar Etzion was a kibbutz from 1943 till 1948. 
22. Citing a United Nations Report, David Ott gives the total number of 
settlers in East Jerusalem and the West Bank as 90,000 by mid-1979. 
They were distributed amongst 17 settlements in and around Jerusalem 
and 62 settlements in other parts of the West Bank (Ott: 1980: p. 73). 
23. Tamari quotes a report in 'The Observer' which revealed that in 1977, 
the average population in each settlement in the occupied territories 
was 100 (Nakhleh & Zureik, eds.: 1980: p. 88). 
24. With the exceptions of Kiryat Arba and Rafah, settlements in the occupied 
territories do not employ local, or non-Jewish, labour. 
Chapter Five 
ISRAEL & THE WEST BANK 
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Chapter Five 
The consideration of the expropriation of land and establishment 
of settlements in Israel after 1948 and in the West Bank after 1967 
has served to illustrate the dynamic nature of the colonial relationship. 
While the continuity of the relation between coloniser and colonised can 
be seen in an analysis of colonialism -as a 
historical process, a fixed 
character should not be attributed to this process. For example, the 
widespread expulsion of the Arab population and expropriation of property 
which took place after 1948 has not taken place in the West Bank - the 
context has changed and the requirements have changed. Aspects of the 
changing context and requirements have been discussed; the concern of 
this Chapter will be to examine the nature of the relationship between 
Israel and the West Bank since the 1967 occupation. In Chapter Two, it 
was suggested that the creation of a single customs barrier was of signi- 
ficance, in that the formation of a single barrier towards other economies 
helped establish new conditions between Israel and the occupied territories, 
and an elaboration of this provides a useful starting point. 
The Nature of Trade 
On the movement of goods and services between Israel and the occupied 
territories, a report issued by the Bank of Israel states that: 
The rising share of trade with Israel in 
the areas' /I. e. 1967 occupied territories7 
total foreign trade expresses the expansion 
of ties between the three econoiTiies in fact, 
it is more in the nature of trade between 
adjacent regions within a single economy than 
of international trade. 
(Bregman: 1975: p. 90). 
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Witihin the period considered in the Bank of Israel report, 1968-73, the 
occupied territories had become Israel's second largest export market - 
for the West Bank, this meant that 90% of all imports came from Israel 
(Hilal: 1976). Although the links between the West Bank and Gaza and 
their former trading partners in the Arab world were severed immediately 
after the 1967 war, the Allenby bridge from the West Bank to Jordan was 
soon re-opened. However, an increasing share of exports from the occupied 
territories goes to Israel, either for consumption there or to become part 
of Israel's exports overseas. 
The main drawback in approaching the analysis of such changes using 
concepts like 'trade' was discussed in Chapter One, and it is that the 
significance of what is actually being 'exchanged' and how it is exchanged 
is glossed over. As Van Arkadie suggests: "Once the appropriate environ- 
ment was established by Israeli public policy, the market dynamics lent 
to the resulting economic process an apparent naturalness and logic... " 
(Van Arkadie: 1977: p. 43). Thus, for example, the emphasis placed on 
economic growth, higher wages and the possession of consumer goods as 
defining features of the relationship between Israel and the territories 
occupied in 1967 implies the notion of exchange between partners of equal 
status. The possibility of linking economic growth, higher wages, and 
consumption of consumer products with the demands of Israeli industry for 
cheap labour and a market for produce is outwith the boundaries of such an 
approach. By insisting on the centrality of 'market forces', the fact that 
they have been operating under the control of a military government for 
sixteen years becomes of little significance. 
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The conceptualisation of the relationship between Israel and the 
occupied territories as that of the relationship between coloniser and 
colonised is the attempt to construct an interpretation of the meaning 
of occupation for West Bank Palestinians which can take into account 
their specific experiences under the detail of implemented Israeli policy 
and the experience of the Palestinian encounter with Zionism. By 
approaching the analysis in this way, we can look more closely at what 
is involved in trade between Israel and the occupied territories. Of 
all exports from the West Bank to Israel, in 1973 the proportion defined 
as 'industrial' had risen to over 80% (Bregman: 1975). According to Bregman, 
'industrial' meant construction materials, textiles and clothing, and 
furniture. Referring back to Chapter One, it was noted that the definition 
of- indtistry on the basis of product rather than the form of production 
can lead to anomalous conclusions being drawn, with no differentiation 
being made between, for example, a home-based workshop run as a supplement 
to subsistence farming and a high technology factory. In the West Bank, 
1 
only three enterprises employ over 100 people, and perhaps the most 
significant change to have taken place since 1967 has bee. n the increase 
in subcontracting for Israeli manufacturers. This has been particularly 
so in the textile industry, and the position of Palestinian workers in 
textiles in the West Bank will be discussed later in this Chapter. For 
the time being, we can note that textiles and clothing has become an 
increasing constituent of Israel's exports overseas, and suggest that the 
use of cheap labour employed in workshops in the occupied territories 
has 
contributed to this. As an example of the extent to which subcontracting 
is taking placer Ryan has noted that the value of subcontracted work in 
the West Bank rose from IL 810,000 in 1968 to IL 3,800,000 in 1970 
(Ryan: 1974) p. 15). 
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In 1969, the 'Jerusalem Post' reported: 
Sewing shops are sprouting up to do jobs for Ata, 
Rex, Barbir, Elastex and others. 'We have another 
eight clothing factories ready to give orders if 
there are takers', Mr. Bechar /of the Israeli 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry/ said. Contracts 
are given out by furniture factories: Rahat of 
Lydda has booked orders with companies in Nablus 
and Bethlehem. An Israeli company was planning to 
build its own foam mattress plant, but instead placed 
orders with a factory on the West Bank to the sum 
of IL 400,000 in 1968 and will double this amount 
this year. 
('Jerusalem Post', Overseas Weekly: 7.2.69). 
The Israeli government has offered investment incentives for 
Israelis who wish to establish enterprises in the occupied territories by 
extending the 'Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investment' (see 
Chapter Two). It should be noted that this applies only to Israelis, 
and residents of the West Bank and Gaza cannot take advantage of these 
benefits. The privileges offered to Israeli investors include a loan of 
up to 50% of working capital at low interest, a government grant of up to 
a third of the investment in building and development, and exemption from 
income tax for five years (cited in Ryan: 1974). In addition, the potential 
I'-- 
cost of labour is lower in the occupied territories than in Israel. 
The shift of capital to areas sharing economic features with the 
West Bank, such as a supply of cheap labour and government-sponsored 
inducements and benefits for investors, has been documented throughout the 
world, and is at the core of research into the New International Division of 
Labour. Fr8bel et al. discuss the way in which parts of the production 
prr-)c-ess are relocated according to the supply of reserve armies of potential 
workers at a low price: 
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The first shifts of US industry were to Western 
Europe and to countries 'south of the border'; 
West European countries transferred production 
to other regions in Europe, such as Eire, Greece, 
Portugal and the south of Italy; Japanese industry 
moved into South Korea and Taiwan. At the same 
time, industrial firms recruited labour from 
countries with high rates of unemployment and drew 
it in to the traditional sites of industrial prod- 
uction. Hence the appearance of Gastarbeiter in 
Western Europe, and Mexican and Puerto Rican 
immigrant workers in the USA. 
(Fr6bel et al.: 1980: p. 14) 
While the West Bank exhibits the characteristics thought to be favourable 
in the reorganisation of production, there has been no large-scale Israeli 
investment in the occupied territories outwith their own settlements there 
(see Chapter Four). The reasons for this can be seen in the specific 
conditions operating in the area. Firstly, there is the political uncer- 
tainty as regards the future of the occupied territories, and as will be 
discussed later, it has been in Israel's interests to maintain such 
uncertainty. Secondly, there has been no need to establish enterprises 
in the West Bank as geographical proximity has made it easy to employ 
Wost Bank labour in concerns inside Israel's 1949 borders. This also 
means that West Bank workers employed in Israel remain under the control 
of the Israeli Military Authorities, as the particular political strictures 
which have been applied do not permit residents of the occupied territories 
to remain overnight in Israel. 
It can be suggested that for Israeli capital the location of enter- 
prises in the West Bank, or subcontracting to small local concerns, repre- 
sents a Imopping-up I of elements of the workforce, and this point will be 
cli-iborated later. For the time being, a consideration of the New 
International Division of Labour can be linked with previous discussion of 
trade as a means of domination, as the main feature which is hidden in 
most studies of 'trade' between Israel and the occupied territories is that 
the main export from the territories to Israel is labour. 
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West Bank Labour in Israel 
In Ju-1y 1968 the Israeli Knesset approved adraftbill permitting a 
fixed quota of Arab workers from the West Bank and Gaza to be employed 
in Israel. The requirements were security clearance of the prospective 
employee, plus a certificate from the Labour Exchange stating that there 
would be no replacement of Israeli labour, and Israeli law was applied 
to channel everyone seeking employment through the Labour Exchanges 
(Rekhess: 1975). By September 1968, around 5,800 West Bank residents were 
employed in Israel; by July of the following year this had risen to 9,000, 
and it is estimated that by this time there were a further 9,000 'illegal' 
workers who had not been employed through official channels (Ministry of 
Labour: 1976). There has been a continued increase, both amongst those 
following the legal procedure and those not. According to the Israeli 
Ministry of Labour, in 1980,40,200 people from the West Bank were employed 
in Israel - 28% of the West Bank workforce - and the Ministry of Labour's 
estimate is that these 'legal' workers constitute about two-thirds of the 
total. A more realistic percentage of the West Bank labour force employed 
2 
in Israel is therefore 40-50%. 
The importance of this for the Israeli economy is that while Palestinians 
from the occupied territories constitute around 20% of Israel's civilian 
industrial workforce and from 12-30% of the agricultural workforce, 
3 
they 
are heavily concentrated in certain sectors such as construction. 
Statistics 
compiled in 1981 by the Israeli Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs 
indicate that 65% of construction workers inside Israel are Palestinians 
from the West Bank and Gaza ('The Times': 9.4.83). Given that this figure 
4 
excludes residents of East Jerusalem, 'illegal' 
labour, and Palestinian 
Arabs resident inside Israel, then the extent of the total participation 
in 
construction can be seen to 
be considerable. 
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It has been suggested by Farjoun. that the need to sustain a settler 
society involved the maintenance of a relatively high standard of living 
for Israel's Jewish population in order to prevent emigration or political 
instability, and that this imperative imposed constraints on action 
against the Jewish proletariat (Farjoun: 1980). In addition, military 
and political developments after 1967 entailed the expansion of all sectors 
concerned with the administration of the newly-occupied territories, and 
the constantly increasing defence sector has already been noted (see 
Chapter Two). Farjoun's argument is that as defence and related industries 
have demanded more and more of the Jewish workforce, and as the perpetuation 
of the State of Israel in its present form requires the maintenance of a 
Jewish majority - and consequently the granting of privileges and special 
status to that majority - the Israeli civilian economy has become largely 
dependent on Arab labour. 
The significance of this for Farjoun's argument is that Arab workers 
t4 
cons itute a 'reserve army of labour' in the &ense that the Arab labour 
force must absorb the fluctuations in the Israeli economy. In other words, 
while Jewish workers in Israel have the advantages accorded to organised 
labour and are protected by the requirements of the state regarding Jews 
in Israel, no such advantages pertain to Arab workers. This enforced 
flexibility described by Farjoun can be seen to some extent as a character- 
istic shared by migrant labour in other parts of the world. For example, 
in West Germany, Turkish workers are imported during periods of economic 
expansion and are the first to be made redundant when they are no longer 
of use. Similarly, the current trend in the oil-producing states of the 
Gulf to utilise Asian labour, which can be obtained as part of a total 
contract and is cheap and relatively free of prob lems. 
5 
Such workers have 
no 'rights' and can make no claims. 
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There is, however, an important sense in which Palestinian workers 
in Israel differ from migrant labour in other parts of the world and 
that is the way in which their situation is constantly modified by their 
national status. It is for this reason that the context in which we can 
discuss the position of Palestinian labour in Isr4el is conceptualised as 
a colonial relationship. Tamari talks of the "daily confrontation with 
Jewish contractors, bosses, workers and Israeli culture in general" 
(Tamari: 1981), and this confrontation is not restricted to the workplace. 
To give an example of this, we can consider the type of work, for the most 
part defined as 'unskilled', and the actual work processes involved. 
Tamari points out: 
Traditionally, Arab construction, which constituted 
a job with an elaborate hierarchy of skills and stages 
of initiation, has been transformed by Israeli building 
firms into a relatively mechanised industry with a 
tremendous thirst for unskilled labour. 
(Tamari: 1981) 
While this process of deskilling is familiar from other parts of the world, 
i 
and can be explained at one level as a common problem faced in the disruption 
brotiqlit-- ibout by the introduction of capitalist forms, at another level 
tile Iji(ilysis must consider the sense in which- this is a facet of the 
Palestinian experience of colonisation. The process can be traced back to 
the position of Arabs inside Israel after the establishment of the state. 
It has been described as follows: 
In the period 1948758, the Arab worker was driven 
into the unskilled, manual jobs that were the most 
exhausting and least well paid, jobs shunned by the 
Jewish worker such as mixing plaster cleaning jobs, 
unskilled jobs in quarries and construction.... 
(Jiryis: 1976: p. 221) 
The reason why the Arab worker took this kind of employment is that there 
was little option. The expropriation of land (see Chapter Four) meant 
that income from agriculture was much restricted and often involved 
Arab wage-labour on land which they had owned prior to the 1948-9 war, 
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as all Arab towns and villages inside Israel were dispossessed of 
considerable portions of the land on which they had depended for their 
livelihood. Until 1966 Arabs inside Israel were under the jurisdiction 
of Area military Governors. In order to leave their villages, travel 
permits had to be granted and these were with-held from Arabs wishing to 
travel to Jewish areas to find work (Jiryis: 1976). While Arab labour was 
cheap and unorganised, it was more important for the Israeli state at that 
time to prevent competition from Arab labour and, as in the time of the 
Mandate, Arabs were excluded from all but the bottom end of the scale. 
6 
For the Arabs in the 1967-occupied territories, agriculture is becoming 
less and less viable and alternatives within the occupied territories 
themselves are few. Research carried out in the West Bank indicates that 
in construction there is a preference shown by West Bank workers for 
employment in Israel rather than the West Bank, and building contractors 
have complained about the difficulty in recruiting local labour, even when 
the same salaries are offered (Tamari: 1981). The explanation suggested 
is the difference in the conditions of work, in that Israeli contractors are 
generally working for large construction companies, the West Bank workers 
are being employed illegally, and payment is prompt and regular. Arab 
construction firms in the West Bank are mostly small family concerns and 
the work process differs in the way mentioned previously, so that the 
workers required are traditionally 'skilled' craftsmen, and the work is 
neither regular nor dependable. 
The closing of opportunities as regards employment has implications 
also for education amongst Palestinians both inside Israel and in the 
occupied territories. There are few employment prospects for people going 
through higher education, and as will be discussed in Chapter Seven, there 
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is increasing pressure on children not to complete schooling due to their 
early entry into the labour market. What this means is that Arabs who 
have undertaken formal education must either accept such work as they are 
allowed to do, and this is extremely unlikely to be consonant with their 
qualifications or abilities, 
7 
or else they must emigrate to find work. 
The Arab worker is Israel shares many of the problems faced by migrant 
labour in other parts of the world, and also by many peoples of the 'Third 
World' who are experiencing the shift of certain types of production from 
the industrialised countries. At this level, the relationship between 
Israel and the West Bank can be analysed within the matrix of the kind of 
changes which are brought about when production is reorganised on a 
transnational basis. However, for Palestinian workers, their experience 
is modified by particular aspects of their experience of Zionism. To 
provide an example of this level of analysis, we can consider the establish- 
ment of trade unions amongst West Bank workers. 
The Unionisation of West Bank Workers 
(i) Position of Arab workers in Israel 
The main differentiation made by Israel in its treatment of Arab 
labour is between those who are considered Israeli citizens and those who 
are not. As East Jerusalem has been annexed, (see Chapter Four), residents 
8 
of East Jerusalem are defined as having Israeli citizenship. This 
affects mainly how the worker is paid, his/her conditions of employment 
and his/her position as regards organised labour in Israel. These factors 
further divide the 'legal' West Bank worker from the 'illegal'. 
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Workers from the occupied territories who have gone through the 
Labour Exchanges are not paid directly by the employer. The gross wage 
is transferred to the Payments Section of the Employment Service where 
deductions are made for income tax, National Insurance and 'social benefits'. 
According to the Ministry of Labour, this ensures equal pay for the West 
Bank worker and the Israeli worker, preventing both the erosion of the 
income of unskilled Israeli workers and the exploitation of West Bank 
employees. To prevent the West Bank worker from receiving a higher net 
wage, any balance in thedeductions (e. g. for pensions) is credited to each 
worker's account in a 'special fund' to finance social and development 
projects in the West Bank. This is linked to the cost-of -living index. 
The Ministry of Labour does not carry out these projects; in budgetary 
year 1973-74, IL 112 million was lent to the Ministries of Vinance and 
Defence for "undertakings of a progressive intent in the Administered 
Areas" (Rekhess: 1975). 
10 
The 'illegal' worker does not pay tax or 
insurance, and is usually hired and paid on a daily basis (see section 
iii). The Ministry of Labour blames the persistance of illegal labour 
largely on the "lack of understanding on the part of the worker regarding 
the advantages of organised labour" (Ministry of Labour: 1976). Organised 
labour means the Histadrut, and we can look briefly at Arab workers in 
the Histadrut. 
(ii) Arab members of the Histadrut 
in 1973, there was a Histadrut proposal that occupied territories 
workers in permanent employment in Israel should be made members of the 
Histadrut. The proposal was defeated (although East Jerusalem residents 
were admitted to membership at this time), and criticised as a policy of 
I creeping annexation'. The situation remains that while not members, 
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"the Federation /Histadrut/ has taken upon itself the responsibility of 
protecting the wages and social benefits to which workers from the 
(administered) areas are entitled" (Ministry of Labour: 1976). What this 
means is that a 1% levy is deducted from the wages of workers from the 
occupied territories and transferred to the Histadrut. Thus, they are 
paying dues to an organisation of which they cannot be members in order 
to have their 'interests' protected. As for East Jerusalem residents, 
they are liable for full Histadrut dues. 
It can be noted here how the Histadrut operates with regard to Arab 
labour. The background to its formation, and its mode of operation during 
the Mandate were discussed in Chapter Three. According to official 
Histadrut publications, Arabs (including Druzes) 
11 
were admitted as 
members in 1959. However, this was to a separate 'Arab section', and 
full membership was not granted until 1966. There is still a 'Department 
of Arab Affairs' within the Histadrut, the aim of which is stated as 
follows: 
This special department was brought into being 
in order to bring about its own elimination. It 
is planned to incorporate its various activities 
within the scope of the general agencies of the 
Histadrut when the time is ripe ... The main reason 
for the continued existence of this framework arises 
mainly from the difference of language and partly 
due to the wide dispersal of Arab members throughout 
the land. 
(Histadrut, Executive Committee: n. d. ). 
Until now this aim has not been realised. 
Histadrut statistics regarding the distribution of Arab members 
over types of occupation provide a useful general outline of the coMpo- 
sition of the Arab labour force in Israel. Table 5.1 is based on 
qovernment figures and shows the percentage employed in various fields 
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(percentages of the total are in the usual Israeli governmental 
division of Jewish and non-Jewish citizens). Table 5.2 is based 
on Histadrut membership figures and gives the number of Arab members 
employed in certain areas as a percentage of all Arab members, 
compared with the overall percentage of members. Table 5.3 gives 
details of the distribution of employment inside Israel amongst 
workers from the occupied territories. 
It should be noted that the classification of categories of 
employment differs between the data provided by the three sources, 
and there are difficulties in all statistics of this kind in deciding 
which occupations belong in which category. The figures used in 
Table 5.2 refer only to Histadrut members, while those in Tables 5.1 
and 5.3 refer to all workers (i. e. all registered workers). It could 
therefore be argued that workers in certain areas are more likely to 
joint the Histadrut, for example those employed in industry as opposed 
to agriculture. However, there appears to be no significant disparity 
in proportions between Tables 5.1 and 5.2. 
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Table 5.1 
Occupational distribution of Jews and Arabs employed 
and resident in Israel, by percentage of total 
Year 
Total 
(thousands) 
academic- 
scientific 
professional- 
technical 
managerial 
clerical 
tradesmen, 
salesmen 
services 
agricultural 
construction & 
industry-skilled 
construction & 
industry-unskilled 
unknown 
JEWS 
1973 1975 1976 
981 995.2 1018 
6.2 7.2 7.4 
ARABS 
1973 1975 1976 
107 107.8 109 
o. 7 1.2 
11.7 13.2 13.3 7.6 7.1 7.1 
3.5 3.4 4.2 o. 7 0.4 o. 3 
17.1 18.5 18.4 4.6 3.8 4.1 
7.95 7.9 8. o 7. o 6.2 6.8 
12.5 11.8 11.4 10.7 8.9 9.3 
6.1 5.1 5.3 14.5 16.1 15.6 
28.4 26.3 25.3 35.5 40.2 40.5 
5.6 5.2 5.4 15.6 12.6 11.4 
3.7 3.1 3.2 
Computed from original statistics quoted in E. Farjoun Palestinian Workers in 
Israel -a reserve army of labour, from Israel Statistical Annuals, 1973,75,76. 
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'I'ihie . 2 
Arab Members of the Histadrut: Distribution 
According to Branches (1971) 
Category of 
employment 
Arab 
members 
(total no) 
% of total overall 
Arab members % 
building & 
13,000 31.8 8.9 construction 
industry & 
8,600 21.0 24.1 crafts 
government 
1,200 2.9 24.3 employees 
agriculture & 4,500 11.0 8.5 forestry 
Source: Jacob M. Landau, The Arabs and the Histýadrut 
. 
Department 
of Labour Studies, TI-al Aviv University, 1976. 
Table 5.3 
Workers from occupied Territories employed in 
Israel*, by economic branch, 1976 
Category of 
employment 
Total No. 0 0 
construction 32,500 50.3 
industry 12,800 19.7 
agriculture 10,000 15.4 
other 9,500 14.6 
* This is restricted to registered workers 
Source: International Labour office, Report of the Director-General, 
1980. 
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In spite of these problems, several general points can be made. 
The separation of construction and manufacturing in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 
highlights the concentration of Arab labour in the construction sector, and I 
the significance of this has already been noted. Histadrut ownership of 
a wide range of economic concerns was discussed in Chapter Three, and 
while Palestinians resident in Israel and East Jerusalem are technically 
full members of the Histadrut, they are excluded from employment in any 
area connected with'the production of military items. As Israel currently 
spends over 20% of the GNP on military use, 
12 
this is a considerable 
part of the economy (see Chapter Two). It includes much of the electronics 
industry, aviation, steel production - in fact, anything connected directly 
or indirectly to the production of arms, ammunition and weapons systems. 
The Histadrut is a major employer in this field. According to Farjoun, 
around half of all Jewish industrial workers are employed in the military 
and aviation industries (Farjoun: 1980). 
Referring back to comments made earlier about the process of 
'deskilling', in 1979 the International Labour Office drew attention to 
what it described as "the gradual introduction of a kind of division of 
the employment market not only on the objective basis of the type of jobs 
but also in fact to a large extent along ethnic lines" (International 
Labour Office: 1980). This refers to the lack of Palestinians in what 
could be classified as skilled or professional employment. According to 
information in the ILO Report: 
... no serious effort 
has been made to implement 
a policyof occupational promotion for workers from 
the occupied territories who are employed in Israel. 
Some marginal cases of occupational promotion were 
mentioned but it was pointed out that they were the 
exception proving the principle still in force whereby 
these workers are used to do jobs refused by Jewish 
labour, and according to these sources, the desire 
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to protect the latter against any possible 
competition from workers coming from the 
occupied Arab territories explains the 
refusal to consolidate their position in 
employment and in the Israeli economy. 13 (International Labour Office: 1980). 
While non-Israeli Histadrut members are entitled to benefits in 
the workplace, they are excluded from certain benefits outside the 
I 
workplace, even although deductions have been made from their wages in 
respect of these. For example, they are entitled to benefits of the 
National Insurance Scheme which are based on the criterion of employment, 
such as employment injury and bankruptcy of the employer, but are not 
entitled to National Insurance benefits based on criterion of residence. 
This latter category includes invalidity, unemployment, and children's 
allowance (International Labour Office: 1980). Although an agreement has 
been made with the West Bank health authorities that West Bank residents 
14 
employed in Israel be given free medical treatment, the provision of 
services in the West Bank is very poor (see Chapter Six). 
(iii) Illegal Labour and the Employment of Children 
As was suggested earlier, in addition to workers registered through 
the Labour Exchanges, there are at least another third employed in Israel 
illegally. These workers are hired either through an Arab contractor or 
middle-man, 
15 
or at a recognised pick-up point. In Jerusalem for example, 
lorries and vans arrive each morning at a spot opposite Damascus Gate and 
the drivers select workers from the people waiting there. The overt nature 
of the hiring operation makes official claims of attempts to stop 
illegal 
employment questionable. 
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A report on an ILO on-the-spot examination of the situation of 
workers from the occupied territories revealed that around 20% of 
those illegally employed in Israel are minors, defined as children 
under the age of 14.16 The main area of employment is in agriculture, 
and it has been suggested that: 
Many moshavs permanently rely for their profits 
on the nimble-fingered 10-year-olds from the 
refugee camps, who can be hired for less than 
E1.00 per day at the unofficial labour market at 
Erez junction, near the pre-1967 border of Israel. 
('The Guardian: 26.2.82). 
As a general rule, work permits are not granted to children under the age 
of 17, but much younger children are openly hired illegally. Articles 
reproduced by MERIP describe the scenes at the established 'markets' in 
the Gaza Strip, Erez junction and Ashkelon junction, where children between 
the ages of 10 and 14 gather each morning from 3.00 a. m. onwards hoping to 
be hired for work in Israeli settlements. Wages are fixed in negotiations 
between the Israeli contractorand the Arab middle-man, who takes a 
percentage of the children's earnings (MERIP: 1979). 
Child labour is not restricted to Israeli enterprises, and it is 
common to see young children working in shops and fields in the West Bank. 
As has been pointed out by the ILO, the persistence of a system whereby 
workers employed illegally can be fined and yet employers escape legal 
action suggests that there has been no concerted effort to end the 
practice (International Labour Office: 1980). 
While the employment of children is common throughout the Middle 
East, and indeed outwith the advanced industrialised countries, the 
employment of children in the circumstances outlined above can also 
be 
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seen as an instance of their experience of colonisation. Thus, for 
example, we can relate child labour to particular policies implemented 
by the Israeli state regarding the status of non-Jews, also to the kind 
of agricultural production which has developed in Israel. The fact that 
680,620 Palestinians are still registered as refugees 
17 
in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip means that: " ... as long as a third of Gaza's 500,000 
inhabitants are supposed to exist on UNRWA hand-outs of sugar, flour 
and cooking-oil, child labour will be difficult to stamp out, even by a 
more concerned authority. " ('The Guardian': 26.2.82). 
(iv) Employment in the West Bank 
As Table 5.4 indicates, the main trend in employment in the West 
Bank has been the shift from agriculture towards services, and to a 
lesser extent, industry. 
Table 5.4 Employment in the occupied territories (excluding Jerusalem) 
1970 1979 
1000 % 1000 % 
TOTAL 152.7 100 137.7 100 
Agriculture 59.2 38.8 38.4 28.0 
Industry 21.0 13.8 23.2 16.8 
Construction 12.9 8.4 13.9 10.1 
Services 59.6 39.1 65.7 45.1 
Source: International Labour Office: 1979: Appendix, p. 44. 
- 171 - 
It was noted earlier that an increasing amount of work was produced in 
the West Bank under contract for Israeli manufacturer, particularly in 
textiles and clothing. This is organised in small workshops set up by 
Arabs, and is prevalent around Ramallah, el-Bireh and Bethlehem. There 
are 25 workshops in the Ramallah area, 
18 
most of which are producing 
clothes under contract for Israeli factories. Each workshop employs 
between 50 and 70 workers, and around 95% of the workforce are women, 
the majority of whom come from the surrounding villages and refugee camps. 
The working day is 8-10 hours, with one 30 minute break and compulsory 
overtime when necessary to fulfil orders. Women employees are paid less 
than half as much as men. 
This can be compared with clothing factories in Nablus and Hebron 
which are producing largely for the local market, and which employ a 
lower percentage of women. The pressure of wcrrking to meet contractual 
agreements is absent in these cases. It can therefore be suggested that the 
nature of the work in the subcontracting workshops requires a workforce 
which can be hired very cheaply and which is docile. The women employed 
in Ramallah have very few alternative employment prospects, especially 
so close to home, and the significance of this will be brought out in 
the discussion of West Bank trade unions. 
The rapidly increasing entry of women into the wage labour market has 
had not only an economic impact but has effected disruption within the 
family as the traditional unit of family production breaks down. Attitudes 
towards, for example, a female member of the family moving outwith the 
home and often the village to find work have had to be modified in the 
19 
face of economic necessity. This has been exacerbated by the number of 
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men in the West Bank who have emigrated to find work, and also the number 
of men who have been imprisoned or detained for 'security offences'. 
20 
What can be suggested, then, is that since the 1967 occupation, the 
changing opportunities for employment inside the West Bank indicate a 
shift between sectors, and that the decreasing number of people involved 
in agriculture can be related to the expropriation of land (see Chapter 
Four), and to the application of Israeli policies and techniques in 
agricultural production, and this latter point will be elaborated in the 
section on West Bank agricillture. 
However, when the situation of women employed in workshops in the 
West Bank is seen in the light of previous discussion about 'deskilling' 
and ideas about a New International Division of Labour, then thereý has 
also been a change in the process of production. 
West Bank Trade Unions 
When Israel occupied East Jerusalem and the West Bank there were 
seventeen unions, the majority of which were Jerusalem branches of 
Amman-based organisations. 
21 
By 1970, only seven unions remained - all 
outwith East Jerusalem. According to one unionist, this was not due to 
an explicit ban on trade union organisation but rather a combination of 
factors such as a decreasing membership aa many of the population were 
22 
employed inside Israel, and the harassment of trade union members and 
officials by the Military Authorities. By 1981, there were thirty unions 
based in the Jerusalem-West Bank area, and around half of these were 
based in East Jerusalem. Several are organisations which closed in 1967 
23 
and have reopened within the past few years. Their legal status is 
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complicated by the fact that membership includes residents of East Jerusalem 
and the West Bank, with the former being defined as 'Israeli citizens' 
(see Chapter Four) , and the unions attempt to represent members employed 
in Israeli enterprises as well as in the West Bank. 
As far as Israeli law is concerned, "all persons employed in Israel 
are completely free to establish trade union organisations, regardless 
of race, creed or sex" (International Labour Office: 1980) . However, 
the structure of Israeli labour relations is such that a union must join 
24 
the Histadrut. The Histadrut position regarding workers from the 
occupied territories was discussed earlier, and the ILO reports their 
attitude towards Arab organisation as limited to the following: 
... the Histadrut had held a meeting with several 
hundred workers from the territories to hear 
their grievances but had no intention of asking 
them to affiliate and had not accepted any such 
affiliation. It had suggested that the workers 
from the territories should elect a committee 
which would represent them in the Histadrut and 
enable them to belong to works committees. 
(International Labour office: 1980: para. 63). 
This means that West Bank unions attempting to operate inside Israel are 
not recognised by employers or government, and so cannot 
fulfil any 
25 
representative functions. 
Inside the West Bank, unions are constituted according to Jordanian 
law, subject to Israeli Military amendment. An important amendment 
has 
been that regarding election to union posts, as anyone convicted of a 
'security offence' by a court having jurisdiction in the West 
Bank or in 
iS ineligible for election. Further, a list of nominees for election 
mu. c:; t be submitted to the Army Area Commander at 
least 30 days before the 
election, and names can be deleted without appeal and with 
no reason for 
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The deletion being given. 
26 
This has led many unions to postpone elections 
as they claim interference by the Military Authorities would prevent free 
elections. 
Direct action has been taken by the Military Authorities against 
trade union members and officials. For example, it was reported that an 
armoured car was placed outside the home of George Hasboun, the Deputy 
General Secretary of the General Federation of Trade Unions in the West 
Bank in order to prevent him from attending a meeting in Nablus which was 
to discuss the East Jerusalem Electricity Company 
27 
('The Middle East': 
March, 1980). The wife of a member of the Jerusalem Catering Workers' 
Union said that in 6 months of marriage, her husband had spent four months 
in prison. In all, he has been in prison five times, for periods of 
6 months; 3 months; 2 months; 18 days and at the time of the interview had 
been imprisoned for 4 months. In addition, V-2 years were spent under city 
arrest. At no time were any charged preferred. 
28 
The basis of the conflict is not workplace activity, but the sense 
in which the West Bank Unions are perceived as a political force, and 
the way in which they constitute opposition to the Israeli occupation. 
A spokesman for the Military Government has been quoted as saying: 
Permission is given to mayors, trade unionists 
and others to hold meetings, if these meetings 
will bring peace closer and build bridges to our 
neighbours. But if they only want to discuss 
settlements, land and the Electricity Company... 
if the meetings are to speak against normalisation, 
and about politics, then we will not give them 
permission to hold their meetings. 
('The Middle East': March, 1980). 
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Inquiries carried out by the ILO into cases of arrest and imprisonment 
of trade unionists in-the West Bank were answered by the Military Autho- 
rities that "the persons concerned had been sentenced by the courts or 
were on trial not because of trade union activities but on specific 
charges relating to illegal political activities" (International Labour 
Office: 1980). 
Given the way in which the West Bank unions define themselvesthere 
can be no division between political and union activities. Their 
perceived remit of representing all Arab labour irrespective of residence 
or place of employment cuts across the Israeli categorisation of Arab 
workers discussed earlier. In addition, the unions have operated in 
concert with the professional associations representing doctors, dentists, 
traders and so on and have participated in the National Guidance Council 
in the West Bank. This is a body made up of representatives from political 
parties, municipalities, charities and trade unions which serves to 
coordinate opposition to the occupation (see Chapter Six), and the trade 
union representation is through their own coordinating body, the General 
Federation of Trade Unions. 
29 
Under Jordanian law, any 21 workers can ; 
for an association provided they obtain a permit which serves as a license 
tc) operate as a trade union and qualifies the union for membership in 
Ilio GPTIJ. As application for a permit must now be made to the MilitarY 
Aut-liori Her, and there have been long delays in them being granted, the 
30 
GI-IM iiow idmits Cis members unions which are 'waiting' for a permit. 
1111,1t. 1- I'llo, ()I- Hie West. Bank workforce are union members. 
31 
This can 
.,.,; 1), irt-ly (im, to there being 
insufficient unions to cover all 1, , 
32 
B(-ikor's Union, , for example, estimates that 
95% of its 
potciitial membership are in fact union members, suggesting that where 
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unions exist they are supported - and partly because of the difficulties 
outlined above, in that it is difficult to show workers what advantages 
they would have by joining a union. In the case of the Ramallah textile 
workers discussed earlier, a Tailor's Union was set up in April 1981 and 
by October 1981 had a membership of 85 out of a potential membership of 
1,500. The problems in generating support for the union were outlined by 
its full-time organiser as being firstly, workers finding time to attend 
meetings. As was noted earlier, most of the employees are from surrounding 
villages and refugee camps and are bussed back at night. Also, compulsory 
overtime means that a 12-hour day is not uncommon, and this does not leave 
much time for union meetings. Secondly, discouragement from the families 
of the women workers. The organiser felt that the idea of a trade union 
was not accepted by the families, and it had been hard enough for them to 
accept the women working in the first place. Family opposition is linked 
to the third point, which is the attitude taken by the owners of the work- 
shops towards the union. Workers attempting to gather support for the 
union in the workplace have been dismissed, and the owners have threatened 
dismissal to anyone who joins. 
The members of the Ramallah Tailor's Union are almost all women, and 
it is interesting in this context to look at the formation of Working 
Women's Committees in the West Bank: 
33 
Working Women's Committees were 
first established early in 1981, and after six months there were 14, 
aiminq to cater for all working women. 
34 
The membership is composed mainly 
of teachers, nurses and factory workers. One of the organisers defined 
their long-term goal as "the raising of awareness in order to fit women 
for their role in the struggle to liberate Palestind'and explained that 
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their reason for coming into being was the belief that an organisation 
was needed which would focus on problems which spedifically affected 
women. Discrimination against women is seen to operate on three levels. 
The first is racial, and this applies to all Palestinians under occupation. 
The second is economic, as women are paid less than men, and the third is 
social, which is a questioning of the role of women in Palestinian society. 
The approach of the Working Women's Committees emphasises practical 
help, as "people are more ready to listen to theories if you help on their 
farm", and the committees have been involved in setting up medical centres, 
illiteracy programmes and arranging speakers and discussion groups. In 
this way, they are filling in the gaps in the provision of social and 
health services in the West Bank. 
One issue which has been debated within both the Working Women's 
Committees and the trade unions is the extent to which what is perceived 
as conflict within Palestinian society - social discrimination - should be 
postponed during the wider resistance against occupation. The WWC's argue 
that the two are inseparable, but some unionists have criticised the 
existence of separate organisations for women, and suggest that women should 
work through their relevant trade union. 
The attempt to organise labour under occupation cannot isolate the work- 
place from the wider context, as was illustrated in the discussion of the 
position of West Bank workers in Israel and in the West Bank 
itself. 
West Bank trade unions have to formulate strategies to deal with the 
conflict arising from the contradictions 
between capital and labour, and 
their struggle to organise in the workshops of the West Bank 
is an example 
of this. Although they are excluded 
from operating within Israeli enter- 
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prises, the insistence on drawing no distinction 
Palestinian worker is an important political point. 
between categories of 
In this context, it is interesting to note the way in which other 
kinds of distinction between categories of worker are made. The economic 
basis of Israel's attempt to emphasise a distinction between West Bank 
Arab labour and 'Israeli Arab' labour has been discussed, and the political 
and ideological components noted of maintaining a workforce under military 
government and continuing the enforced disintegration of the idea of a 
Palestinian people. While strategies have been worked out in the West Bank 
to overcome and deny this, groups such as the Working Women's Committees 
are arguing that the differentiation between men and women must be dealt 
with, as women face particular problems in Palestinian society. Thus, the 
apparent attempt to oppose divisiveness and prejudice against women by 
requiring them not to organise separately is in this sense a reinforcement 
of divisions between men and women, and the call to postpone the 'internal' 
differentiation effectively justifies existing attitudes and practices 
towards women. 
In conclusion, even exist±ng under the restrictions which have been 
discussgl-, d, the West Bank trade unions are still functioning and have 
not been officially banned - unlike political parties and the National 
Guidance Committee - so their ability to continue is of importance to a 
united resistance front. 
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West Bank Aqriculture 
The decreasing number of people involved in agriculture in the 
West Bank has been noted, and the intention now is to examine the 
kinds of changes which have taken place. Be, f6re the 1967 occupation, 
over half the West Bank population was employed in the agricultural 
sector, mainly on family farms with some wage labour. The other main 
sources of income were from tourism, and remittances 
35 
from members of 
the family working abroad - an estimated 170,000 people omiqrated from 
the West Bank between 1952 and 1961 (Rekhess: 1975). By 1979, only 
24.1% of the total population (N. B. not working population) was living 
on income derived from agriculture (Tamari: 1981). 
The kinds of problems arising in an attempt to explicate what is 
happening in the West Bank by their very nature give an insight into the 
relationship between Israel and the occupied territories. For example, 
the plethora of official Israeli data collected on aspects of living 
conditions in the West Bank divides the population into categories of 
'urban' and 'rural'. However, the people living in refugee camps are 
subsumed under whichever type of locality they are nearest, with the 
result that a high proportion of rural families are shown as being without 
access to agricultural land - the reason is not acute landlessness amongst 
West Bank farmers but the inclusion of refugee families in the 'rural' 
section of the statistics, so that refugee status in effect disappears 
(Tamari: 1981) . 
The figures on emigration from the West Bank do not indicate how 
many emigrants have been living in refugee camps since 1948, or 1967, 
nor whether they are families leaving permanently or some members of 
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families leaving to find work in order to support those remaining on 
remittances. No distinction is drawn between households deriving their 
livelihood from family farms, and those engaged in agricultural wage- 
labour - all are collapsed under 'agriculture'. Similarly, where women 
and children work on family farms, this is not counted as productive 
labour and so is left out of data on the civilian labour force. 
Such difficulties would make a detailed statistical analysis of the 
changes taking place in the West Bank extremely problematic, but the 
official Israeli sources are of use in a more limited way. For example, 
data on what crops are grown in the West Bank indicate that significant 
changes have taken place. The situation of agriculture in the West Bank 
after 1967 has been described as follows: 
... Israeli advisers and staff officers encouraged 
the re-structuring of agricultural production and 
the modernisation of cultivation methods in the 
West Bank .... The receptiveness of West Bank farmers 
to change was indicated by their adoption of new 
cultivation techniques ... and by the increasing 
capitalisation and mechanisation of agriculture. 
(Migdal, Ed.: 1980: p. 189). 
It can be suggested that in this case 'restructuring' meant that agriculture 
iii Lhe West Bank was to be brought into line with the demands of the 
Israeli market, and that this has involved change in what is grown, how 
it is grown and where and how produce can be sold. 
After 1967, the immediate concern of the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture 
was to protect Israeli agriculture and ensure that there would be no 
competition from West Bank cultivators, and so restrictions were imposed 
for a period of what was called "planning and adjustment" (Bregman: 1975). 
Lesch has pointed out that if agricultural produce from the West Bank 
had been allowed access to Israel at the end of the 1967 war, it would have 
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undersold Israeli produce by around 25% (Lesch: 1970). No such restric- 
tions were imposed on Israeli produce entering the occupied territories, 
and as much of Israel's agricultural output is subsidised by the government 
this was disadvantageous to the West Bank farmers. 
Van Arkadie has stated that Israel intended to reorder the agricultural 
pattern of the West Bank so that it would complement rather than compete 
with Israeli produce. This has been limited, and the changes in the types 
of crops grown indicate a shift towards producing vegetables and tree crops 
for export, and a shift away from the more labour-intensive field crops, 
although field crops which could be exported for processing, such as chick 
peas and tobacco, did show marked increases in production (Van Arkadie: 
1977). As an indication of how the 'readjustment' operated, by 1972-3 
the cultivation of melons in the West Bank had decreased from 36,000 tons 
to 3,300 tons -a decrease of 90.8%. By 1975, the West Bank was importing 
over 11,000 tons of melons from Israel (computed from "Statistical Abstract 
of Israel", 1977; and from "West Bank Agriculture, 1973", cited by 
Van Arkadie). 
The bulk of agricultural produce for export still goes to Jordan, 
as it did before 1967, with Israel importing around 12%. While the 
restrictions on exports to Israel were technically loosened by the early 
1970's, as Bregman has shown this operated only if the goods to be exported 
were in small quantities which could easily be absorbed by the Israeli market, 
and if a large influx of goods threatened the maintenance of the price of 
that crop in Israel then it would be prohibited. Thus, for example, dates 
and grapes could not be exported to Israel (Bregman: 1975). 
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Tho exportation of West Bank produce to Jordan was lialted after 
the 1967 war, but the institution of an 'open bridges' policy provided 
the possibility for trade to be resumed via exports to Jordan and through 
Jordan to the rest of the Arab world. However, it did not prevent freedom 
of import into the West Bank, nor for that matter, freedom of movement. 
It can be noted that the denial of access to the bridges from the West Bank 
to Jordan has frequently been used as a punitive measure, and this applies 
to produce as well as people. 
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In effect, what the 'open bridges' policy provides is a means of 
dealing with agricultural surpluses in the West Bank without endangering 
the Israeli economy, as well as keeping a route open to the Arab world. 
It has been suggested that Israeli produce is being exported to Arab 
countries by this route (Ryan: 1974: p. 13). In this context, it is 
interesting to note the importance of a market for Israeli goods brought 
about by the Camp David Agreement as well as by the occupation of the 
West Bank and South Lebanon. By 1982, Israeli exports to Egypt had 
reached $15 million -a 50% increase over the 1981 figures. 
to a report published by the "Economist Intelligence Unit": 
Trade with Lebanon has been much more lively, 
rising from $4 million worth of Israeli goods 
sold in Lebanon in July, to $7 million worth 
in each of August and September, and to $9.3 
million in October. 
(Economist Intelligence Unit: 1983: p. 18). 
And, according 
At that time, there were no formal trade agreements between Israel and 
Lebanon, so that all trade which was being carried out was on an ad 
hoc, 
37 
cash only basis. However, the establishment of trading 
ties was a 
condition of Israel's bargaining position 
in the cease-fire negotiations, 
and since this has been agreed then even a token 
boycott of Israeli produce 
by Arab countries is difficult, since, as was discussed earlier, Lebanon 
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is an important funnel for trade in the Arab world and an important 
interface between the West and the Arab countries. 
It was suggested before that changes in how cultivation is carried 
out in the West Bank have taken place alongside changes in what is 
actuall-y grown. Ryan has noted the organisational. structure established 
by the Military Authorities, with members of staff from the Israeli 
Ministry of Agriculture attached to the occupation staff (Ryan: 1974). 
A network of 'agricultural councils' was set up to deal with marketing 
guidance, production and liaison with the administration, the councils 
being composed of "notables and leading farmers" (see discussion of 
Villaqe Leagues in Chapter Six). In addition, research and surveys were 
carried out, demonstration plots set up, agricultural field days held 
and visits to Israeli facilities organised (Migdal, ed.: 1980). 
It is impossible to isolate the effect of certain forms of techno- 
logical innovation on West Bank agriculture. Shift in the pattern of 
land-use towards less labour-intensive crops, the rapid drop in the number 
of people engaged in agriculture, the loss of land through expropriation, 
and the various less direct disincentives attached to farming under military 
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occupation are all instances of a rapid capitalisation, of agriculture 
in the context of the specific colonial relationship in the West Bank. 
A clear example of this interplay is provided by the use of water. 
Water as a Resource 
The importance of water as a resource was expressed in the following 
plan submitted to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919: 
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The economic life of Palestine, 
of every other semi-arid countr., 
the available water supply. It 
of vital importance not only to 
water resources already feeding 
but also to be able to conserve 
them at their sources... 
39 
like that of 
I depends on 
is, therefore, 
secure all 
the country 
and control 
In Israel, water resources and supplies are administered on a national 
basis by the Israel Water Commission, which comes under the jurisdiction 
of the Ministry of Agriculture. Quotas of water for agriculture and 
domestic consumption are allocated to towns, villages and settlements and 
exceeding the allocation can incur a fine. An Israeli journalist, in 
describing the case of an Arab village in the triangle, has noted that 
3 
the water allocation for agriculture averaged 200m per dunum, while that 
3 
for a neighbouring Jewish moshav stood at 1,000m per dunum (cited in 
Amun et al.: 1977: p. 46). Overall, some 22.6% of the cultivated area of 
field crops in Israel is cultivated by Arab villagers yet according to 
official statistics, they receive less than 2% of the water allocated for 
agriculture (Amun et al.: 1977: p. 41). Abu Kishk has pointed out that the 
majority of Arab villages in fact have no water allocated for irrigation. 
In the Arab sector, less than 9% of the land is under irrigation, while 
in the Jewish sector this proportion is over 50% (Abu Kishk: 1981: pp. 132-3). 
This serves firstly to provide an obstacle to the little Arab 
agriculture which has survived within Israel's 1949 
borders and secondly 
as a means of regulating what can actually be grown. 
The extent of land 
expropriation was discussed in Chapter Four, but 
it has been suggested 
that in spite of this loss, agricultural output could be maintained given 
different factors of production, such as capital and water (Abu Kishk: 1981). 
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The restriction of the supply of water means that Arab farmers are forced 
to rely on crops which can be grown without expensive irrigation, such 
as olives, and are unable to compete with Jewish concerns. In other 
words, capital-intensive agricultural methods which are used to a large 
extent for the production of goods for the lucrative export market - such 
as dairy produce and horticulture - are not available to Arab agricultu- 
ralists. 
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It has been estimated that 30% of Israel's water supply now comes 
from the West Bank, and that the West Bank's underground water resources 
are being used as a reservoir for Israeli requirements (Khouri: 1980). 
The importance of this can be seen when the Israeli deficit in water 
requirements, estimated at 265 million m. 
3 
in 1979, is set against the 
West Bank water surplus of some 630-775 million m3 per year (data from 
the Royal Scientific Society, Amman, cited by Abu Ayyash: 1981: p. 123). 
In addition to the extraction of water for use inside Israel, 
Tsraell settlements in the West Bank have their own water network. This 
has involved drilling deep-bore wells and installing powerful pumps in 
order to supply settlers' domestic and irrigation demands. Around 20 
such wells have been sunk in the Jordan Valley alone. The depth of the 
new wells being drilled means that if they are situated near existing 
wells or springs then they drain off the existing water supply. Thus, for 
example, following the drilling of three deep-bore wells on the site of 
al-Auja spring, the outflow of the spring which had been as average 11 
million m3 per year dried up in 1979. This meant that all cultivation 
carried out in al-Auja was ruined, at an estimated cost of $3 million 
(Matar: 1981: p. 102). 
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Water pumped by the settlements is exclusively for use in the 
settlements and is not available to West Bank Arab towns and villages. 
Military Order 158 was introduced to amend Jordanian Law No. 31 (1953) 
which required approval to be sought for the siting of new wells. The 
Military order requires a permit to be granted by the Area Commander before 
a well can be sunk, and also covers irrigation established before 1967 
(Abu-Lughod: 1982). However, since 1967 no Arab town, village or indivi- 
dual in the West Bank has been given permission to drill for water for 
agriculture or public supply and only 7 permits have been granted to drill 
for personal domestic consumption (Davis et al.: 1980). Hebron, for 
example, is growing in size and its geographical position, being built on 
mountains, means that there is a need for pumping equipment and strong 
water pressure to connect homes being built on the mountains to the water 
supply. The municipality planned to sink wells in Bani Na'im and Sam'ua 
villages, and run pipes to the city, but their application for a permit 
was rejected by the Area Military Commander (Interview, Hebron Municipality: 
September, 1981). 
As is the case with agriculture inside Israel, the application of 
water policies is a requirement of a particular kind of agriculture, and 
again in the West Bank this is the introduction of capital-intensive 
cash-crop farming. The Jordan Valley settlements, as Harris has indicated, 
are producing out-of-season goods for export, while the economy of the 
Katif complex in the Gaza Strip is based on the hothouse cultivation of 
tornatoes (Harris: 1978). In the latter case, the sinking of wells to 
supply the high levels of irrigation required has drawn water away from 
Gaza's main industry, which is orange plantations. 
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Uri Davis refers to an Israeli article on the recommendations made 
by Begin's advisers on the negotiations with Egypt which included the 
insistence that, should an 'autonomous administration' come into being in 
the West Bank restrictions would be placed on the depth to which wells 
could be sunk. Also, that Israel should have exclusive rights to the 
deep water bed in the West Bank, as: 
There is unanimous agreement on the fact that 
should control of water resources in the West 
Bank slip out of Israeli hands in the process of 
the establishment of Palestinian autonomy the 
entire Israeli infrastructure would be placed 
in immediate jeopardy. 
(Davis: 1979: P. 13). 
The importance of water also colours Israel's invasion of Lebanon. 
The Zionist Delegation's submission to the Paris Peace Conference 
referred to earlier suggested a northern boundary for a Zionist state 
which would run from "a point on the Mediterranean Sea in the vicinity 
of Sidon and following the watersheds of the foothills of the Lebanon" 
(Quoted in Hadawi: 1968: p. 12). This would encompass the Litani and 
Awali Rivers and their sources on Mount Hermon, and in fact closely 
approximates a line 27 miles north of Israel's 1949 border where: 
... the Israeli Army 
has embarked on a E25 million 
scheme of fortifications, improved roads and con- 
solidation behind an ingeniously protected new 
front line ... The set-up 
has given the Israeli 
occupation a new look of permanence. 
('The Times': 10.8.83). 
What is being suggested is that an analysis of the nature of the 
relationship between Israel and the West Bank can be constructed by 
highlighting particular instances which are conceived of as being 
interrelated. Thus, while Israeli policies regarding water in the West 
Bank and in Lebanon can be seen in the context of strategies adopted by 
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an occupying force, they are also related, at a more abstract level, 
in the way in which capitalist forms of agricultural production destroy 
non-capitalist agricultural production. Similarly, an examination of 
the problems encountered by Arab labour in Israel can compare this at one 
level with problems encountered by migrant labour, in other parts of the 
world in the face of a global restructuring, and also maintain the 
specificity of these difficulties by relating them to the place of 
Palestinians as a colonised people. The discussion of West Bank trade 
unions introduces another level of analysis, that of the meaning of 
colonisation for the colonised, and it is at this level that we can under- 
stand the different strategies for survival which have emerged in the 
West Bank. Chapters Six and Seven pick up this level of analysis by 
considering particular forms of resistance which have arisen as moments 
in the colonial relationshp. 
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NOTES 
According to Bregman (1975), 90% of all enterprises employ fewer 
than 10 people. It is not clear if this includes family labour. 
2. According to the General Secretary of the East Jersalem-based 
Bakers' Union, when all categories of worker are included, the 
percentage employed in Israel is around 60%. 
3. This varies according to region and season. Also, see section (iii) 
on the employment of children in agriculture. 
4. This category includes those who have chosen not to go through 
official channels, as well as those who cannot, such as children 
under the age of 17. 
5. For a discussion of the useofi-Asian labour in the Gulf states, see 
Birks & Sinclair, Economic and Social Implications of Current 
Development in the Arab Gulf: the Oriental Connection, in Niblock, 
ed. (1980). Also, Enid Hill, Modernization of Labour and Labour Law 
in the Arab Gulf States, (1979). 
6. For a discussion of the divisions within Israe. li Jewish society, see 
for example, an examination of the problems faced by 'Oriental' 
immigrants in Andrew Mack's Oriental Jews: Class, Ethnicity and 
Ideology, in Davig et al., ods. (1975). Also, the situation for 
Israeli women in Avishai Ehrlich. 's Zionism, Demography and Women's 
Work in Khamsin 7 (1980). 
7. For example, while there is no ban on Arab students studying electronics, 
they cannot be employed in the Israeli electronics industry for reasons 
of 'security'. 
While they are defined as such for the purposes of tax, employment 
etc., applications for citizenship can be turned down. 
'Social Benefits' are entitlements based on the criterion of employment, 
such as sick pay and accident compensation (Israeli Ministry of Labour; 
1976). 
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10. No (i(, (-, ii 1,; vre availabte on the nature of these projects. 
For a discussion of Druzes in Israel, see Friendly & Silver, 
Israel's Oriental Immigrants and Druzes (1981). 
12. Comparable figures are: Britain 2.5-5%; USA 5-10%; USSR 10-20%; 
Algeria 2.5-5%. The only states on a par with Israel are Oman and 
UAE (Kidron & Segal: 1981). 
13. It was claimed by an Arab chemical engineer with Israeli citizenship 
that he had been offered a supervisory position if he would call 
himself by a Jewish name, as it would be demeaning for the Jewish 
workers he would be in charge of to be supervised by an Arab. 
(Interview: August 1981). 
14. Over 55% of the Histadrut's expenditure is on Kupat Holim, their 
health care scheme, as Israel has no public medical service 
(International Department, Histadrut: n. d. ). 
15. For a discussion of sub-contracting and recruitment to Israel's 
construction industry, see Tamari: 1981. 
16. However, education is compulsory until the age of 16 (see Chapter Seven). 
17. Statistics from a map of UNRWA's area of operations, 30.6.1979. 
18. The information in this section was provided by the organiser of 
Ramallah Tailor's Union in October 1981. 
19. As Birks and Sinclair put it: 
Women have always worked and continue to work 
in the traditional sector: they are often seen 
working in the fields ... Their labour 
is of 
considerable significance in traditional sectors 
which have experienced the outmigration of labour... 
In the absence of the male household head, women 
have been obliged to adopt roles and functions 
normally reserved for men. 
(Birks & Sinclair: 1980: p. 347) 
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20. Under the Emergency Regulations enforced on the West Bank, 
detention can be imposed for indefinite periods without preferring 
charges or bringing the prisoner to trial. Examples of the 
operation of these regulations are provided in Ibrahim Al-Abid.. 
. 
Israel and Human Rights, (1969). See also Naseer Arurij Resistance 
and Repression (1978) for a discussion of the torture of political 
prisoners in Israel and the occupied territories. 
21. This section is based on information provided by the General 
Secretaries of the Bakers' Union and the Printing Union, 
East Jerusalem. 
22. The initial disparity in wages earned by West Bank residents 
employed in Israel and those employed in the West Bank appears to 
be decreasing. According to the Israeli Ministry of Labour, in 1970 
the average wage in the occupied territories was 54% of the Israeli 
wage and by 1975 it had risen to 82%. It should be noted that while 
the absolute wage may be higher in Israel, there are more deductions 
(Ministry of Labour: 1976). This can be seen as an indication of 
the degree of integration between the economies of the West Bank and 
Israel. 
23. For example, the Bakers' Union was established in 1957, closed in 
1967 and restarted in 1981. 
24. The Histadrut differs from organisations such as the TUC in that a 
worker joins the Histadrut and is then assigned to a relevant trade 
union, of which there are 43. Around 65% of the total population of 
Israel are Histadrut members (International Department, Histadrut: n. d. ). 
25. one strategy which has been adopted with workbrs employed inside 
Israel is to take individual cases to the Israeli courts. A 
Jerusalem lawyer who has dealt with several such cases said that 
none had been successful. It may seem paradoxical that a union 
which refuses to accept the legitimacy of the Israeli annexation of 
East Jerusalem should implicitly confer legitimacy by appealling to 
Israeli legal institutions, and parallels can be drawn with the many 
attempts since 1948 to take cases of land expropriation to the Israeli 
courts. It can be suggested that in both instances, the intention was 
to publicise grievances rather than attempt to secure change through the 
legal system. 
26. Military Order 825 was issued in amendment of Article 83 of Jordanian 
Labour Law No. 21 (1960). The operation of the MO was backdated such 
that holders of union office who had been elected prior to the issuance 
of the MO and who do not fulfil its requirements are declared 'illegally 
elected' and their position annulled (Shehadeh: 1980). 
27. See the discussion of municipal remits in Chapter Six. 
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28. This information was provided during a day of protest against the 
conditions in Israeli prisons, during which time the families of 
prisoners staged a sit-in at the Red Cross Centre in Hebron. 
29. The GFTU is affiliated to the General Union of Palestinian Workers, 
which is represented in the Palestine National Council and has six 
places reserved in the 21-strong Central Council. In attempting to 
represent Palestinian workers resident in other Arab countries, the 
GUPW has faced problems similar to the West Bank organisation. As 
Peretz explains: 
.... It has not served the same function as usual 
labour unions to protect the rights and conditions 
of employment of its-members because it has not been 
recognised by employers in host countries as a 
bargaining agent. 
(Peretz: 1977: p. 60) 
30. According to the organiser of a newly-formed West Bank Union, if the 
request for a permit is not answered after three months, it is taken 
as acceptance. 
31. This figure was quoted as including all West Bank workers regardless 
of residence or workplace (Interview: October, 1981). 
32. In September 1981, the Bakers' Union changed its name to the Industrial 
Food Union, and expected its members to increase to about 1,000, as it 
now covered all food processing factories (Interview: October, 1981). 
33. For a history of women's organisations in the West Bank, see 
Yvonne Haddad, Palestinian Women: Patterns of Legitimation and 
Domination, pp. 159-63, in Nakhleh & Zureik., eds. (1980). An appendix 
to the paper consists of a chronology of Palestinian Women's organi- 
sations from 1921 to 1969. 
34. This section is based on discussions with members of the Ramallah 
branch of the Working Women's Committee. 
35. The significance of income from remittances can be linked babk to the 
increasing import of consumer goods from Israel which was noted 
earlier. 
'30. In tfl(, summer of 1981, punitive measures taken against Nablus included 
the refusal to allow lorryloads of tomatoes from the town to cross the 
bridge for sale on the Jordanian market, and they were instructed to 
return to Nablus. Tomatoes cannot be stored, and this resulted in two 
weeks' exports being wasted (Interview: September 1981). 
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37. According to an Israe-li newspaper report: 
Every day, many tons of fruit and vegetables 
are illegally exported from Israel to Lebanon. 
According to one authorised estimate, some 10 tons 
of strawberries alone are now being sent out daily. 
Most of all the exporting of fruit and vegetables 
to Lebanon takes place in violation of Israeli law, 
and bypasses the Agrexco (Fruit Marketing) company 
and the organised marketing organisation. The 
directors of Agrexco are aware of the situation, and 
have asked the army authorities to close the border 
with Lebanon to agricultural exports, unless these 
take place through Agrexco. A senior IDF officer... 
told its directors that the IDF did not regard it 
as its job to close the border. 
('Ha'aretz': 21.2.1983). 
38. For example, we can note the increased use of inputs such as chemical 
fertilisers, where the amount used rose by 175% between 1968 and 1973. 
The numberof tractors increased from 120 to 866 in the same period 
(computed from data in Administered Territories Statistics Quarterly, 
Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics: 1975: pp. 52,71). 
39. This quotation is taken from the submission of the Zionist delegation 
to the Paris Peace Conference (Cited by Hadawi: 1968: pp. 11-12). 
40. on this point, reference can be made to the discussion in Chapter 
Three of the development of agriculture under the Mandate, and the way 
in which the Mandate state facilitated the development of the Jewish 
(capitalist) sector. 
Chapter Six 
STRATEGIES FOR 9URVIVAL 
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Chapter Six 
The focus in this Chapter is on what colonisation means for the 
colonised, and how interpretations are contested and reconstituted in 
particular historical circumstances. Three instances will be discussed 
of how the experience of colonisation is worked out at the level of 
local politics. The first concerns Palestinians living inside Israel 
shortly after the establishment of the Israeli state, and the other two 
are drawn from the West Bank after the 1967 occupation. Their conceptu-.. 
alisation as moments in a colonial relationship involves an analysis which 
is more than a history of types of political organisation, and the problematic 
set out in the Introduction will be raised regarding the level at which a 
Palestinian unity can be assumed. 
Al Ard (The Land) 
The Al Ard movement was formed in 1958, ten years after the establishment 
of the State of Israel. Its history as a movement was short, as it was banned 
in 1964 and subject to many restrictions in its six years of existence. 
However, it is illuminating as a particular interpretation constructed 
by Palestinian Arabs living inside Israel at that time, and the way in 
which this was translated into political practice. 
1 
Al Ard was set up by a group of people who left the Popular Front, 
and we can begin by outlining brief ly the development which led to the 
dissolution of the Popular Front. It had come into existence in 1956 as 
an alliance of communists, nationalists and progressives, and its consti- 
tution affirmed its aim to: 
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... abolish the military government, to end the 
expropriation of Arab land, to effect the return 
of expropriated property to its owners, to 
abolish racial discrimination, to introduce the 
use of Arabic in all government departments, and 
to work towards the return of all refugees to 
their homes. 
(Jiryis: 1976: p. 186) 
While these aims were specific to the problems faced by Palestinians 
remaining in Israel, accounts of both the beginning and the end of the 
Popular Front accord most weight to external political events. Jiryis, 
for example, suggests that the support which international communism gave 
to the 'Arab struggle' encouraged cooperation between communists and 
nationalists throughout the Arab world, and that it was in this spirit 
in which the Popular Front was set up in Israel. (Jiryis: 1976). Baransi 
explains the dissolution of the Front as a resiilt of the "repercussions 
on us of the situation in the Arab world" (Baransi: 1981: p. 19). This 
refers to the conflict between communists and nationalists over Egypt's 
union with Syria, and the influence of Nassar's pan-Arab rhetoric can be 
seen in the location of the struggle confronting Arabs inside Israel 
within the struggle taking place through the whole Arab region. 
2 
The split within the Popular Front is therefore presented as consonant 
with the divisions between Arab nationalists and the communist parties in 
Arab countries, notably Egypt. The Front separated into two groups; the 
smaller consisted of communists and those prepared to continue cooperating 
with the communist party, the larger issued a new programme under the 
name of 'Usrat al Ard' (Family of the Land). Application was made to the 
Israeli authorities for permission to publish an Arabic weekly newspaper, 
and publishing began pending the granting of the permit. 
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In understanding the emphasis placed on a pan-Arab perspective, it 
is important to recognise not only what was happening regionally at that 
time, 
3 
but also what was happening to the Arab population inside Israel. 
As was noted in Chapter Four, in the first ten years of the new state, 
Isreal established a series of laws which firstly, enabled large-scale 
expropriation of Arab land and secondly, served as a basis for instituting 
a legal system which discriminated heavily against non-Jews. Thus, the 
remaining Palestinian Arab population was cut off from neighbouring countries, 
in many cases dispossessed, under military government, and their exclusion 
had been legalised and legitimated. Opposition to these measures depended 
1, -Arqely on initiatives taken by the Israeli Communist Party (MAKI). While 
recognising the relationship between international communism and the formu- 
lation of policies by the Israeli Communiý; t Party, 
4 
it should also be 
noted that they were the only avowedly non-Zionist political party which 
legally existed, and as such the main focus of organised Arab opposition 
was through MAKI. 
5 
Some of the Zionist parties also attempted to organise amongst 
13, ilestinians inside Israel. MAPAI ran allied lists for the Knesset as 
el-irly ; is 1949, and MAPAM has also put forward separate Arab lists for 
election 
6 
(Lockman: 1976). However, to look at support for political 
parties as an indicator of the political perceptions of Arabs inside 
Israel is misleading on three main grounds. Firstly, the tactics used 
by the Israeli parties to capture the 'Arab vote' have included the 
presentation of campaign literature in Arabic which directly contradicts 
the party's 'official' position (Cohen: 1965), and secondly, votes have 
been won through the manipulation of a system of patronage and reward. 
Thirdly, the Israeli authorities prevented the formation of any overtly 
Arab party, and so opposition to the state was diffused through the Israeli 
parties, obscuring motivations for voting particular lines. 
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In one sense, Al Ard represents the first attempt after 1948 to form 
an independent Palestinian Arab organisation under Israeli rule. The 
programme drawn up by the founders on their disassociation from the 
Popular Front was published in the first issue of the newpaper, and contained 
the following five points: 
1. Equal rights for Arabs in all respects, and the repeal of the 
discriminatory laws desiqned to destroy the Arab identity. The 
right of Arabs to develop in the framework of their own customs 
and national character. 
2. Recognition of the right of the Arab refugees to return to their 
homeland. 
3. Recognition that Arab nationalism is the decisive force in the 
Arab world, and that any other opinion is historically wrong. 
4. A call for positive neutrality towards the two world powers. 
5. A call to tie the progress and fate of Israe. 1 to the progress and 
fate of the Arab countries in the economic, educational and social 
spheres (El-Asmar: 1975: p. 69). 
A delay in the official response to the application for a publishing 
8 
permit led to Al Ard attempting to circumvent the law by publishing each 
issue of the paper under a different editor and with a different title - 
all of which incorporated 'Al Ard'. 
9 
The permit was not granted, and after 
the group had published thirteen issues of the newspaper in the way described 
above, the police closed it down and confiscated the latest issues (Jiryis: 
1976: p. 188). The members of Al Ard then applied to register as a printing 
and publishing company, and after an initial refusal for registration on 
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t1w (Irouri(I. -, of "opposition to the, security of the State and the interests 
of the peof)le" a hearing on appeal in the Israeli Supreme Court led to 
the company's eventual registration. However, a license to publish a news- 
paper was again refused (Jiryis: 1976). 
The final programme submitted by the group "developed through a 
bitter internal struggle-between the left and the right" (El-Asmar: 1975: 
p. 73). It contained seven points, as follows: 
1. The levels of 'Israeli-Arab' education, science, health, economy 
and political status should be raised. 
2. A true and just social equality among all social strata in Israel 
must be sought. 
A just solution to the Palestinian problem in the persepctive of 
its being one and indivisible to be sought; a solution which would 
be in accord with the will of the Palestinian-Arab people. 
4. Recognition of United Nations decision of 29 November 1947, which 
would provide a just solution which would maintain the rights of 
both Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian-Arab peoples. 
5. Support of the liberation, unity and socialism in the Arab world 
in all legal ways. 
6. Acting for peace in the Middle East and in the world in general. 
7. Support for all progressive forces throughout the world. Opposition 
to imperialism and support of all the peoples who are trying to free 
themselves from its yoke (Summarised from El-Asmar: 1975). 
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The Supreme Court ruled that Article 3 was flutterly destructive of 
the existence of the State of Israel" (Jiryis: 1976: p. 133). The 
leadership of Al Ard was placed under house restriction, some were taken 
into administrative detention, and in 1964 the Minister of Defence used 
the Emergency Regulations to declare Al Ard an illegal organisation. It 
has been suggested that Al Ard was banned because members had intended to 
contest the Knesset elections in November 1965 (Interview: July, 1981). 
In fact, a list was submitted, the 'Socialist List', with ten candidates 
who were supporters of Al Ard. Four of them were exiled within Israel, 
and the list was not permitt6d to contest the election (Jiryis: 1976). 
Again, the reason was that the 'Socialist List' threatened the security of 
the State of Israel. 
The history of the Al Ard movement indicates the careful emphasis on 
remaining within the bounds of Israeli legality. The way in which the 
publication of the newspaper was managed was discussed earlier, and the 
appeals to the Supreme Court after the refusal of the publication permit 
and licence to register as a company are further evidence of this. In 
Chapter Five, note was made of the attempts to contest land expropriation 
in the Israeli courts, and to some extent this had become an established 
political practice. 
When this is linked with statements made regarding the way in which 
Al Ard conceived of the State of Israel, then it is clear that the move- 
ment defined itself and its aspirations within Israeli hegemony. Their 
adherence to the United Nations partition plan of 1947 in proposing a 
Palestinian state to exist alongside the State of Israel did not question 
the basis of the State of Israel. One founder member is quoted as sa-Ying: 
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We certainly support the opinion that the 
Jewish people has a right to its own indepen- 
dent state... The first thing a Palestinian 
state would have to do would be to negotiate 
and to arrive at a peace agreement with the 
State of Israel. 
(Mansur Qardush, quoted by Al-Asmar: 1975: p-74). 
There was a degree of cooperation with Jewish organisations, although this 
was a source of conflict within Al Ard. Fouzi Al-Asmar has said that he 
favoured cooperation, and helped establish links with the 'Third Force' 
and the 'Semitic Action Group'. A joint conference was held for Jewish 
and Arab authors, and at a demonstration which took place in Jerusalem in 
1963 calling for the end of military government, "the leaders of Al Ard 
walked side by side with Jews and behind the Israeli national flag". 
(El-Asmar: 1975: p. 75). 
It is suggested that the conditions which establish the parameters 
within wNch certain kinds of interpretation emerge do not determine the 
form of the interpretation, and in the case of the Al Ard movement this 
can be summed up as the way in which an attempt was made to express a 
distinct Palestinian identity within the boundaries of a state which 
excluded the possibility of such an identity existing. An analysis of the 
history can locate the contradiction of trying to forge an identity based 
on pan-Arab assumptions regarding the indivisible unity of the problems 
between the Arabs and Israel, and their particular status as Arabs in 
Israel. However, while an analysis at this level can delineate contra- 
dictions in this way, in Al Ard's own terms the contradistinction of 
being a non-Jew in Israel was not faced head on, and in a sense the way in 
which Al Ard's strategies were formulated was as a means of avoiding this 
issue. 
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Chronologically, the development of the Al Ard group parallels the 
emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organisation outside Palestinian 
territory. By the late 1950's, Fatah (Palestine National Liberation 
Movement) had begun to circulate a monthly publication which called for 
Palestinians to remember their common identity and purpose. Its programme 
for the recovery of Palestine pointed out that it was no good relying on 
others, least of all the Arab states which have: 
.... stopped the Palestinians' mouths, tied their 
hands, deprived them of their freedom of action 
in what is left of their country, resisted the 
idea of this regroupment, turned them into a 
theatrical claque which applauds this and reviles 
that... You went with many parties, and fought for 
many causes-what was the result? Did you restore 
your honour? or one inch of your land? .... You 
remain scattered, without honour, or personal or 
collective identity. Let us raise the banner of 
our own unity, of revolution in Palestine, and put 
this aim above any other. 
(Quoted by Hirst: 1977: p. 272). 
Thiý--; refelcts the disillusion with the way in which the Arab 
governments had dealt with the 'Palestine problem', and the scepticism 
was not dispelled by the incorporation of special Palestinian units into 
the armies of Syria and Iraq, nor by the 1964 Arab Summit decision to 
form a Palestine Liberation Organisation. Rodinson described this decisi6n 
as that: 
... those who were especially preoccupied by 
the problem should be given a bone to gnaw to 
keep them quite ... A 'Palestinian entity' was 
to be created to give expression to the desires 
of the Palestinians, who were the most interested 
party, without taking a form which might embarrass 
the constituted Arab states ... 
(Rodinson: 1982: p. 142) 
Fatah retained its organisational independence, and in 1965 began to carry 
out guerilla raids into Israel. 
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By the end of 1966, the Arab Nationalist Movement under the leadership 
of George Habash had set up the 'Heroes of the Return', and according to 
Hirst, at this time there were no less than forty Palestinian groupings 
(Hirst: 1977). The defeat in the 1967 war compounded the failure of the 
United Arab Republic in 1961, and the ANM fragmented. At the end of 1967, 
George Habash declared in the inaugural statement of the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine that "the only language which the enemy 
understands is. that of revolutionary violence. " (Hirst: 1977: p. 282). 
The guerilla groups took over the leadership of the PLO in 1968. 
The discussion of the Al Ard group has highlighted one interpretation 
and one strategy for survival articulated by Palestinians at a particular 
moment, and the political and social location of the group is interesting 
to note in this context. In terms of Palestinian politics it was a new 
kind of potential leadership - one which was not drawn from the landed 
families. Instead, the majority of the founder members of Al Ard were 
young, and employed as teachers, writers and so on (Interview: July 1981). 
This background is reflected in the way the position of Palestinians in 
Israel was perceived, the political strategies which were formulated, and 
in the kinds of issues which were raised. The emphasis on legality, for 
example, can be related to Fanon's polemic regarding the emergence of a 
'young nationalist bourgeoisie' and the creation under colonialism of the 
response of non-violence, described as "an attempt to settle the colonial 
problem around a green baize table" (Fanon: 1978: p. 48). In terms of the 
wider themes rais. ed in this work, a response which tries to find some basis 
for negotiation and compromise is, in its determined opposition to physical 
violence, a manifestation of the violence of the colonial relationship. 
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The task of the PLO has been to attempt to link the experiences of 
Palestinians, whether they have lived in exile since 1948 or under occupation 
within the Palestine constituency. It can be suggested that this 
conceptualisation was clarified after the 1967 war, as the differences 
of living under military occupation in the West Bank and living as an 
Arab minority inside Israel suggested different tactics. In this vein, 
we can turn now to look at municipal politics in the West Bank, and 
how they have become a form of resistance to occupation. 
West Bank Municipalities 
In Chapter Five, the relationship between Israel and the West Bank 
was analysed in terms of the kind of changes which have taken place 
since 1967, and the discussion of West Bank trade unions examined one 
instance of how resistance has been expressed through the organisation of 
labour under particular conditions. The conditions which provided the 
context within which Al Ard developed were suggested as being the situation 
of Arabs in Israel in the early years of the state; the way in which the 
Al Ard movement sought to define a distinct identity can be set against 
this situation and the ideas about Arab unity which were current regionally 
at that time. In this was, the discongruity between the level ofa historical 
analysis of the conditions which made Al Ard's strategy possible and the 
level of the historicity of the strategy itself highlights the way in which 
the Al Ard movement found a means of surviving, and it was suggested that 
for Al Ard, survival meant a definition within Israeli hegemony. 
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For the West Bank municipalities, the conditions under which they 
have to operate have been summed up as follows: 
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories 
have enjoyed since 1967 no rights and no 
representative institutions. There is no 
authority to which they can appeal, no 
protection which they can invoke. Their 
every movement and action is subject to 
the arbitrary authority of the Israeli 
military governor. They can be detained, 
imprisoned, deported, without the inter- 
vention of any tribunal. Their houses and 
property may be destroyed, their lands 
confiscated, their crops burned and their 
trees cut down. 
(Kayyali, ed.: 1979: p. 133) 
The operation of the municipalities can be seen as a means of coping with 
life under the conditions described above, and it can be argued that the 
1976 municipal elections indicated a redefinition of how daily life could 
be managed; one which was based on the recognition that a continued presence 
is in itself a form of resistance. 
The municipal elections held in 1976 were the second round held 
under Israeli occupation and differed markedly from those in 1972,10 
both in candidature and in the issues on which the election was contested. 
The decree issued in 1971 by the Military Governor to announce that 
elections were to be held met with a call to boycott from both the PLO 
and the Jordanian Government. However, in January 1972, King Hussein 
withdrew his threat of sanctions against those who participated in the 
elections, and a fortnight before the first polling day 
11 
announced a new 
'federation plan' for the West Bank and Jordan (journal of Palestine 
Studies: 1972: Vol. 1, no. 4, p. 167) . 
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It has been suggested that Israel and Jordan had similar interests 
in the outcome of the elections; namely, that the formation of an entity 
independent of Israel and Jordan should be prevented (Metzger et al.: 
1983). To this end, both were prepared to support the status quo and 
effect the return to office of the incumbents, who had been municipal 
officials under the Jordanian administration. The extent to which Israel 
was prepared to ensure that the elections would take place is indicated 
by the measures which were taken in Nablus, where no candidates came 
forward. A former mayor, Hamdi Kana'an, withdrew his name the week before 
the election, and the incumbent mayor, Malzuz Al-Masri, refused to run. 
According to Metzger et al.: 
... several leading intellectuals from Nablus were 
threatened with deportation. Hikmat Al-Masri, a 
telative of the mayor, was arrested for having 
contact with terrorists, a grave charge. The 
businesses of the Masri family were investigated 
and partially placed under surveillance ... Defence 
Minister Moshe Dayan threatened to place the city 
and all of its businesses under Israeli control 
and to put Lieutenant-Colonel Aaron in charge of 
the administration. 12 (Metzger et al.: 1983: p. 155) 
Under Jordanian law, the franchise was extended only to male residents 
over the age of 21, who owned property and-paid property taxes. A turn- 
out of around 85% re-elected the traditionalleadership, 
13 
although it can 
be suggested that the high voting figures were aided by the stamping of 
identity cards at the polls. 
14 
When the next round of elections was held 
in 1976, the franchise had been widened to include women and propertyless 
males, so that around three times as many people voted as in 1972. In 
sixteen of the twenty-four localities where elections were held, majorities 
were won by the Palestine National Front, a coalition of members of PLO 
groupings, Communists, Ba'athists, progressives, trade unions and cultural, 
social and professional organisations. Its aim had been to create a 
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political force on the West Bank which would unite a wide range of groupings, 
and which would be part of the PLO yet would retain a degree of autonomy 
in formulating its own policies. 
Due to the degree of support shown in the elections, the newly-elected 
officials were able to claim that their success reflected "the political 
will of the Palestinians in the West Bank, and the widespread support for 
the PLO" (Interview: August 1981). This, however, was not a sudden 
phenomenon, and an explanation must include changes within the West Bank 
and within the Palestinian constituency as a whole. 
The PNF was not formed until 1973,15 and before this opposition to 
the occupation had been expressed in sporadic demonstrations, strikes and 
protests from people who had been Jordanian functionaries. 
16 
Israeli 
reaction was to use the range of legal provisions still valid from the 
Miandate in addition to Jordanian law and Israeli military amendments. 
In Chapter Five, the use was noted of trade restrictions as a means of 
collective punishment, and other forms of collective punishment, such as 
curfews, 
17 
and the destruction of property, 
18 
are imposed. over 500 
people had been deported from the West Bank in 1970, all without being 
charged (Lesch: 1979). Incidents of summary arrests and detention without 
trail have already been noted; other restrictions on civil liberties 
include restrictions on travel, censorship of all printed material, the 
banning of all political parties and restrictions on freedom of association 
(Shehadeh: 1980) . 
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By the early 1970's, the mainstream PLO groupings such as Fatah were 
19 
moving to a 'diplomatic approach' as an alternative to armed resistance. 
It can be suggested that given the organisational structure of the PLO, the 
massacre of Palestinians in the refugee camps in Jordan in 'Black September' 
1971 and the crushing of Palestinian organisations there made this shift 
inevitable. The regroupment of the remains of the PLO forces and insti- 
tutions took place in Lebanon and, as was discussed in the Introduction, a 
second demonstration was provided eleven years later of the way in which 
Palestinians in exile exist on the whim of the host country. 
An example of the attitude of the PLO towards the residents of the 
occupied territories was indicated by Yasser Arafat in his pronouncement that 
they were not expected to assume an active military role, but rather to remain 
on the land awaiting their release from occupation, as "merely holding out 
for a day is a small victory" (journal of Palestine Studies: No. 9,1973: 
p. 192). other groupings within the PLO expressed concern about the formu- 
lation of aims in the Palestine National Front charter in terms of a resis- 
tance to occupation in the occupied territories and the suggestion of a 
possible Palestinian state alongside Israel. For example, George Habash of 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) argued that the 
Palestine National Front should struggle against Israel itself and not 
only the occupation (Lesch: 1980: p. 52), and the PFLP remained less involved 
with the Front. the PNF charter does not mention the idea of a 
'secular 
democratic state in all of Palestine', and it can be suggested that this 
20 
reflects the importance of the Communist Party with the Front. 
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Folowinq the October War in 1973, the search for diplomatic 
intiati-ves within the PLO intensified and at the 12th meeting of the 
Palestine National Council 
21 
in 1974, a majority of organisations 
supported the resý-lution that a Palestinian state should be established 
in "any part of Palestine from which Israel will withdraw or which will 
beliberated. , 
22 
Later than year, the Arab Summit in Rabat responded to 
a petition sent by the PNF and representations from the PLO and recognised 
the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the "sole legitimate representative 
of the Palestinian people", whose aim is to "establish an independent power 
in every liberated part of Palestinian territory. " This was followed by 
United Nations recognition of the PLO, and an invitation for Yasser Arafat 
to address the UN General Assembly. 
The Israeli response in the West Bank was to depor-t to Lebanon one 
of the organisers of the PNF petition to the Rabat Summit, and arrest 
others thought to be involved (Lesch: 1980). A wave of strikes and demon- 
strations in support of the PLO were held in the West Bank and led to 
further arrests and expulsions, among them the head of the Communist Party 
in the West Bank and the President of Bir Zeit University (See Chapter 
Seven). In spite of the PLO's success in being accepted as representing 
the Palestinian people, it was excluded from negotiations at the Geneva 
Peace Conference over the future of the occupied territories, and indeed 
has remained excluded through the Camp David negotiations and the intia- 
tives proposed by various Arab states. 
It was suggested in Chapter Four that Israel's settlement policy in 
the West Bank has been consistent under Labour and Likud governments, and 
the broader aspects of Israeli policy can be seen to follow the same 
pattern. That is, that the aim has been to set up some form of 'civilian 
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autonomy' which would safeguard Israeli interests in the areas while 
absolving the Israeli state from any responsibility towards the 
Palestinian population. For example, in October 1975, the Defence 
Minister in the Labour Government, Shimon Peres, outlined a 'civil 
administration' plan which would involve a federation between Israel 
and the occupied territories leaving Israel in control of defence, 
foreign affairs and finance (Lesch: 1980). The 'autonomy plan' proposed 
by Prime Minister Begin 
23 
in December 1977 as a preliminary to the 
consultations with the United States and Egypt indicated that military 
government would be abolished, but that control of security would remain 
the responsibility of Israel. This plan explicitly claimed Israeli 
sovereignty over 'Judea and Samaria', 
24- 
and the right of Israelis to 
settle there, 
25 
but suggested that due to competing claims the question of 
sovereignty should be left open (Metzger et al.: 1983). 
Tn arguing that 'autonomy' under these conditions simply means that 
ini Ii f-, -Iry occupation b(-comes permanent, Fayez Sayegh sums up the offering 
Lc) t1w Palestinians as folloWS: 
A fraction of the Palestinian people (under one- 
third of the whole) is promised a fraction of its 
rights (not including the national right to self- 
determination and statehood) in a fraction of its 
homeland (less than one-fifth of the area of the 
whole); and this promise is to be fulfilled several 
years from now, through a step-by-step process in 
which Israel is to exercise a decisive veto power 
over any agreement. Beyond that, the vast majority 
of Palestinians is condemned to permanent loss of 
its Palestinian national identity, to permanent 
exile and statelessness, to permanent separation 
from one another and from Palestine - to a life 
without national hope or meaning. 
(Sayegh: 1979: p. 40) . 
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However, even the limited meaning of 'autonomy' defined in Israeli 
plans for the West Bank requires a measure of cooperation from within 
the occupied territories themselves. Earlier, it was suggested that 
before the 1972 elections, Israeli and Jordanian interests in the West 
Bank were coincidental in seeking the perpetuation of the leadership 
which had been in power under Jordanian rule, and it will be argued 
in the discussion of Village Leagues that to some extent Israel has 
tried to retain that option. The municipal officials who were elected 
in 1976 had been elected on policies which made it clear that they would 
not participate in any discussions on 'autonomy', and the way in which 
they perceive their remit has brought them into direct confrontation 
with the military authorities. 
The role of the municipalities was summed up by one official as 
"the provision of leadership for West Bank Palestinians in the absence 
of a sovereign state" (Interview: September 1981). This has involved 
protest against the Israeli occupation in general as well as against 
specific measures taken by the military authorities. It can be suggested 
that initially it was the assumption of responsibility as elected 
representatives of the Palestinians in the West Bank in opposition to 
tho occup,.: ition which brought the municipalities into conflict with the 
iiii IiI iry q()ver-imwiit . Tlw Wost Bank mayors in particular 
have acted as 
1)ý)t It ltwýll ly and i-ritornationally, and have worked to coordinate 
,,,, Ijij,.,, I wt-j. v! (y in the West Bank. For instance, at the end of 1976, 
26 
(Iocido(l h) introduce VAT in the occupied territories. e 
muj, i(. ipAit, ies orqanised a strike as a form of civil disobedience and 
roiivened meetings of all groups in their constituencies. The result was 
a total strike, and the implementation of the new tax 
law was delayed 
(InLerviow: June 1981). 
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The Israeli censure to which the Mayors have been subjected 
includes the deportation in 1980 of Mayor Kawasme of Hebron and Mayor 
Milhelm of Halhul, following an attack on Jewish settlers in Hebron. 
Also in 1980 Bassam Shaka'a of Nablus, Karim Khalaf of Ramallah and 
Ibrahim Tawil of el-Bireh were badly injured in car bombings. While 
the bombings cannot be attributed directly to the military authorities, 
it is fair to say that little has been done to apprehend the attackers. 
27 
In 1981, Mayor Shaka'a described the level of restriction against him 
personally, where he is under town arrest and followed by the military 
within Nablus, and his home is under constant surveillance (Interview: 
June 1981) . 
While the municipalities' self-defined role was widened to include 
representation and opposition to the occupation, confrontation with the 
military authorities over the day-to-day running of the municipalities 
began soon after the 1976 elections and has intensified since then. The 
administrative remit of the West Bank municipalities includes the respons- 
ibility for social services; health provision; libraries; fire brigade; 
public order; the granting of licences for building and trading (Interview: 
June 1981). Taxes are raised locally to finance three main areas of 
service. These are 'cultural tax', a tax for cleaning the town, and a tax 
for 'safety and protection'. An official in Hebron Municipality said that 
given the low level of income, revenue for taxation is insufficient to main- 
tain even a basic level of services (Interview: September 1981). The Mayor 
of Nabl(js Municipality confirmed that Nablus had a 30% budget deficit 
overall, and had insufficient financial resources to contemplate improving 
any services (Interview: June 1981). 
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Certain taxes must also be paid by the municipalities to the 
military authorities, for example, for power supplies. Israeli control 
of the West Bank's water resources was discussed in Chapter Five, and 
the way in which electricity is controlled provides a similar example of 
an aspect of domination, as well as illustrating the particular daily 
problems faced by the municipalities. Before 1967 there were eleven 
electricity generating companies in the West Bank, and this included 
private concerns like the Jerusalem Electricity Comapny as well as 
municipal and cooperative operations (World Council of Churches: 1980). 
Since then, Israel has attempted to link the West Bank into the Israeli 
grid. This would facilitate the supply of power to Israeli settlements 
in the West Bank, and would provide another means of controlling economic 
activity which relies on electricity. Also Israel would be able to decide 
on the level of charges for electricity. 
According to the World Council of Churches report, the Jerusalem 
Electricity Company has been compelled to supply electricity to Israeli 
settlements built within the Company's area of operation: 
"Various pressure tactics applied to the Company 
have included appointing two Israelis to the 
Board, subjecting the Company to Israeli laws 
and forcing it to buy electricity from the 
Israeli Company so as to supply the requirements 
of Israeli settlements, and selling it at fixed 
low prices. " 
(World Council of Churches: 1980). 
Hebron Municipality ordered and paid for generators but permission to 
import them was refused and the municipality was linked to the Israeli 
grid. A request to supply electricity to several new houses on the 
outskirts of Hebron has been refused by the Israeli Company, and there 
have been complaints from residents of the city about the quality of 
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service provided. For example, it was claimed that the power is often 
too we, --A to like a fluorescent tube light (Interview: October 1981). 
The municipalities are responsible for providing facilities for 
education, such as school buildings, although not for education itself 
(see Chapter Seven). In Nablus, one new school was opened between 1967 
and 1976 - in this area, provision must be made for 700 new pupils annually. 
Between 1976 and 1981, the municipality had built three schools. When the 
buildings were half-finished, work was ordered to stop, but following 
protest the schools were completed (Interview: June 1981). During the 
same period, Hebron Municipality completed eight new schools. The need 
for a rapid expansion of facilities is indicated, in that at present 102 
classrooms have more than 50 pupils and 43 rooms are in double use (i. e. 
one class attends school in the mornings and another in the afternoons). 
When the schools were built, they were leased to the Department of Education, 
which is under the auspices of the military government, with a proposal 
that the rent would be used to build one new school every year. However, 
no rent has been paid (Interview: September 1981). 
Due to the problems in raising money noted earlier, the municipalities 
have relied mainly on donations from other Arab countries. The most 
important source of finance has been money sent from the Joint Palestinian- 
Jordanian Committee 
28 
_ the 'steadfastness fund'. The establishment of 
this fund marked the resumption of formal contacts between the PLO and 
Jordan, after the break which followed Jordan's attack on the Palestinians 
in 1970. Both were aligned within the Arab Rejection Front on the Camp 
David proposals. However, it can be suggested that the new cooperation 
was not adopted to the same extent in the occupied territories. 
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In 1978, a National Guidance C6mmittee was formed in the West Bank. 
It was immediately banned by the military authorities and most of its 
members placed under town arrest. In a sense, it developed as a result 
of new conditions in the West Bank with which the PNF was unable to deal. 
Rather than an alliance of political groupings, the NGC is more like a 
parliament, with 22 members selected as representatives of regional and 
political groups. According to Metzger at al., in 1980 the Committee 
consisted of two trade union delegates; nine mayors; the editors of 
'Al Fajr' and 'Al-Tali'ahl; 
29 
representatives from the student organisations, 
the Muslim Council and two representatives from the Gaza Strip (Metzger et al.: 
1983: p. 223). 
The rapprochement between Jordan and the PLO was reflected in the 
decreasing significance of differences between the pro-Jordanian factions 
in the West Bank and the supporters of a mainstream Fatah line. For 
example, when asked about Jordan's role in efforts to find a 'solution' for 
the West Bank, the Mayor of Bethlehem, Elias Freij, who is generally regarded 
as pro-Jordanian, replied that: 
"... it must be made clear that terms such as 
'pro-Jordanian' are obsolete. Today there is no 
difference between Jordan and the PLO, between 
King Hussein and Yasser Arafat, where the way to 
a solution to the conflict in our region is conc- 
erned... We are all united in our basic demands for 
a Palestinian state under PLO leadership ... I am for 
a confederation between the two states... " 
('New Outlook': Jan/Feb. 1980). 
However, ties with Jordan were not unanimously supported by the more 
left-wing of the PLO groupings, who remained suspicious of American 
involvement in Jordan and of Jordanian designs on the West Bank. 
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The National Guidance Committee has defined its relationship with 
the PLO as one where the Committee considers itself to be part of the 
PLO, but not as representing the PLO in the West Bank. This means 
that the NGC expects to be able to make decisions on events occurring 
within the West Bank without necessarily referring them to the PLO 
leadership, and on occasion this had led to tensions. For instance, when 
the Joint Palestinian-Jordanian Committee was set up the NGC wanted 
control over the allocation of resources, for while a grant was made 
to the municipalities, finance was also awarded to individual projects. 
The NGC argument was that they were in the best position to judge the 
relative merits of projects applying for funding (Interview: June 1981), 
but the Joint Committee did not relinquish financial control. 
In August 1981, Military Order 973 was announced which effectively 
banned the municipalities from accepting donations, and this was later 
extended to prevent any West Bank institution, charity or club both from 
spending money which had been gained from external sources and from 
accepting money sent to the West Bank.. This applied whether or not th. e 
proposed project already had approval from the military authorities. The 
Mayor of Qalqilya was reported to have received a written directive dated 
August 16,1981, stating "The (military) command forbids any money to be 
brought in from Amman. " In this case, the money was JD22,500 from the 
Jordanian Government which had been sent specifically to buy a fire tender 
and a garbage truck. Permission to bring the money from Amman had been 
requested and approved prior to the military directive ('Al Fajr': 6-12 
September, 1981). 
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In S-eptember 1981 the municipalities were ordered to pay tax to the 
military authorities of 7% on all financial transactions. This was back- 
dated to the date of occupation, which meant an accumulation of 14 years 
of tax (Interview: October, 1981). Israeli financial assistance has been 
used as a reward. The Mayor of Beit Jala Municipality and four council 
members were 'excluded' from the town following a dispute over the construc- 
tion of an Israeli settlement on land owned by Beit Jala. The remaining 
council members resigned in protest. Rather than hold new elections, the 
military authorities appointed a Mayor and councillors, and immediately 
awarded them a grant of IS 1 million. According to an ex-council member 
of Beit Jala, the townspeople refused to go to the appointed officials 
(Interview: June 1981) . 
As well as exercising financial control over the municipal councils, 
all projects must be submitted to the military government for approval. 
The case in Nablus was noted earlier where the construction of a school 
was ordered to be halted when it was nearing completion, and . Metzger 
et al. cite examples of approval being given for projects and then with- 
drawn when costly preparations have been made (Metzger et al.: 1983: 
pp. 179-80). Despite the punitive measures taken against municipal officials 
and the restrictions placed on the way in which the municipal councils 
can operate, the Israeli Military Administration has not secured the 
cooperation of the West Bank municipalities, and the latter have remained 
firm in their opposition to the occupation. Before examining more recent 
consequences of this, we can look at the way in which a different sort of 
strategy was formulated in the West Bank with the establishment of Village 
Leagues. 
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Village Leagues 
The first village league formed after the Israeli occupation of the 
West Bank was in Hebron district in 1978. It consisted of fifteen 
village mukhtars 
30 
under the leadership of Mustafa Dudeen, a former 
government official in Egypt and cabinet minister in Jordan. By 1979 
only three mukhtars remained in the league. However, by 1981 the 
estimated membership in Hebron district was 120,48 of whom were 
mukhtars. 
31 
By early 1982, leagues had been set up in Ramallah, Bethlehem, 
Qalqilya and Silat el-Thaher (Jenin) districts, and unsuccessful attempts 
made to establish branches in Jericho and Nablus. The increase in the 
number of leagues and in the level of participation has helped to encourage 
claims that the leagues constitute a new 'moderate' leadership ini-. the 
West Bank, and criticism has been made that village leagues are mere 
creations of the Israeli military authorities: created in order to 
facilitate the imposition of the restricted 'civilian autonomy' described 
previously. 
The intention here is to move beyond a descriptive history to an 
examination of how the kind of political reality constructed by the leagues 
operates in conjunction with the dominant power relation in the West Bank, 
which has been analysed as that between an occupying, colonising force and 
an occupied, colonised people. In the light of the discussion of the 
Al Ard movement and municipal councils, it is hoped that through the 
examination of a very different attempt to accommodate to life under 
military rule, and the kinds of interpretations and perceptions which form 
the basis of andrationale for this accommodation, an understanding may be 
reached of the contradictions generated by occupation. 
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The permit which was granted to the Hebron league by the Israeli 
military authorities was permission to set up a cooperative organisation 
to improve social and economic facilities in the villages in the area. 
According to Mustafa Dudeen, the impetus for organising in this way was 
provided when, on his return to the West Bank from Jordan in 1976, many 
of his friends and family complained of the low standard of living in 
the villages. The way he defines the league is as a 'rural self-heln 
group. ' The kinds of projects which have been carried out so far include 
the building of schools, clinics and roads, and the supply of water and 
electricity to some of the villages (Interview: December 1981). 
There is a precedent for organisation of this kind in the West Bank, 
as Village Leagues were set up under both British and Jordanian rule. 
The Chairman in both cases was Mustafa Dudeen, and it was stated that 
many of the present league members had been involved in leagues operating 
under previous regimes. The continuity of the leagues in representing 
the interests of the rural population is emphasised by their supporters, 
to the extent of claiming that "the urban dwellers have exploited the 
1#32 peasantry for centuries . 
League members emphasise the economic nature of the conflict between 
urban and rural, 
33 
and cite the disparity in the provision of services 
between towns and villages as evidence of the lack of concern shown in the 
urban centres of administration for the level of services in the villages. 
There is some confusion over who is supposed to provide services to the 
villages. According to the mayors of the municipalities, it is their 
responsibility. According to the leagues, they are ready to assume 
responsibility for services in the villages, leaving the municipalities to 
manage the towns. 
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The definition of conflict proposed by the leagues is presented in 
this way as an attempt to redress the exploitation of a rural peasantry 
by an urban administration. However, underlying this is tension between 
two very different perceptions of the situation in the West Bank. In 
the discussion of municipalities, it was suggested that as the occupation 
began to exhibit features of permanence, new definitions emerged of ways 
of living under occupation which focussed on resistance to military rule. 
For the leagues, the rightness or desirability of the occupation is not 
an issue - the main concern is the formulation of a strategy for working 
within the parameters imposed by the occupying authorities. As Mustafa 
Dudeen explained: 
We are realistic. There is an occupation here, 
it is a fact. It can't be denied. We still 
have to live. If, to help the villages means 
we must deal with the Israelis, then we deal. 
(Interview: December 1981) . 
The emphasis on the continuity of league activity under British, Jordanian 
and Israeli rule which was referred to earlier is an important element of 
acceptance of the status quo, in that such an emphasis excludes a consid- 
eration of the specific nature of each regime. 
There is some evidence to suggest that the leagues were set up under 
Jordanian auspices in 1978. Ex-Jordanian officials make up the bulk of 
league membership, and in 1981 Mustafa Dudeen claimed that Jordanian money 
was being provided for league projects. Jordan's influence in the West 
Bank was noticeably weakened by the 1976 election results, and it was 
not until after 1978 that relations were renewed between Jordan and the 
PLO. This latter connection is perhaps indicated in Jordan's change of 
position, when it was reported that: 
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The Prime Minister of Jordan, Mr. Moder Badran, 
gave Palestinians who have cooperated with the 
Israelis via the Leagues one month to sever their 
links with the organisations. The ultimatum was 
backed by the threat of treason charges carrying 
penalties from death to confiscation of property. 
('The Guardian' : 5.3.82) . 
While this threat is largely academic in that Jordan is unable to impose 
its sovereignty in the West Bank, it could affect league members who still 
receive salaries from the Jordanian Government, or those who have business 
interests in Jordan. 
The basis of this attitude, and indeed the major criticism of the 
leagues, has been the way in which they cooperate with the Israeli 
authorities. As was noted earlier, all proposed projects in the West Bank 
must be submitted to the military authorities for approval, whether the 
proposal is made by village leaguesi charities, individuals or munici- 
palities. At this level, the leagues are following the same procedures 
as everyone else, and it is on these grounds that the leagues criticise 
municipal councils for their refusal to 'face facts. ' However, 50% of 
leaque funding is a direct grant from the Israeli authorities (Interview: 
December 1981). It was claimed that IS 40 million (approximately E1,350,000) 
had been provided in the first six months of 1981,34 and the Israeli 
administration has openly encouraged the leagues by, for example, refusing 
to accept applications for trading licences and mukhtar appointments unless 
processed through the village leagues (Interview: September 1981). 
The policies adopted by the military authorities towards the 
municipalities have had the effect of further strengthening the leagues' 
position. The Israelis have made no secret of their search for 'moderate' 
Palestinians with whom they can negotiate the form of autonomy proposed 
- 221 - 
for the West Bank, and in addition to the restrictive policies imposed 
On th(ý Mk'rIicLpii-I- councils, the military government has tried to find an 
', -ilternative leadership' to the elected officials. Thus, for example, 
it was reported in the Israeli press that: 
Dr. Milson, with the approval of the commander 
of the territory ... attempted to enlarge the 
power of other representative bodies in the 
West Bank, for example, of the chambers of 
commerce, thereby limiting the influence of 
the elected city councils as the only repre- 
sentatives of the people. 
('Ha'aretz' : 3.8.77) 
In November 1981, Dr. Milson was appointed as 'civilian administrator' 
35 
for the West Bank, and a(lain attempts were made to create a suitable 
Tic, qotiý-jtin(j r)artner. According to reports: 
This is to be done by judicious use of 
patronage and funds to the Village Leagues, 
shadowy local organisations on the West Bank, 
whose Palestinian membership is prepared to 
coo. 1-erate with the Israelis and is hostile 
to the PLO. 
('Financial Times': 17.4.82). 
The introduction of the 'civilian administration' sparked off a series of 
protests and demonstrations in the West Bank, and municipal official refused 
to deal- with the new administrative staff, arguing that to do so would be 
to legitimise the permanency of Israeli occupation. 
In March 1982, the Mayor of el-Bireh, Ibrahim Tawil, was sacked from 
office and replaced by an Israeli army officer. The reason given was his 
refusal to meet with Dr. Milson, and the Israeli Defence Ministry issued 
an explanatory statement that: 
They /the municipality/ have refrained from 
discussing municipal and city affairs with the 
civil administrator. This situation has seriously 
harmed the interests of the city and its inhabitants. 
('The Sunday Times': 21.3.82). 
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The dissolution of the el-Bireh council precipitated a three- day 
general strike. one week later, Bassam Shaka'a, Mayor of Nablus, and 
Karim Khalaf of Ramallah were also dismissed, and all three Mayors were 
placed under house arrest. 
36 
When the Dura council was removed from 
office, it was not replaced by an Israeli army officer but by a four-man 
council appointed by the military government from within the ranks of 
the village league ('Al Fajr': 15.6.82). 
In their attempt to undermine the local support enjoyed by the 
municipal councils, the Israeli military authorities strengthened the 
village leagues in that they became virtually the only channel of 
securing the approval of the authorities for any project in the West Bank 
at both individual and community levels. In other words, initially the 
leagues were indirectly supported by the military administration, as 
their organisation was concomitant with Israeli plans for the West Bank. 
This had little to do with specific aspects of local government, but 
rather with the practices of municipalities in opposing the occupation. 
Overt support was shown by the end of 1981, when weapons were provided 
37 
to league members, and in some cases Israeli army escorts. e new 
branches of the league which were set up in 1982 were opened by Menachem 
Milson, and financial aid was granted. For example, in June 1982, a new 
village league was opened by Milson in Asirah al-Shamiliyah in Nablus 
district, and at the opening ceremony IS 1.5 million was promised for a 
water project ('Al Fajr': 30.6.82). Claims have also been made that the 
leagues have assisted the Israeli military in carrying out 'security actions' 
in the West Bank. A statement was issued in June 1976 by residents of 
Beit. Kahil (Hebron District) following the shooting of a teacher who had 
been taking part in a demonstration. This was in opposition to attempts to 
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erect electricity poles on village land with the intention of connecting 
the village to the Israeli grid. It was reported that: "The workers were 
accompanied by armed guards from the Israeli-backed Village Leagues, Who 
opened fire on the demonstrators. " ('Al Fajr': 25.6.82). 
It can be suggested that village leagues serve to further Israeli 
interests in two main ways. Firstly, they do not challenge the legiti- 
macy of Israeli authority in the West Bank, but rather accept it as a 
'fact' which must be dealt with, thereby fulfilling Israel's criterion 
for 'moderate' Palestinians. Secondly, they act as a focus for criticism 
of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which is at least implicit and 
usually explicit in league criticisms of municipcý)l councils. The conflict 
which the leagues perceive between urban and rural, between themselves 
and the municipalities extended to the PLO ties in with the Israeli inter- 
pretation of the relationship between the PLO and the Palestinians in the 
occupied territories as being based on an external minority organisation 
imposing its political will. 
It was this kind of rationale which provided much of the impetus for 
Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The Israeli Defence Secretary at 
that time, General Sharon, was quoted as saying: "... quiet on the West 
Bank requires the destruction of the Palestine Liberation Organisation in 
Lebanon. " ('The Guardian': 12.7.81). In Chapter Five the economic logic 
underpinning the occupation of the West Bank and the invasion of Lebanon 
was elaborated; this statement by General Sharon illustrates the ideological 
continuity. The translation into Israeli control of the south of Lebanon 
has been dubbed the creation of a "North Banle' and according to newspaper 
reports: 
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... the Israeli military is foisting pro-Israeli 
village leaders on the Lebanese... The Israelis' 
scheme is modelled on their 'village leagues' 
in the occupied West Bank, with a village committee 
for administration backed up by a village militia... 
Their proposals represent a direct challenge to the 
long-established muktars, the traditional local 
leaders, and to the eventual return to sovereignty 
of President Amin Gemayel... 
('The Sunday Times': 6.2.83). 
So far, the concern has been to show how the village leagues have 
come to terms with the Israeli presence on the West Bank and how Israeli 
interests and league interests have coincided at various times - albeit 
for different reasons. However, it is important to look at what happens 
when these interests do not coincide. Mustafa Dudeen has been quoted 
as saying: 
Jews and Arabs are doomed to live together. The 
Arabs cannot throw the Jews into the sea. The 
Jews cannot throw the Arabs into the desert. For 
this reason, I am satisfied to build a bridge of 
trust. We must co-exist. 
('The Sunday Times': 21.3.82). 
In the first month of 1982 alone, more than 2,000 acres of Arab land in 
the West Bank were expropriated by the Israeli military authorities ('The 
Guardian': 4.2.82). Chapters Four and Five outlined the forms of Israeli 
colonisation in the West Bank, and examined the way in which occupation has 
inVolved the domination of the resources of the West Bank as well as 
settlement on the land. Mustafa Dudeen has publicly protested against 
land seizures, and the impression is that league protest has been treated 
by the military administration in the same way as protests against land 
expropriation from any other source - totally ignored. 
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It is in this context that we can set claims that the village leagues 
are an alternative or 'moderate' power base. The real relation of power 
is between the occupying forces and the occupied population, however 
sectors of that population attempt to accommodate themselves to their 
situation. The Israeli authorities have encouraged the development of 
village leagues insofar as the leagues' interest and practices coincide 
with their own. Non-coincidence can be ignored, as this is not a relation- 
ship based on equality in any sphere. As for the leagues, the way in 
which they perceive the power structure, and attempt to come to terms with 
the occupation, precludes a consideration of the specific nature of the 
Israeli regime, and this is illustrated by their powerlessness in the face 
of rapid, and increasing, expropriation in the West Bank. 
Taken together, the three instances which have been discussed in this 
chapter highlight particular moments in the colonial relationship and share 
an underlying concern with the search for ways to continue existing under 
occupation. For the municipalities, this has involved the recognition 
that a continued presence in the West Bank is in itself a form of resistance, 
and the significance of this can be assessed by referring to the earlier 
discussion of the way in which Zionism has excluded the Palestinian people 
physically, and negated them ideologically. In this light, the kinds of 
opposition which have been carried out on a day-to-day basis within the 
municipalities assume a greater importance, not least for the way in which 
they have acted as a focus and a representation for the West Bank population. 
Issues of this nature raised by the municipalities can perhaps be 
used to answer Fanon's critique of the non-violent option selected by 
the 'young nationalist bourgeoisie'. His description of a membership 
drawn from the intellectual and economic elite, and the desire to enter 
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some form of negotiation, is applicable to the majority of West Bank 
municipal officials as well as to Al Ard. It can be argued that Fanon's 
conclusion, that only greater violence can destroy the violence of 
colonialism, is borne out by the fact that the adoption of 'non-violence' 
has not protected those involved from the wide range of punitive measures 
utilised by the military authorities, and, indeed, even the extent to which 
the village leagues have been prepared to compromise has not been sufficient 
to alter the nature of the colonial relationship. 
However, the derivation of prescribing spontaneous acts of physical 
violence as the remaining desirable option neither takes into account the 
realities of the situation in the West Bank nor the value of managing to 
survive. The issue of how means can be found to deal with a colonising 
power while opposing that power will be raised again in Chapter Seven, 
when discussion will focus on education in the West Bank. 
The examination of Al Ard, the municipalities and the village leagues 
indicates that at different times and under different conditions, attempts 
have been made to come to terms with the occupying forces. In the case of 
the village leagues this involved open sponsorship by the military govern- 
ment; in the case of Al Ard and the municipalities it has meant treading 
a very fine line between the need to oppose occupation and the need to 
survive, and in a sense this is a dilemma faced by the entire Palestinian 
population. 
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NOTES 
The sources on which this information is based are interviews with 
a founding member of Al Ard who is still resident in Israel; 
interviews with people who were members of the Israeli Communist 
Party in the 1950's and 1960's; books written by two founders of 
Al Ard, Sabri Jiryis and Fouzi Al-Asmar. 
2. See the discussion of the genesis,. development and political role 
of the Arab National Movement in Walid Kazziha, Revolutionary 
Transformation in the Arab World, (1975). 
3. See, for example, Maxime Rodinson, Marxism and the Muslim World, 
(1979), and Israel and the Arabs, (1982). Also, Samir Amin, 
The Arab Nation, (1978) . 
4. The history of the Palestine Communist Party is of interest both 
for the part it played during the British Mandate, and for the 
way in which it has fragmented and reformed since 1948. For an 
account at a regional level, see Suliman Bashear, Communism in 
the Arab East 1919-1926, (1980). An analysis of the attitude of 
the Palestinian Communist Party towards the Arab population, and 
their political activity during the Mandate, is provided in Musa 
Budeiri, The Palestine Communist Party 1919-1948, (1979), and a 
chronological presentation of the evolution of left-wing politics 
in Palestine and Israel is carried out in Zachary Lockman, The Left 
in Israel : Zionism vs. Socialism, (1976). 
The situation is virtually unchanged, and the present official Communist 
Party, RAKAH, is well supported by Arabs in Israel. See Sixty Years 
of the Communist Party of Israel, published by the Central Committee 
of RAKAH (1980). 
6. MAPAI is the social-democratic Labour Party which dominated the ruling 
Israeli coalition from 1948 until 1977. MAPAM, the United Labour Party, 
is more to the left amongst the Zionist parties. 
7. Jiryis describes the rewards given to members on MAPAI's Arab list 
as follows: 
... he might be appointed to the board of a company 
marketing Arab agricultural products, or he might 
be allowed a deferment in the payment of his taxes, 
or he might be granted a license to carry arms. He 
might be allowed to rent a few hundred dunums of 
farmland from the absentee properties ... 
(Jiryis: 1976: p. 167) 
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According to a founding member of Al Ard, under British Mandatory 
law, any citizen could publish a newspaper without a permit, as 
long as it was a single issue and not a regular publication (Interview: 
June 1981). 
For example, 'This Land', 'Call of the Land' and so on. 
10. Under Jordanian Law, municipal councils are elected every four years. 
Elections had been due in 1967, but were postponed following the 
occupation. The elections which were scheduled to take place in 1980 
have been postponed indefinitely. 
The elections were to be carried out in two stages, with the towns 
in the north of the West Bank voting four weeks before the towns in 
the south. 
12. Ma'zuz al-Masri ran for office, the economic restrictions on Nablus 
were liftecl and the Mayor's relatives were released from prison. 
13. For a discussion of the West Bank under Jordanian rule, see Jamil 
Hilal, Class Transformation in the West Bank and Gaza, (1976). 
Saul Mishal, West Bank/East Bank: the Palestinians in Jordan 1949-1967, 
(1978), draws on material from Jordanian archives captured by the 
Israel Defence Forces during the 1967 war, covering political events 
in the West Bank from the mid-1950's to the mid-1960's. 
14. Identity cards must be carried at all times and are frequently 
requested, for example at road blocks. 
15. The first attempt to establish a broadly-based opposition to the 
occupation was the Higher Commission for National Guidance, set up 
in September 1967. The three founding members were deported three 
months later. Several other attempts were made, but according to 
Metzger at al., these failed "not only because of Israeli counter- 
measures, but also because of differences of opinion among the various 
factions. " (Metzger et al.: 1983: p. 150). 
16. The refusal to cooperate with Israel and advocacy of reannexation by 
Jordan led to the deportation of several 'notables'. For example, 
Sheikh Abdel Hamid el Sa'eh, the President of the Islamic Higher 
Council, was deported on 23.9.67. The Mayor of Jerusalem, Ruhi el 
Khatib, was deported on 7.3.68, and Kamal Dajani, a former Member of 
Parliament, on 6.9.68 (Al-Abid: 1969: pp. 109-114). 
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17. "In May 1979 the 4,000 inhabitants of the Jalazoun camp north of 
Ramallah were subjected to a twelve-day curfew after some youths 
from the camp were suspected of throwing stones at Israeli military 
vehicles. The curfew lasted for twenty-two hours a day... " (Gilmour: 
1982: P. 133). 
18. Al-Abid provides details of the destruction of the villages of Beit 
Nuba, Amoas and Yalu in November 1967 (Al-Abid: 1969: pp. 123-5). An 
ex-prisoner interviewed in the West Bank revealed that his house had been 
been blown up when he was arrested, although he was not charged (Inter- 
view: September 1981). 
19. This was formalised in the programme approved by the 12th session of 
the Palestine National Council in 1974 as follows: 
"The PLO will struggle by every means, the 
foremost of which is armed struggle, to 
liberate Palestinian land and to establish 
the people's national independent and fighting 
authority of every part of Palestinian land to 
be liberated... " 
(London Office of the Palestine Liberation Organisation: 
1983). 
20. For a summary of the programme of the Palestine National Front, see 
MERIP Reports, No. 25. The Communist Party retained the notion of a 
'two-state' solution, in that they proposed self-determination within 
the West Bank. For a discussion of the Jordanian Communist Party 
in the West Bank under Jordanian administration, see Amnon Cohen 
Political Parties in the West Bank under the Hashemite Regime, in 
Ma'oz, ed.: 1975. 
21. The Palestine National Council is the equivalent of a parliament, and 
has members nominated as representatives of political groupings, labour 
organisations and various interest groups. The membership varies from 
loo-18o, and meetings take place twice a year. The National Council is 
responsible for electing an Executive Committee, which is in permanent 
session and is charged with the implementation and execution of 
National Council policies. Members of the Executive Committee have 
individual responsibilities and portfolios, like members of a cabinet 
(, London office of the Palestine Liberation Organisation). 
22. The idea of the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and 
Gaza continues to be referred to as a 'transitional stage I. 
23. The Begin Plan is reproduced as an appendix in David H. Ott, Palestine 
in Perspective, (1980). 
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24. In 1977, Menachem Begin's Counsellor for Foreign Information gave 
instructions that Israeli officials were to use the terms 'Judea and 
Samarialwhen speaking of the West Bank ('Al Fajr': 29.9-77). 
25. In Begin's proposals, the right to acquire land and settle in Israel 
was extended to Arabs from the occupied territories who became Israe 1i 
citizens. However, as was noted in Chapter Four, over 9o% of the land 
in Israel is held by the Jewish National Fund and its agencies, and is 
held exclusively for Jews. 
26. According to the Geneva Convention, an occupying authority does not 
have the right to alter existing tax laws. However, Israel denies 
the Convention's applicability to the West Bank and Gaza on the 
grounds that prior to the Israeli occupation these territories were 
not held by the 'legitimate sovereign'. See, Report of the National 
Lawyers' Guild Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli-Occupied West Bank 
and Gaza (1978), and Allan Gerson Israel, the West Bank and Inter- 
national Law (1978). 
27. Questions were asked in the Knesset by a member of the Labour Party, 
as to why no progress had been made in the search for the attackers 
('Jerusalem Post': 26.9.81). 
28. The Joint Palestinian-Jordanian Committee functions as a collecting 
point for funds from Arab governments, and administers the fund. 
According to Metzger et al., it amounts to $150 million (Metzger 
et al.: 1983: p. 228) . 
29. 'Al Fajr' is an Arabic daily newspaper, published in East Jerusalem, 
which also issues a weekly English edition covering news from the 
occupied territories. 'Al-Tali'ah' is the Arabic weekly publication 
of the Communist Party. 
30. For a discussion of the position of Mukhtar in the West Bank from 
Ottoman times until the 1967 occupation, see G. Baer The Office and 
Functions of the Village Mukhtar, in Migdal, ed.: 1980. 
31. Of the 48 mukhtars, 17 were from Dura villages, which is the home of 
Mustafa Dudeen. According to the Information Office in Hebron 
Municipality, the remainder are "representatives of the intelligentsia 
and local bourgeoisie" (Interview: September 1981). 
32. This explanation was given by a full-time official of Hebron Village 
League in December 1981. 
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33. It can be argued that the separation of urban and rural in the West Bank is difficult to sustain - socially, politically and economically. Factors such as the geographical proximity of villages to the main 
urban centres, and the way in which family connections provide social 
and political support across distinctions between urban and rural areas 
make this a problematic basis of analysis. See, for example, Talal Asad's 
critique of Abner Cohen's Arab Border-Villages in Israel (1965), where 
the reliance on this sort of explanation is analysed as an aspect of 
the colonial relationship. Asad Anthropological Texts and Ideological 
Problems: an Analysis of Cohen on Arab Villages in Israel in Review of 
Middle East Studies, No. 1. 
34. The late Chairman of Ramallah District Village League, Yusuf al-Khatib, 
was quoted in 'Al Anba', an Israeli Arabic newspaper, on 26.7.81. 
35. Menachem Milson holds the rank of General in the Israeli Army. 
36. Mayor Khalaf's house arrest was specified as in his home in Jericho, 
rather than his home in Ramallah, so he is excluded from the munici- 
pality (Vinancial Times': 29.5.82). 
37. The official announcement that members of Hebron, Ramallah and Bethlehem 
Village Leagues would be armed was reported in 'Al Fajrl on 4.2.82. 
However, on a visit to the league headquarters in Hebron in December 
1981, initial questioning and search were carried out by Israeli Army 
soldiers. An army jeep is permanently assigned to Mustafa Dudeen, and 
during an interview with him, three armed Arab supporters were in the 
room. At that time, Dudeen claimed that he already had enough weapons 
to "protect all 4,000 members of my family and all of my league. " 
Chapter Seven 
EDUCATION UNDER OCCUPATION 
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Chapter Seven 
Since 1967, education in the West Bank has been a source of direct 
conflict, and one which is not restricted to those immediately involved 
with educational institutions. This Chapter will examine education as 
a form of politics which has significance for coloniser and colonised, and 
will extend the discussion of Chapter Six of particular responses to 
occupation in a consideration of some of the more diffuse aspects of the 
colonial relationship. Thus, it is not an exhaustive study of the history 
of educational institutions, nor a catalogue of the actions which the 
military authorities have taken. Rather, it is an attempt to utilise an 
analysis of what is happening to education in the West Bank under occu- 
pation in advancing the general themes which have been raised in the thesis 
concerning the operation of the relationship between coloniser and colonised. 
The first section of this Chapter is concerned with the importance of 
education to the coloniser, and as Gerson points out: 
Perhaps the most powerful instrument an occupying 
power has at its disposal in attempting to 
permanently redefine existi. ng institutional and 
social structures of occupied territory is the 
power to initiate broad educational reforms 
involving curricula, texts and teachers. 
(Gerson: 1978: p. 178). 
In addition to the ideological role of education, it can be argued that 
education policies are an essential part of the general economic 'restructu- 
ring' which was discussed in Chapter Five, and this is suggested in the 
second section by relating the kinds of changes which have been imposed 
on educational institutions to changes in the economic structure of the 
West Bank. The first two sections are therefore concerned primarily with 
the way in which power has been exercised on education 
by the military 
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authorities, and the way in which this can be located within a consid- 
eration of Isrealls occupation of the West Bank. 
The third section focusses on the significance of education for the 
colonised, and examines the sense in which we can talk of education 
as politics. of particular importance is the way in which educational 
institutions have created an environment within which political forms can 
develop, and the way in which the academic milieu interrelates with the 
West Bank population in general, and student politics is used to explore 
these aspects. 
Restrictions imposed by the Military Authorities 
Universities 
The announcement of Military Order 854 in July 1980 and related 
amendments made to Jordanian laws 
1 
served to, ýinstitutionalise over-arching 
military control of education. While the order had not been implemented in 
its entirety by October 1983, it has been partially enacted and remains 
on the Statute books, and the implications and effects of its promulgation 
are important. The full text of Military Order 854 and the amendments 
to Jordanian Education and Culture Law is provided in Appendix 3. 
A report published by the University of Birzeit notes that the 
extension of Jordanian law was in 
f act the, application to higher education 
of a law designed to govern kindgergarten and school 
level education 
(University of Birzeit: 1982). This means that control 
is extended, such 
that a permit must be granted annually 
for an educational institution to 
continue to operate, teaching certificates 
can be awarded and cancelled, 
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and the curricula and text-books come under the supervision of the 
'authority'. The authority was transferred from the Jordanian Education 
Ministry to the Israeli 'supervising officer' (University of Birzeit: 1982). 
In addition to restrictions placed on the functioning of institutions, 
MO 854 brought academic staff and students under the direction jurisdiction 
of the authorities. One section of MO 854 which has been applied requires all 
'foreign' staff and students to obtain an individual permit certificate from 
the Military Commander of the West Bank. Those classified as 'foreign' 
include residents of other occupied territories, Israeli citizens and all 
foreign passport-holders, and the latter category contains Palestinians 
who are holding foreign passports (Interview: November 1981). A consider- 
ation of the geographic origins of Birzeit's student population indicates 
the effects of this law. According to a University newsletter, 21.3% of 
the studeriLs are from Gaza, 16.3% from Jerusalem 
2 
and 0.3% from Galilee 
(Birzeit University Newsletter: March 1983). Therefore, 37.9% of Birzeit 
students are classified as foreign. 
As for members of staff, the West Bank universities have relied 
heavily on recruiting foreign faculty members, to the extent that they 
constitute about a quarter of staff members at Birzeit University and are 
represented to a lesser degree in the others. In August, 1982, the 
military government announced that all faculty members who were not residents 
of the West Bank would be compelled to sign a statement dissociating them- 
selves from the PLO, and that this would be a condition in granting a work 
permit. The text of the statement ran as follows: 
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I hereby declare that I am fully committed 
against indulging in any act and offering 
my assistance to the organization called 
the PLO or any other terrorist organization 
that is considered to be hostile to the 
State of Israe 1 as indicated in the Act 
for the Prevention of Acts of Belligerence 
and Enemy 
_ 
Propaganda-such acts being of 
a direct or indirect nature. 
('The Guardian': 1.10.82). 
The faculty members involved refused to sign this statement and as a result, 
22 out of 26 foreign staff at Al-Najah University, including the President 
and Vice-President, were deported. 
3 
All the deportees held Jordanian 
passports. The remaining 4 foreign lecturers were barred from teaching. 
At Birzeit Univeristy, 3 members of staff were deported and the remaining 
27 foreign faculty members barred from teaching,;! and at Bethlehem and 
Hebron Universities, all foreign staff were barred from teaching and one 
British lecturer was deported from Bethlehem. 
The requirement to sign the 'loyalty oath' attracted international 
protest, and this extended to Israeli-military sources being quoted in 
the Israeli press as saying that the document the teachers were being asked 
to sign did not have a significant security motivation ('Halaretzl: 26.9.82). 
Furthermore, the Israeli military administration in the West Bank already 
has wide-ranging prerogatives which confer the ability to both d6fine and 
4 
deal with infringements of Israe-li security. A study carried out by 
five professors from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem into conditions in 
5 
the Universities in the occupied territories points out that if someone 
is permitted to enter the West Bank but then banned from teaching there, 
it must be inferred that they cannot be a threat to security given their 
free movement in the area, and this is the position regarding foreign 
passport holders employed by West Bank universities. 
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In November 1982, the Israeli government withdrew the requirement to 
sign the 'loyalty oath' and instead amended the work permit application 
form so that any non-resident who applied for a work permit was required 
to sign a form which, according to an Israeli Government Press office 
Release, "contains no commitment on the part of the applicant...... rbut/.. 
lists certain conditions whose non-fulfilment will lead to the cancellation of 
the permit" (Cheverton: 1983). The text of item B(3) of the amended form 
states: 
During the period in which the permit is valid, 
the permit holders will refrain from any action 
harming security and public order and in this 
context will obey all the law's stipulations and 
security legislation forbidding any action or 
providing any service that can be construed as 
aiding or supporting the PLO or any other hostile 
organisation... 
(Cheverton: 1983). 
The similarity of this clause to the original pledge left the position 
of foreign faculty members unchanged in their refusal to sign a statement 
which is seen as political, or at least as being of political use. 
6 
Many 
have defied the ban on teaching but are subject to continuing anxiety about 
their futures in the West Bank, and also to the harassment imposed on all 
residents of the occupied territories. In this way, the different levels 
at which Military Order 854 affects the academic community become apparent. 
Firstly, there is the effect on the institutions themselves, in terms of 
licensing and appointing staff. Secondly, there is the control over which 
staff and students can be in the universities, and thirdly the strain and 
tension which these conditions engender. 
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(ii) Schools 
Restrictions have also been imposed on the schools in the West Bank. 
For example, the Military Officerin Education sets a limit on the number 
of teachers who can be recruited to government-administered schools in each 
district in any one year. Nasru provides details of the deficit in recruit- 
ment for each district, and calculates the overall deficit in the West Bank 
to be 47% (i. e. between teachers required and teachers recruited). 
7 
What 
this means in real terms is that in 1976/77,927 applicants out of 1101 were 
rejected (figures exclude Ramallah district). As for the number of teachers 
required, she calculates that this would be around 800, over and above the 
200 replacements needed for resigned places, rather than the 173.5 teachers 
who were actually employed (Nasru: 1977). 
Of the applicants for teaching posts, 30% were University graduates 
and the remaining 70% were graduates of teaching training colleges. The 
significance of this is that a teaching qualification does not give much 
scope for employment outside the teaching profession. Itmay also be 
possible to suggest that this is significant for the employment of women in 
the West Bank. Philip Davies (Davies: 1979) suggests that education is by 
far the largest area of employment for women who have completed university, 
and his figures on the employment of graduates of Bir Zeit University in 
8 the period 1962-70 break down as follows: 
Table 7.1 Bir Zeit University Graduate Employment 
Sector Male % Female % 
Education 47 35 
Commerce 5 0 
Professional 16 0 
Clerical- 0 19 
Managerial 32 16 
Unemployed 0 30 
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It is difficult to find out what happens to those who train as 
teachers and cannot be employed. Davies'figure of 30% unemployment 
amongst female Bir Zeit graduates at a time when they were not barred 
from government schools9 suggests that for women there is little alter- 
native. Nasru suggests that a high proportion of rejected applicants 
actually leave the West Bank in order to find work, and emphasises that 
this is a consequence of recruitment policy rather than an excess in the 
number of teachers trained relative to the number required. She takes 
this further in suggesting that there is a relationship between the 
Military Officer's recruitment policy and the deportation policy; especially 
since in both cases the target group is educated young people. In other 
words, that the recruitment policy implemented by the Military Education 
Office in the West Bank serves to increase the pressure on the educated 
young population to leave due to their inability to find work. 
(iii) Curriculum 
Following the 1967 occupation, teachers in the West Bank threatened to 
strike over the proposed changes in the school curriculum and texts used. 
The kind of changes which were envisaged would have brought West Bank 
schools into line with Arab schools inside Israel 
ID 
andaccording to 
Gerson (Gerson: 1978), West Bank educators criticised this on the grounds 
that international law demands that the existing institutions of an 
occupied territory be maintained. 
11 
The importance of this threatened 
strike was that in many ways it was the first organised opposition to the 
Israeli occupation -a fact recognised by the new Military Government's 
attempts to reach some compromise. However, the concessions which were 
suggested were too late, as a call for teachers to strike and pupils to 
boycott classes had already been issued. The strike ended with a compromise - 
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and also because as one ex-teacher suggested, even 'deformed' education 
was better than none. 
12 
If we look first at the changes which were demanded in the textbooks, 
of the 134 Jordanian texts used in West Bank schools, 78 were considered 
so politically biased as to be unacceptable. The only texts approved 
were foreign language and scientific textbooks published abroad 
('Jerusalem Post': 15.8.67). A spokesmand for the Israeli Ministry of 
Education and Culture stated that: "All teaching of the hatred of 
peoples and the destruction of states, including, of course, the State of 
Israel, must be eliminated. Those teachers who cannot accept this principle 
will be asked to leave.: (Nasru: 1977: p. 18). 
Some examples of what this means should illustrate how demands for 
textbooks alterations work in practice. 
- Two textbooks used in the 3rd preparatory class (i. e. approx. age 14-15) 
were banned. These were "Geography of the Arab World" and"Jordanian 
Society", a history text. The books which were issued to replace them 
had the same content with the omission of all geographical concepts 
which relate to political concepts - the title 'Palestine' was replaced 
by 'Israel'. 
- An Arab Grammar for grades 4-6 (age 10-12) was described as being "full 
of hate propaganda" and so banned. Examples given are "the enemy was 
routed.... the number of survivors is very small", "Holy war is duty", 
"the homeland has been stolen", "the Arabs will not rest until their 
Paradise is returned to them" (Gerson: 1978: p. 201). 
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The major change in curriculum after 1967 - and one of the 
concessions made by the West Bank teachers in ending their strike - 
was the dropping of a subject called 'The Palestinian Problem'. This 
was basically a history of Palestine and the Palestinian people. Other 
ares which had some changes made were religion, Arabic literature, 
history and geography. A 'West Bank educator' quoted in Nasru says: 
"Israel seems to direct its educational policy against the core of our 
culture and tradition. They drain the national heritage from our 
libraries. " (Nasru: 1977). It should be noted that the above restric- 
tions on curricula and textbooks apply to private and UNWRA schools as 
well as government-run institutions. 
As for institutions of higher education, there is no direct inter- 
ference in the curriculum or in the use of specific texts, although 
MO 854 includes this provision. However, it is likely that any proposed 
text which the Military Authorities would find objectionable is on the 
list issued by the Israeli Military Officer of Education (K. 330/24/611) 
on 19.1.1977 prohibiting 1188 books, and subsequent updatings of this. 
The list is composed exclusively of books printed in Arabic although this 
includes books translated from other languages. According to a report 
by an Israe. li journalist, volumes of poetry, short stories, novels, 
historical and political analyses are amongst those banned. 
13 
One example 
is the Arabic translation of "The Creation and Development of the Israeli 
Army" by Yigal Allon, a former major-general in the IDF (, Israel Defence 
Force) and Israeli Foreign Minister, reputedly because of objectional 
cover notes ('The Times Higher Education Supplement': 30.4.82). 
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The majority of the banned titles are freely available inside 
Israel, but although East Jerusalem has been 'annexed' since 1967, the 
censorship rules of book buying and distribution which apply on the West 
Bank also apply in East Jerusalem. The Hebrew University report describes 
this anomaly, and points out that where security censorship exists, as 
it does in Israel, this is generally to prevent the publication of material 
which is thought to be of potential damage to state security, rather than 
to prevent access to material which has already been published (Gavison 
et al.: 1981). The difficulty of obtaining permission to import periodicals 
and journals from Arab countries 
14 
has also been noted, and the difficulty 
of carrying out academic activity without free access to information sources 
(Gavison et al. : 1981) . 
Non-completion of Schooling 
Education in the West Bank is compulsory to the level of grade 9. 
This covers the elementary cycle of grades 1-6 (age approx. 6-12) and 
the preparatory cycle cE grades 7-9, or ages 12-15. The third level of 
schooling is the secondary cycle which takes students up to age 18 
(grades 10-12). In the secondary cycle students begin with one general 
academic year after which they are separated into academic and vocational 
specialisations. The academic specialisation is further divided into 
science and arts streams, while the vocational areas include commerce, 
agriculture and industry. A secondary certificate is issued on the 
completion of 12 grades and the student is expected to sit the Tawjihi, a 
uniformly-administered national examination. Success in the Tawjihi is 
the necessary university entrance qualification. 
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After 1967, a West Bank Examinations Board was established to take 
over supervision of the exam from the Jordanian Ministry of Education. 
According to Mahshi and Rihan, the West Bank Board continues to cooperate 
closely with the Jordanian Ministry in registering candidates, selecting 
examiners and issuing results, and while the Board officially reports to 
the Israeli Education Officer for the West Bank, the certificates awarded 
are exchangeable in Amman for Jordanian certificates which are admissable 
entrance qualifications for universities in other Arab states (Nakhleh (ed): 
1980). Nasru suggests that the West Bank education departments are subjected 
to two often conflicting types of instruction: one issued directly by 
the Military Officer of Education within the Israeli administration and the 
other issued indirectly from the Jordanian Ministry of Education. She 
suqqests that the problem of coping with conflicting policies is especially 
clear in the areas of curriculum content, teacher training programmes and 
the evaluation of examination results (Nasru: 1977). 
There are three types of school in the West Bank. Government-run 
schools are those which are administered by the Jordanian Government 
prior to 1967 and which now come directly under the jurisdiction of the 
, Israeli Education Office. UNWRA operates 
its own schools, but provides 
education only at the elementary and preparatory levels. Thirdly, private 
schools, which unlike UNWRA and Government-administered institutions 
generally charge tuition fees. 
Table 7.2 represents the distribution of pupils between the three 
categories of school for selected years since 1967. 
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Table 7.2 
The distribution of pupils according to type of 
School attended, 1968-77 
1968/9 1971/2 1974/5 1976/7 
total number 162,750 196,161 213,684 230,736 
of pupils 
government 120,968 147,183 162,588 175,627 institutions 
% of total 74.32 75.03 76.08 76.11 
UNWRA 
25,690 29,277 31,054 34,078 
schools 
% of total 15.78 14.92 14.53 14.76 
other 16,092 19,701 20,042 21,031 
% of total 9.88 10.04 9.37 9.11 
Source: Computed from Statistical Abstractof Israel (1968-1978). 
When statistics of school attendance are broken down according to grade, 
the disparity between the number of pupils in the elementary cycle and 
those in the preparatory cycle - both within compulsory education - is 
striking. 
Table 7.3 
School registration according to educational cycle 
1967/8 1971/2 1974/5 1976/7 
total 142,893 195,208 212,131 227,149 
kindergarten 4,709 7,786 7,379 7,789 
elementary 104,064 135,139 144,231 146,592 
preparatory 23,625 35,590 41,056 48,683 
secondary 10,495 16,693 19,465 24,085 
(kindergartens are all privately-run) 
Source: Mahshi, K. & Rihan, R., Education: Elementary and S econdary in 
Nakhleh (ed): 1980. Table compiled by them through "personal 
contacts with some education directorates and from the office of 
UNWRA in East Jerusalem. " 
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While the nature of the data collection means the figures cannot be taken 
as absolute, as a general illustration they suggest. that a significant 
number of children in the West Bank do not complete compulsory education. 
Nasru's attempt to correlate the rate of dropping out of school with 
sex, district and years of schooling indicate some useful general points. 
Her findings as regards a correlation with sex were that there is little 
difference between the ratio of girls dropping out and boys to the total 
number enrolled. As regards years of schooling the highest level of 
school-leaving is in the elementary cycle (ages 12-15). The attempted 
correlation on district is interesting, as she suggests that the West Bank 
districts bordering on Israel may have a higher incidence of premature 
school-leaving due to children being employed in Israeli enterprises. 
While the figures quoted do back this up, care must be taken with the 
conclusions drawn as several other factors could be significant, for example, 
families losing land as a source of livelihood, or areas with a high 
proportion of the population already employed in Israel. Also the proximity 
of all West Bank areas to Israel is such that most areas are within easy 
travelling distance. However, when reference is made to the discussion 
of child labour in Chapter Five, then the degree of non-completion of 
compulsory education is confirmed. one West Bank teacher interviewed 
said he had seen Israeli labour contractors outside the school making 
arrangements to employ children in agriculture. For the first few days 
many of the children tried to cope with attending school in the morning 
and working in the fields in the afternoon, but most dropped out of 
school after that. He described them as appearing at school "tired, and 
smelling of onions" (Interview: August 1981). 
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What this means is that almost half the potential workforce of the 
West Bank has no formal education after the age of twelve. To some 
extent this can be compared with the situation in other parts of the 
'Third World' but particular aspects of the situation in the West Bank 
can be seen as modificatory. In a Bank of Israel Research publication, 
Arie Bregman states: 
An analysis of employment rates in correlation 
with education levels inidcates that, unlike the 
situation among the Jewish population of Israel, 
the employment rate in the administered areas 
goes down as the level of education (measured 
in years of schooling) rises.. A similar problem 
exists among educat6d non-Jews in Israel, who 
have a relatively high unemployment rate. " 
(Bregman: 1975: pp. 34-5). 
In other words, it is when the non-completion of schooling is set in the 
context of the West Bank under occupation, and factors such as the 
restrictions on educational institutions are juxtaposed with forms of 
economic transformation, that education can be seen as an instrument of 
power. 
University Structure 
In 1967 there were 8 institutions in the West Bank and Jerusalem 
offering post-school education. None of the courses lasted more than 
two years, and the vast majority of the students were doing teacher- 
t'raining. A West Bank resident who wanted a university education would 
have to go abroad; either to study a complete degree progranune or to 
upgrade the associate degrees awarded by private colleges such as Birzeit 
after two years' study. 
15 
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Birzeit itself was upgraded to a 4-year degree-awarding 
institution in 1972 to become the first university in the West Bank. 
16 
Bethlehem University was founded by a Christian (Roman Catholic) order 
in 1973, and in 1977 al-Najah University was set up in Nablus. Founded 
as an Islamic college, Hebron is now the fourth university in the West 
Bank and, like the others, is a privately-financed institution. Table 
7.4 indicates the comparative sizes: 
Table 7.4 
West Bank University Students & Staff, 1983 
University Students Staff 
Birzeit 
Bethlehem 
al-Najah 
Hebron 
2,037 224 
1,360 99 
3,181 275 
1,789 35 
Source: 'Middle East International': 19.8.83 
The West Bank Universities have been criticised for failing to 
provide the sort of training thought necessary for the West Bank. Davies 
for example, suggests that there is a deficiency in technical and 
vocational training courses. As an illustration he points out that there 
is little attention paid to the acquisition of skills relevant to rural 
planning and development in an area where 70% of the population live in 
villages of under 5000 inhabitants. He concludes that, finding it difficult 
to adapt to the social and economic development needs and the employment 
realities of the West Bank, many graduates emigratein order to "market their 
skills in a wider Middle East labour market, at the expense of the West 
Bank. " (Davies, 1979: p. 69) . 
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In discussing curricula followed by the universities, the problems 
faced by schools should be noted. For the 9,915 secondary school pupils 
whoare studying sciences, there are 19 physics, 20 chemistry and 9 
biology teachers who are university graduates in the whole of the West 
Bank. Thus, most science instruction in schools is given by unqualified 
teachers. As for facilities, out of 99 secondary schools only 47 have , 
even one-roomed laboratories. 
17 
In the Tawjihi examinations the number 
electing to sit the literary option is increasing at 7.8% per annum 
while the scientific candidature increases at 5.2%. The number choosing 
the 'non-academic' option is less than 4% of the total. Obviously this 
has implications both for the types of courses offered by universities 
and for the labour market in general (Nasru: 1977). 
The cost of different types of education is another factor, both in 
schools and in universities. It is much cheaper to provide arts and 
social science courses than to provide the necessary facilities for the 
study of natural sciences, and the shortage of qualified teachers in 
sciences helps perpetuate the imbalance. 
In speculating on why students choose to study particular subjects, 
it can be suggested that in addition to factors mentioned previously, 
vocational training is more geared towards aprecise job market than is a 
more general academic training. The uncertainty of the West Bank makes 
this kind of planning for the future very difficult, both for the intending 
student and for the institutions. In academic year 1980/1, staff at the 
University of Birzeit were still teaching in July to make up for the time 
lost through closures. The university was closed again at the beginning 
of November, after having completed three weeks of term, and this time 
the closure was for two months. In all, Birzeit. University lost seven 
months of academic year 1981/2. 
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Closure involves the military authorities instructing the university 
administrator to order all teaching and research activities to cease, 
and the physical prevention of students and staff from entering the 
campus. 
18 
The Hebrew University report concedes that if "serious 
incidents and disturbances" have taken place, then there may a case 
for closing the university for a short time in order to "calm tempers 
and prevent repetition". However, it suggests that the universities are 
frequently closed as a punishment rather than as a preventative measure, 
and as such, university closure constitutes an unacceptable collective 
punishment (Gavison et al.: 1981). 
Education as Politics 
In the discussion in Chapter Six of strategies for survival, it 
was suggested that there is a dilemma in finding means of opposing 
occupation while continuing to live in the West Bank. This is clearly 
seen in the case of the municipalities, where the nature of local 
administration under the sovereignty of the military authorities in 
conjuriction with resistance to that authority, gives rise to a range of 
contradictions and tensions. While education institutions have to cope 
with some of the same problems - for example, in securing a permit to 
operate - they are in a different position, and this can be seen partly 
as arising from the different nature of academic activity and partly as 
the special position of universities in the West Bank. 
In a letter to "the Jerusalem Post", an Israeli academic noted that 
educational institutions in the occupied territories are national, 
Palestinian institutions and deduced that: 
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it is not only natural, but entirely appropriate 
that calls for self-determination and attempts to 
articulate a national consciousness should emanate 
from academic centres, intellectuals traditionally 
being among those entrusted with preserving the 
rights and traditions of their people. 
('The Jerusalem Post': 6.1.83) 
The assumption of such a role, however, takes on different connotations 
when placed in the context of an attempt to generate and define an 
identity which is in direct conflict with the Israeli authorities, and 
reference can be made to previous discussion of the link between the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the process of colonisation on the 
West Bank. 
In this sense, what is being suggested is that the universities in 
the West Bank are able to create a political forum and also to anchor 
this in the wider community, and an elaboration of this can begin by 
looking at the student movement. 
A member of staff at Birzeit University, herself a former student 
there, suggested that after 1967 the nature of the student intake 
changed -a change which was intensified by the gaining of university 
status by Birzeit College and the establishment of Bethlehem and 
al-Najah Universities. Higher education had previously been the preserve 
of those from wealthy families. Now, many of the students were attending 
university and college in the West Bank itself and were drawn from a much 
wider background. The students had direct experience of occupation 
before starting university and were more 'political' than the previous 
student body (Interview: July 1981). 
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This had consequences within the institutions themselves, as the 
students demanded participation in the running of the establishments and 
raised questions as to the way in which educational institutes could 
and should operate under conditions of military occupation. The demand 
for student participation led to some conflict with the administration 
in the universities; the latter fearing that open hostility to the 
occupation forces would lead to greater interference from the authorities 
and pressure for them to 'control' their student population. The questioning 
of the role of educational institutions involved an exploration of the 
relationship between the universities and the rest of society and was one 
which refused to accept that education could somehow be separated from 
other areas of life in the West Bank. 
The way in which this is reflected in student politics provides a 
starting-point from which the emergence of different types of perspective 
can be considered. The formal political divisons within the student body 
are those between the Islamic bloc and a united grouping of Fatah, PDFLP, 
PFLP,, Communists and non-aligned 'progressives' and 'nationalists'. 
Elections to student posts usually involve a straight contest between 
representatives of these two main bodies. It was not until the late 
1970's that Islamic student groups appeared. Since then, they have gained 
support and are the majority on al-Najah student council. In Birzeit 
University the secretary of the Islamic bloc said that no attempt had 
been made to orgahise as a distinct group prior to the student elections 
in 1979. In this election the Islamic bloc ran against a united front 
and achieved 43% of the vote. In 1981 their percentage was 35%: a 
substantial proportion when it is considered that the opposition is an 
alliance of several groups. 
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Two points can be introduced here. Firstly, student elections in 
the West Bank have an importance greater than their actual status - in 
other words, they are of more significance than simply deciding which 
students will serve on the student council. In the absence of other kinds 
of political indicator, the elections in the universities highlight the 
kinds of issues which are being discussed as well as the support which 
various groupings have. The second point concerns the Islamic student 
groups, and their success within the universities. It has been pointed 
out that student elections are held shortly after the start of the 
academic year, and that over one-third of the student body are in first 
year with many having come from backgrounds where religious sentiments 
and practices are strong. Support for the Islamic bloc was strongest 
amongst first-year students, and those on science and engineering courses 
(MERIP No. 103: 1982). Nevertheless, the kinds of interpretations put 
forward by the Islamic groups were not suggested in any area other than 
the universities, and it is because of this that their position requires 
elucidation. 
19 
For the student Islamic groups, the current situation in the West 
Bank is described in terms of the process of Islamic history; in 
particular the repression of Islam by the west. According to one member 
of Birzeit University's Islamic bloc, Birzeit itself is under western 
influence - evidence for this being the administration's refusal of an 
application to publish an Islamic journal in the university. Further, 
the practice of teaching in English and the 'western' dress worn by 
students-and staff are cited as examples of the infiltration of western 
culture. 
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Interpreting the occupation of the West Bank as a stage in the 
process of Islamic history leads to the rejection of resolutions such 
as UN 242,20 and indeed any attempt to retrieve less than the entire 
area of Palestine on which to build an Islamic state. It was suggested 
that there could possibly be some common elements in the perspectives 
of Islamic bloc students and the others, given their common situation 
under occupation. The description of the 'secular' organisations as 
"a germ in the blood of our people" and the denial of any common ground 
illustrate the way in which the Islamic bloc view other interpretations 
and strategies and also give some indication of the way in which their 
own perception of their reality comes about. 
It was emphasised that the Islamic blocs are not the Muslim 
Brotherhood: an emphasis intended to dispel any notion of a co-ordinated 
organisation. The influence of events in other parts of the world - 
particularly in Iran - was evident, the Khomeini was used as an example 
of what could be achieved: "... in Palestine, as in Iran, the people are 
returning to Islam. We are an Islamic people. " 
The way in which these perceptions are expressed excludes the kinds 
of interpretations and strategies put forward by other Palestinian 
groupings in the West Bank - particularly those involved with or sympathetic 
to the PLO. The main contention is over dealings with the Israelis, and 
it is this which causes divisions, even amongst PLO sympathisers of a 
religious persuasion and those inclined to the Muslim Brotherhood, and 
those embracinq Islamic bloc ideals. 
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The paradox is that Islamic bloc doctrine will not accept dealing 
with the Israelisin any form - no cooperation with progressive elements, 
for example - justifying this on religious grounds. However, the way 
in which they talk of the so-called secular groupings sets them up as 
being opposed to the Palestinian leadership both inside and oiitside the 
West Bank. They are arguing for a quite different approach - one which 
emerges from a particular view of history and demands particular kinds 
of action. In this, their interests have at times converged with those 
of the Israeli authorities. Thus, while condemning any communication 
with the Israelis, the nature of their kind of organisation and the kind 
of ideas promulgated by them are seen by the Military Authorities as being 
no threat, and while it is difficult to imagine a direct relationship 
between Islamic bloc groups and the Military Authorities, it is true to 
say that the authorities have not discouraged these groups. While 
al)pearing the most ideologically extreme, in practice they are allowed 
to flourish. 
An example of this is a demonstration held in Gaza in 1980, reputedly 
the only demonstration held by Palestinians in the occupied territories 
which the authorities have not tried to stop. The demonstrators were from 
the Islamic University in Gaza and in the course of their protest burned 
a library, a clinic and a restaurant. Explanations range from charges of 
collusion between authorities and Islamic groupings, fuelled by the 
Islamic bloc dislike of the PLO, to charges that they are financed by 
various 'reactionary' Arab regimes anxious to prevent the spread of 
radical ideas. It is difficult to see what interest the Israelis could 
have in encouraging the spread of Islam other than an encouragement of 
the type of political practices fostered in Islamic groupings and the 
divisiveness this promotes in the Palestinian community. The exiled 
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President of Birzeit University, Dr. Nasir, has been quoted as saying: 
The Israelis are indirectly supporting the 
Islamic revival by failing to arrest young 
fundamentalists after occasional clashes 
with our supporters. But we also believe 
that outside funding is also reaching the 
Islamic groups. 
('The Guardian': 17.3.82). 
The paradoxical nature of the divisions between the Islamic bloc and 
students from the alliance indicates that this cannot be seen as a 
division between 'religion' and 'politics'; 
21 
rather, it highlights 
conflicting ways of interpreting the Palestinian past and the context of 
Palestinian history. 
On the question of a general 'Islamic politics' in the West Bank, it 
was noted earlier that the ideas put forward by Islamic bloc student 
groups seemed to be of little significance outside the universities, and 
in this sense the Islamic bloc can be seen as a particular reponse within 
education. The lack of significance of this form of politics in the 
West Bank has nothing to do with the absence of religious devotion, and 
in fact evidence of the strength of Islam as a religion can be seen in 
towns such as Hebron and Nablus and in the villages - for example, in Nablus 
during the fast of Ramadan, to be seen eating, smoking or drinking in 
public constitutes an offence against public decency. 
With reference to the discussion in the Introduction of the way in 
which the conflagration in Lebanon has been represented as being a conflict 
between "Christians" and "Muslims", the difference in the level of analysis 
involved in discussing Islam in the West Bank and the construction of a 
particular kind of reality illustrated in Islamic bloc politics is 
indicative of the inadequacy resulting from, a confusion of these levels. 
In other words, Islam is not an unchanging monolith; like other systems 
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()F beli(, -Fý; and practices it differs in different contexts. Edward Said 
has advanced an explanation for the absence of an "Islamic resistance' 
in Palestine, and points out that while Palestine always had a Christian 
community, it differed from most other countries in the Middle East in 
that it did not have one dominant sect (unlike, for example, the Maronite 
Christians in Lebanon). However, in addition to this, he notes that since 
the 1880's, the Palestinian people, whether Christian or Muslim, have 
had a common enemy and it is in their direct encounter with Zionism that 
their experience differs from other parts of the Arab world (Said: 1980). 
As for the emergence of the Islamic bloc within the universities, it 
, may be possible to locate this within the education sector in the West 
Bank. For example, the emphasis on "western values" has been noticeable, 
particularly in Birzeit. In the time spent in the West Bank, the language 
of instruction in Birzeit, and on some courses in Bethlehem, was English. 
The explanations for this were that firstly, members of staff had been 
appointed who could not teach in Arabic; secondly, the source material 
used was in English, and thirdly, any student wishing to continue in 
education would have to go abroad to do so, and the English instruction 
would be an advantage for this (Interviews: July/August 1981). 
While these reasons are valid in themselves, underlying them is a set 
of assumptions based on particular values which have wide-ranigng impli- 
cations. Instances which can be cited as examples of this include ideas 
about the 'superiority' of western academic thinking and the western way 
of life, and the advantage for students who have attended a school which 
teaches in English - these tend to be private schools. Also, dress is 
an immediate differentiating feature between Islamic bloc students and 
the others, as the latter tend to dress like European students while the 
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female Islamic bloc students wear ankle-length dresses and head- 
coverings. 
What is being suggested, then, is that the kind of reality presented 
in student Islamic bloc politics may be located in the education system 
itself and in the control and emphasis within it. There has recently 
been a shift in Birzeit towards teaching in Arabic, and this is a 
recognition of the issues discussed earlier. That these division have 
intensified, and the way in which they have been manipulated by the 
Israeli authorities, provides another instance of the violence of the 
colonial relationship. 
Postscript 
In July 1983, three Arab students were killed in Hebron University 
and over thirty were injured. Although no arrests were made, it was 
suspected that the attackers were Israeli settlers from Kiryat Arba 
('The Times': 28.7.83). A series of demonstrations and strikes were held 
in the West Bank; in East Jerusalem all businesses and shops closed, 
while Hebron and Halhoul remained under military curfew. At Birzeit 
University, stone barricades were erected and tyres set alight, precipi- 
tating a day-long battle between students and Israeli troops. According 
to newspaper reports, the students were throwing stones at the soldiers 
and were in turn being attacked with tear gas, rubber bullets and live 
ammunition - four students were shot ('The Times': 28.7.83). 
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As a form of politics, education in the West Bank involves the kinds 
of restrictions which are placed on academic institutions, staff and 
students over and above the rules which govern the rest of the population. 
It is suggested that this can be related to the importance of 'education' 
for both coloniser and colonised. For the coloniser, it is a means of 
extending ideological control through, for example, restricting what can 
be read. For the colonised, it provides an environment for the negotiation 
of a national identity and culture, and this constitutes a challenge to 
the coloniser. 
At another level, the significance of education under colonial rule 
can be seen in the way in which particular policies are linked with 
underlying objectives. An instance of this is the policy of teacher recrui- 
tment in schools and the effect this has on the kind of education which 
is provided, as well as being a contributory factor in encouraging emigra- 
tion. In this context, the discussion in Chapter Five of the West Bank 
labour force assumes additional importance. 
The violence of education under occupation can therefore be manifest 
in very different ways. One student from Birzeit University described his 
impression of his first year as being made up of tear gas, barricades and 
a constant fear, rather than classes and books, and this was at a time 
when clashes between students and troops were sporadic 
(Interview: July 
1981). Thus, education as politics involves students armed with stones 
fighting soldiers who are armed, and using, military hardware. Following 
the incident described at the beginning of this postscript, the same 
newspaper article quoted a shopkeeper in the West Bank as saying: 
"It is 
wrong, but what else can our young people do? They are 
being attacked by 
settlers with guns, they have to put up some sort of a 
fight. " ('The Times': 
28.7.83) . 
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NOTES 
As will be seen in Appendix 3 Military Order 854 applies only to the 
first part of the series of pronouncements which were made. However, 
public discussion and media reporting refer to the collective as 854. 
Residents of Jerusalem are defined by the Military Authorities as 
Israeli citizens. 
3. The information on deportations and teaching bans in West Bank 
Universities is provided in a review circulated privately by 
Mark Cheverton, a British lecturer who was deported from Bethlehem 
University in November 1982. 
4. See also the discussion of security as a rationale for legal provision 
in Chapter Four. 
5. The report was prepared for an ad hoc faculty meeting, at the Hebrew 
University in December 1980. The committee which was responsible for 
preparing the study consisted of: Ruth Gavison (Law), Yehoshua Kolodny 
(Geology), David Kretchmer (Law)., Eliezar Rabinovitch (Physics) and 
Menahem Yaari (Economics). 
6. A report was prepared for the Committee of Concerned Scientists and 
the Committee on International Freedom of Scientists of the American 
Physical Society by Dr. Edward Witten of Princeton University's 
Physics Department, following a visit to the West Bank in December 
1982. He summed up the feelings of foreign passport-holders as being 
willing to sign a commitment to abide by the law of the land, but 
I)eing unwilling to sign a statement of their own beliefs (Witten: 
1983). 
7. The recruitment conditions for each district are as follows, (1976/77): 
Hebron: asked for 60 new teachers. Limited to 55, but 
44 vacancies arose in addition due to resignations. 
Bethlehem/Jericho: asked for 33, got 17. 
Jenin: asked for 60, got 15. 
Tulkarm: asked for 55, got 15. 
Nablus: asked for 67, got 31.5. 
Nasru suggests that this was achange of policy initiated after 1973, 
and that before then requirements were generally agreed by the 
Military Authorities (Nasru: 1977). 
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During this period, Birzeit was a 
associate degree. (See section on 
Chapter). 
college awarding a two-year 
University Structure in this 
By 1981, no graduate of Birzeit Univerity was permitted to be employed 
in a government school (Interview: September 1981). 
10. As evidence of this, Gerson comments on an interview with Mr. Gadish, 
then Assistant Director General of the Ministry of Education in 
charge of Arab education inside Israel; since 1967 he has been 
coordinator of West Bank education and expressed the view that similar 
subjects and teaching methods were appropriate. For a discussion of 
eudcational provision for Palestinians with Israeli citizenship, 
see Sami Khalil Mar'i, Arab Education in Israel (1978). 
As was noted in Chapter Six, Israel does not accept the applicability 
of the Geneva Convention to the territories occupied in 1967. 
12. It was suggested that it would have suited the Military Authorities 
to close all educational facilitids in the West Bank at this time 
(Interview: September 1981). Similarly, the implementation of 
MO 854 which was discussed earlier has been described as a means of 
"destroying the universities, or reducing them to mediocrity, without 
having to close them officially" (Witten: 1983). 
13. The legal justification for this is derived from the 1945 Defence 
Regulations (Emergency Powers), a British Mandatory law which empowers 
the state, in this case the IDF censor, to ban at its discretion 
anything thought to interfere with 'the security of the state and 
public order'. 
14. The distribution of several of the Arabic language daily newspapers 
published in East Jerusalem is also prohibited in the occupied 
territories. 
15. Birzeit introduced an associate degree programme in 1962. Prior to 
this, Birzeit had been a private school. 
16. Gerson quotes from an interview with Dr. Nasir, the deported president 
of Birzeit, that the upgrading was at his instigation. He carried 
it 
out without asking prior permission of the Military 
Governor, and 
consequently was threatened with disciplinary action unless all unauth- 
oriý; ed . changes were rescinded. 
Despite the threat being ignored 
no disciplinary action was taken specifically on this, 
in that the 
university continued to function as such. However, Dr. 
Nasir was 
deported after the 1973 war for allegedly "failing to cooperate with 
the Israeli authorities in preventing the teaching of anti-Israeli 
and anti-Jewish material. " (Gerson: 1978). 
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17. There is a discrepancy in the provision of facilities between boys' 
and girls' schools. An unpublished survey from Bethlehem University 
reports that 53% of schools have libraries (60% of boys' schools, 
35% of girls') and 47% have laboratory facilities (51% for boys, 39% 
for girls). 
18. There is a difference between closing a university and closing the 
area where the university if located. For example, in July 1981 a 
commemoration was to be held in Birzeit University on the date of the 
murder of the Palestinian writer Ghassan Kanafani. At 8.00 a. m. 
Birzeit village was "closed" until 5.00 p. m., with the result that 
noone who was off Birzeit campus at 8.00 a. m. could attend the meeting. 
19. The information in this section is drawn from interviews carried out 
in the West Bank universities from June-December 1981. 
20. United National Resolution 242 (22.11.67) calls for an Israeli 
withdrawal to the 1949 borders, and the termination of all 'states 
of belligerency'. The latter clause included the recognition of 
territorial integrity of 'every state in the area'. (London Office 
of the Palestine Liberation Organisation: 1983). 
21. The way in which the Islamic bloc conceive of Islam also posits no 
division between 'religion' and 'politics' - Islam is politics. 
The organiser of Birzeit Islamic bloc has been quoted as saying: 
"Islam is a comprehensive way of life. It is 
not just praying and fasting when required. 
It is living the religion every minute of your 
life ... We need to be more 
doctrinaire if Israel 
is to be overthrown we need an Islamic state 
founded on the principles of the Koran. " 
('The Guardian': 15.3.82). 
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Conclusion_ 
In November 1983, representatives of the armies of France, Italy, 
Britain, USA, Syria and Israel were in Lebanon. While the American and 
European troops formed part of the United Nations consignment stationed 
in Lebanon to strengthen President Gemayel's rule, Israel continued its 
occupation of the southern part of the country, and Syrian forces fought 
what remained of the Arafat-led PLO in the north. President Reagan 
issued a statement that: 
... stability in Lebanon is central to /American7 
credibility on a global scale. If Lebanon ends 
up under the tyranny of forces hostile to the 
West, the western allies will be threatened with 
loss of the Arab oil supplies. 
('The Economist': 29 Oct. -4 Nov. 1983) 
In the Introduciton to the thesis, an outline of the situation in 
Lebanon was used to raise the main issues and advance the themes which 
were to be discussed, and the quote from President Reagan is a forceful 
restatement of the kinds of connections which have been analysed. For 
the Palestinians in Lebanon, the end of 1983 saw the PLO led by Yasser 
Arafat being beaten back towards the Lebanese coast by the combined forces 
of the Syrian Army and Palestinian dissident groupings. The complexity 
of the alliances in Lebanon serves again to highlight the need for an 
analysis which can build up a coherent picture from the array of apparent 
paradoxes and conflicts. 
For instance, the Arab governments were instrumental in setting up a 
Palestine Liberation Organisation, and have proclaimed the right of the 
Palestinian people to self-determination. Yet Rodinson suggests that: 
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"The Organisation /i. e. the PL671 had been created 
to enable the Arab states, acting in concert, to 
canalize the claims and aspirations of the 
Palestinians, to keep a close watch over them 
and render them harmless, except when the common 
interest of all dictated otherwise., " 
(Rodinson: 1982: p. 145) 
In 1970, an estimated 5,000 people were killed and 20,000 wounded when 
the Jordanian army attacked Palestinian refugee camps and guerilla bases 
in Jordan, and the remainder of the Palestinian organisation was expelled 
(People's Press: 1981). In 1976, the alliance between Syria and Lebanon's 
Maronite rulers during the Lebanese civil war carried out actions such as 
the siege and massacre of Palestinian refugees in Tal al Zaatar camp. 
Over 1,000 people were killed in the final assault and another 1,000 
executed immediately afterwards (Gilmour: 1982). In 1982, Israel's 
invasion of Lebanon left an estimated 12,000 people killed and 40,000 
wounded, amongst these the victims of the massacres in the Palestinian 
refugee camps of Sabra and Chatila; massacres perpetrated by Lebanese 
militia while Israeli troops sealed the area and illuminated the scene 
with flares (Jansen: 1982). 
Arab governments have expressed verbal support for the Palestinians, 
and have extended financial aid, albeit with strings attached. The reasons 
which underpin this ambivalence can be discussed at two related levels - 
in terms of the class nature of particular Arab states, and in terms of 
power alliances within the region and internationally. Chapter One 
attempted to suggest an interpretation of how these levels are related, 
through a consideration of the historical background to the Middle East 
I problem'. The kind of historical account which is constructed to provide 
this order of explanation cannot be restricted to a description of events; 
rather, it stands-as a theoretical and methodological base for the work as 
a whole. 
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The analysis which was carried out looks at how economic changes 
within Europe generated new relationships between Europe and the rest of 
the world: relationships which came to involve governments, and later 
the implantation of settler populations from Europe in the countries 
of Asia, Africa and the Americas-.. Thenature of these relationships 
is concept ualised as being one of violence. In this way, the problems 
identified with an ahistorical conception of colonialism are answered, 
and the conceptualisation of a violence which is manifest in different 
forms allows the diverse aspects of the colonial relationship to be 
explored in the context of a power relation between coloniser and colonised. 
Violence is apparent in the destruction of the history of the colonised 
as well as in physical destruction; it involves language, and literature, 
and culture, and permeates through to attitudes and ideas. The impact of 
violence can be seen in the society of the colonised as well as of the 
coloniser, and can be seen in the country which is settled as well as in 
the settlers' 'homeland'. 
While the focus of this thesis has been on the meaning of colonialism 
for th_e__ colonised, the issue of violence for the coloniser was raised in 
Chapter One with regard to the roots of Zionism in late 19th century 
Europe, and the relationship was elaborated between the imperial powers 
and the attempts to translate Zionism from a political philosophy to a 
set of strategies. The importance of the Middle East as a region for the 
imperial powers can be seen to take on added significance with the 
discovery of oil, but this represents a change in the form rather than in 
the substance of the unequal relationship. 
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When Israel is placed in this scenario, a new matrix of interests 
is overlaid, and Chapter Two begins to explore this by examining specific 
aspects of Israel's international connections in the light of the analysis 
suggested in Chapter One. Israel's existence was made possible by the 
cooperation of imperial powers earlier this century, and has been 
guaranteed by these powers, in particular by the United States of America, 
since the proclamation of the state. The relaince on overseas aid, the 
overblown defence sector and the internal economic problems connected 
with this, such as the high inflation rate and foreign debt, combine to 
make Israel an economic anomaly. Chapter Two, therefore, moves towards 
a particular instance of how the power relations analysed in Chapter One 
actually operate. 
In order to draw out these contradictions, consideration then focusses 
on the historical development of the State of Israel, from the perspective 
of the impact which Zionism has had for the Palestinian people. This 
inovIves an examination of the ideologies which formed Zionist thinking, 
the ways in which they were translated into practices, and the processes 
which consolidated rule over Palestine. It is argued that the main 
objective of Zionist settlement was the creation of political, social and 
economic institutions which were specifically for Jews, and that the 
institutions which were established at this time formed the backbone of 
the State of Israel - 
The translation of institutional exclusivity, which is consistent 
with the assumptions on which Zionist thinking is based, into a set of 
strategies for holding a colonial territory was facilitated by the 
British Mandate authorities. However, this is not seen as a direct 
sponsoring of the Zionist project in Palestine: rather, it is suggested 
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that there was a coincidence of interests between Zionist settlers and 
British policy in the region, and it is the conjuncture of these interests 
which provides the rationale underlying British Mandate strategies. The 
presentation of Palestinian history in the Mandate period in this way 
draws on the form of analysis which was suggested in Chapters One and 
Two, and Chapter Three therefore locates in this framework the processes 
whereby Palestine was colonised. 
The creation of institutions which were speficially for Jews 
entailed the exclusion of the non-Jewish population. This, in effect, 
was the formalisation of the ideological negation of the Palestinian 
people which is implicit in the political vision of a Jewish entity. 
The establishment of the Israeli state and the Palestinian exodus in 
1948 extended the negation of the indigenous population to the level of 
physical exclusion. As an encapsulation of the violence of the colonial 
encounter, for the Palestinians, Zionism as a political vision entailed 
their ideological non-existence; Zionism as institutional exclusivity 
entailed political and economic negation in Palestine; and Zionism 
translated into a political entity entailed their physical exclusion and 
displacement from Palestine. 
The physical exclusion of the Palestinian population was institut- 
ionalised in the new State of Israel, and Chapter Four focusses on land 
expropriation and settlement as an instance of domination. In addition 
to the economic and political significance of the expropriation of Arab 
property, this chapter considers the establishment of colonial settlement 
as an aspect of the process of colonisation, and as such draws on the 
continuity of the process in Israel and in the West Bank. The continuity 
which is suggested is, however, at the level of a power relationship. 
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Settlement inside Israel is different in several ways from Israeli 
settlement in the West Bank, and while the continuity of the relationship 
between coloniser and colonised can be seen in the analysis of colonialism 
as a historical process, this does not necessitate the attribution of a 
fixed character to this process. 
The numerical weakness of Israeli settlers in the West Bank does not 
belie their importance symbolically, and as an increasingly-used flexible 
paramilitary force, and central to an understanding of their importance 
is the nature of the relationship between Israel and the West Bank. From 
the continuous process of colonisation analysed in Chapter Four, Chapter 
Five moves to examine specific aspects of what colonisation means for the 
people of the West Bank. This analysis is organised around the theme of 
labour, and as such, considers the effect of occupation on work, both in 
terms of the effect on types of employment, and the effect on workers. 
The highlighting of details of colonisation facilitates the discussion 
of the way in which strategies are formulated which enable the people of 
the West Bank to survive. In Chapter Five, the case of Palestinian trade 
unions is an example of this, and Chapters Six and Seven develop this 
theme in different ways. In Chapter Six, three instances are discussed 
of how the experience of colonisation is worked out at the level of 
local politics, while Chapter Seven turns to more diffuse facets of life 
under occupation in considering education as a form of politics. 
The use of 'case studies' in this context is not intended to provide 
exhaustive reviews of the study area, but, as has been argued throughout 
the thesis, has a particular theoretical and methodological status within 
the work as a whole. The kind of explanation which is sought is one 
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which can formulate a unity between colonialism as a historical process 
and the meaning which it has for the people who are colonised. 
The distinction between historical circumstances and the way in 
which these circumstances are experienced, explained and defined is seen 
as important for two main reasons. Firstly, the emphasis is placed on 
the dynamic nature of the colonial relationship and this assures the 
integrity of the history of the colonised people. Secondly, by maintaining 
that while a theoretical unity is constructed of violence as a colonial 
power relation, specific forms of violence are neither reduced to nor 
deduced from this level, an analysis can consider the diverse ways in 
which people perceive and interpret their situation. Taking those two 
points together, this means that an explanation can be constructed at 
different levels of analysis. 
The discussion of particular instances of how Palestinians have 
perceived and explained their experiences has served, therefore, to 
hi(jhliqht the different meanings which occupation has for the occupied. 
The theme which runs through these diverse moments is the way in which 
a reality is constructed and it is at the point where this reality touches 
the objective experience that we can locate the violence of the relation- 
ship between coloniser and colonised. 
Neither Al Ard nor the village leagues addressed themselves to the 
specific nature of Israel and what Zionism means for Palestinians. The 
exclusion of this consideration must not be seen as naivety or a lack of 
awareness; the exclusion is, in itself, a constituent of the construc- 
tion of a form of explanation which has its own internal logic. 
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In this sense, the significance is realisedofboth the issues which 
are focussed on and the silences. Al Ard attempted to define an identity 
which was Arab, and Palestinian Arab, within Israeli hegemony. The 
context within which this identity was perceived was related to the 
pan-Arabism of the time, and as such is related also to the reliance 
on Arab states to solve the problems faced by Palestinians. When this is 
juxtaposed with the position of Palestinians inside Israel at that time, 
with the institutionalised means of discrimination which were introduced 
after the proclamation of the state, the retention of military government 
in Arab areas, and the range of formal and informal restrictions which 
were imposed on the Arab population, then the dissonance of the experience 
and the interpretation exemplifies violence. 
Through the organisation of local politics, questions were asked by 
the municipalities regarding means of resisting the Israeli occupation 
and attempts were made to connect the struggle of Palestinians in the 
occupied territories with Palestinians in exile. It can be suggested that 
the importance of the Palestine National Front and the National Guidance 
Committee lies in the two-fold role of coordinating action in the West 
Bank and of providing an organised. link between Palestinians living under 
occupation and Palestinians outside. Furthermore, this link was crucial 
to the existence of the Palestine Liberation Organisation which has 
tried to overarch the histories and aspirations of all Palestinians. It 
was the interconnectedness at this political level of the Palestinians 
as a people which Israel sought to break by destroying the Palestinian 
institutions in Lebanon, and it is in this context that the events which 
have taken place in Lebanon since Israel's 1982 invasion can be understood. 
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What is being proposed, then, is that the meaning of occupation 
in the West Bank involves the generation of analytical connections 
betweeen the level of Palestinian specifi-dty and the context within which 
Palestinian history can be located, and that an understanding of this 
complexity requires an analysis which can articulate different levels 
of explanation. This is suggested in the theoretical and methodological 
framework of the thesis, and the structure of the thesis itself repre- 
sents an attempt to follow this throught as the Chapters are tightly 
integrated in a sequence which facilitates the shifting between levels of 
analysis. 
For the Palestinian people, the encounter with Zionism has involved 
a violence which has ranged from ideological to physical negation, and 
it is this shared experience which connects the diverse moments of 
violence. The thesis began by noting the significance of the refusal 
of the first Prime Minister of Israel to define the boundaries of the 
state. A fitting end is the comment made by Menachem Begin on announcing 
his retirement. At a time when Israel is in control of the entire area 
of Palestine, the Syrian Golan Heights and about half of Lebanon, 
Prime Minister Begin wants to be remembered as "the man who set the 
borders of the Land of Israel for all eternity" ('The Guardian': 31.8.83). 
APPENDIX ONE 
Fieldwork 
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The field research which was carried out in Israel and the West 
Bank between June and December 1981 arose from the conviction that an 
understanding of what was happening on the West Bank could not be gained 
solely from an external historical account. The methodological and 
theoretical implications of this have been argued throughout the thesis; 
the importance of retaining the meaning which colonialism has for the 
colonised has been emphasised - both theoretically, in that the reduction 
of an expression of an experience to the experience itself is a 
confusion of levels of analysis, and in the sense that to omit a consid- 
eration of the meaning of colonialism is the deny the past of the colonised 
people. The different levels of analysis which are involved in building 
up a coherent picture require different kinds of information, and the 
purpose of this Appendix is to provide a background to the information 
which was collected in Israel and the West Bank. 
It is one thing to state that the meaning of occupation is important, 
and quite another to think about how to get at this'Ineaning", and indeed 
about the significance of whose meaning you get. The way in which the 
fieldwork was designed bore these questions very much in mind, and this 
underlies the status which the fieldwork has in relation to the rest of 
the thesis. The intention was to examine instance S of a colonial relation- 
ship rather than carry out detailed demographical studies, and in this 
way the focus was on the location of information in a particular framework 
rather than on the collection of information as an activity in itself. 
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Following from this, the type of information and the means of 
collecting it can be considered. The objectives were deliberately left 
very broad, partly due to specific limitations, and partly to avoid 
imposing predefined categories. Within the general analytical framework 
of the thesis, I wanted to retain maximum flexibility in terms of what 
areas or topics would prove important. I had not been in the Middle East 
before, and the scarcity of research on the contemporary West Bank meant 
that it was difficult to predict what would be the areas of most interest. 
Above all, the continuing military government of the area made a 
predefinition of what research could be carried out impossible. 
The main limitations on the work can be noted here. one limiting 
factor was language. I spoke very basic Arabic which was inadequate for 
carrying on a discussion. This meant that there was a choice between 
us, inq an interpreter or restricting the orbit to English speakers. While 
having an interpreter was useful on initial visits to a town or village, 
the loss of immediacy in the conversation and in many cases the presence 
of another person were hindrances, so in general interviews were only 
carried out with English speakers. This ruled out the possibility of 
extensive work in villages, but for the most part did not seem disadvan- 
tageous as English is widely spoken in Palestine. 
Language also played a part in the selection of written source 
material as no Arabic or Hebrew literature could be used. Again, however, 
there much available in translation, and translations from Arabic and 
Hebrew newspapers and magazines are provided by various sources (see 
Bibliography). In sum, it has been possible to carry out the research 
without using Arabic sources and interviews because the project was 
designed with that as a limiting factor, and because of the status of 
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the fieldwork in relation to the thesis as a whole. While empirical 
material is important, it is felt that interpretation is a vital part 
of the account in other words, the use to which material is put. 
To give an example of the importance of the location of "facts", 
processed cheese and white bread are subsidised in Israel by the Israeli 
government. By comparison, Arab bread and goats' milk cheese, which are 
not subsidised, are expensive. People therefore begin to eat Kraft cheese 
and sliced bread, and dietary choices adversely affect Arab agriculture 
which is geared towards the production of different kinds of food by 
different methods, and does not receive government subsidies. Marlboro 
cigarettes are widely thought to have a higher social cachet than locally- 
produced cigarettes which taste similar and are one-third of the price. 
At Arab wedding parties, guests are not offered local cigarettes, they 
are offered imported or manufactured under licence American brands. 
As "facts" in themselves, these appear to be items of domestic trivia. 
However,, when they are set in the context of the analysis which has been 
carried out in the thesis, details like this provide graphic descriptions 
of economic processes, political forces and ideas about western (as 
opposed to Arab) culture. When people begin to prefer to eat mass- 
produced food, and prefer to smoke identifiably American cigarettes, then 
that is a statement about the nature of the colonial relationship. 
At another level, it can be seen also as an indication of how the 
economic is related to the political, social and ideological. It is 
unlikely that food subsidies were introduced deliberately to undermine 
the pattern of Arab food consumption and so affect Arab agriculture. 
However, this is what has happened. The significance of the examples 
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which have been mentioned is that they present cameos of the way in 
which the kinds of changes which have talen- place percolate through to 
attitudes about culture, and consumption, and status - they are, in 
effect, instances of how colonialism actually works. 
Aside from linguistic restrictions, no initial selection was made 
of areas of interest, and the first three months in the West Bank were 
spent getting to know the area and talking to as many people as possible. 
While this may be a useful general procedure in carrying out field research, 
the particular situation of the West Bank heightens the necessity to become 
accepted. The people of the West Bank are living under a military 
occupation where a verbal statement of support for the PLO can incur a 
three year prison sentence, and to be seen talking to a foreigner can 
incur suspicion at the very least. I was usually introduced to new 
contacts by mutual acquaintances and this was reassuring both for the new 
contact and for me. The majority of the people I met were very cooperative, 
and a recurring theme was the importance of presenting an account of what 
is really happening in the West Bank. The feeling is strong that the 
situation is misrepresented, or worse, ignored. 
The reality of living under a military occupation also heightens my 
responsibility towards the people who assisted me. General sociological 
practice concerning the protection of the privacy of informants is brought 
sharply into focus when these people live with such dangers. It is for 
this reason that individuals are not named in the text, and this affected 
also the kinds of research methods which could be used. 
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Given the political difficulties and the kind of information I was 
interested in I questionnaires or f ormaU survey methods would not have been 
suitable. Instead, the fieldwork data is a series of unstructured conver- 
sations and impressions and this links in with the status which fieldwork 
is accorded in the thesis. The material which was collected therefore 
represents the accounts of a range of people, and makes two main contri- 
butions to the thesis. Firstly, it stands by itself as statements which 
were made, and ideas which were discussed, outwith an imposed framework. 
In this sense, it provides information about people and events. For 
example, the information on West Bank organisations such as municipalities 
and trade unions is the result of conversations in the West Bank, both 
with people who are involved, and with those who are not involved in these 
areas but commented on them. This contribution, therefore, is empirical 
in that it is a collection of data. The second contribution of the 
material is evident in the way in which ideas and events are set in a 
framework, and this involves my interpretation. 
While research had been carried out prior to staying in the West 
Bank, reading cannot adequately prepare you for the feeling of living 
under a military occupation, where even the military presence is intimi- 
dating. One of the more striking things is the casual way in which 
submachine guns are carried by soldiers and civilians, and the way in 
which weapons are used against demonstrators is frightening. The reality 
of these dangers is quickly learned. However, in addition to having 
first-hand experience of theiýphysical violence of military rule, the 
stay was important for the way in which local information and contacts 
built up, and the way in which this shaped the sort of interpretations 
which were made. 
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To give one example of this. The decision to include material on 
the Al Ard movement (see Chapter Six) was intended to advance the argu- 
ment which had been made regarding the level of Palestinian unity, as 
Al Ard was formed by Palestinians inside Israel and over twenty years 
before the cases considered in the West Bank. The use of this material 
meant that some time was spent in Arab villages in Israel in order to 
talk to people who had been involved with Al Ard, and to get some idea 
of the conditions of Palestinians with Israeli citizenship. 
The immediate impression in the Arab villages which I visited in 
the Triangle was of the contradiction between the affluence suggested 
by the number of very large houses, and the poverty suggested by unpaved 
roads, poor sewage facilities and the lack of community services. To a 
certain extent, this is happening also in the West Bank, and the road 
from Jerusalem to Ramallah, for example, is dotted with very large villas 
under construction. The explanation is that the houses are built by 
families who may have several members working in Israel, but more impor- 
tantly are sent remittances from family members who have gone to work 
abroad. It is rarely possible to invest this money in land, so it is 
invested in a house. The poor facilities are the result of Israeli policy 
towards Arab towns in Israel: with the exception of Nazareth, all Arab 
towns in Israel are classified as 'villages' for the purposes of the 
allocation of municipal grants and services, with the result that the 
latter are barely adequate to maintain existing services, let alone insti- 
gate new ones. A similar situation is faced by the municipal councils on 
the West Bank, and the restrictions which have been imposed on them are 
detailed in Chapter Six. 
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The seven months which were spent in the area allowed me to get to 
know people and places, and to be accepted, although it must be emphasised 
that this was due in a large part to the assistance I had, and the 
introductions I was given. More time would have been useful, as it was 
really only in the last three months that I had clear ideas of what I 
wanted to do. Plans were made to return for six weeks in summer 1982, 
which would have given me around six months to go through all the material 
which had been collected, sort the fragments into some sort of order, and 
then return to fill any gaps. However, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon 
in that year and its aftermath meant that these plans could not be 
realised. 
It is doubtful, however, whether similar fieldwork methods could 
have been carried out then. During the time I spent there, I travelled 
alone to towns and villages and generally talked to as many people as 
possible. The only place hostility was shown was in Hebron. This happened 
on an early visit when I was alone in the town and several people shouted 
'Israeli'. When I visited the town a few times and had been seen with 
local people there were no problems. It can be explained by the location 
of Kiryat Arba settlement on the outskirts of Hebron and the particular 
problems faced in the encounter with settlers in the town. Many of the 
settlers there are American, and on appearnce this was obviously the 
easiest group to identify me with. From accounts of people who have been 
in the area recently, it would not now be possible to move around so 
easily, as the whole situation has become much more tense and volatile. 
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While being foreign means you are conspicuous in Arab towns and 
villages, it is an advantage with regard to dealing with the military 
authorities. I had no official dealings with the Military Government, 
but as a foreign passport-holder I was not subject to the same restric- 
tions on movement imposed on Palestinians. This privilege is evident, 
for example, at roadblocks. Passengers with ID cards must leave the 
vehicle for questioning while others remain inside, and this can happen 
many times on a short journey. It is not, however, the formal differences 
in treatment which are remarkable but the way in which the treatment is 
carried out. For instance, travelling on a bus from the Israeli part of 
Jerusalem to the Old City, two Israeli soldiers stood up and began to 
check ID cards. It didn't seem like an official check, as they had been 
on the bus for some time, and this was confirmed as they only checked 
the cards of two old men sitting opposite me, both wearing, keffiyahs 
(traditional Arab cotton scarves or head-covering). I automatically 
offered my passport but it was politely declined. The whole episode was 
made as humiliating as possible for the old men. The soldiers joked 
in Hebrew, which the old men evidently did not understand, and others on 
the bus joined in. 
While I was shown courtesy, except on the few occasions when travelling 
to non-tourist areas aroused some suspicion, it is impossible to be unaware 
of this difference in treatment. It is evident in attitude, and in 
conversation with Israelis about the Palestinian population. An American 
university lecturer who had recently emigrated to Israel commented that 
whenshe was in the US, her views on Israel were thought to be "hard" and 
on the political right. However, amongst colleagues at the Hebrew 
University in Jerusalem these same views have labelled her as a liberal 
"dove". 
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In conclusion, the purpose of the time spent in the West Bank was 
to collect material constituting instances of the colonial relationship. 
Given the analytical and methodological framework which underpins the 
thesis, the nature of this material emphasises its location in a framework 
rather than the collection in itself, and this in turn affects the way 
in which material is collected and the status accorded to the data. 
Weight is accorded to my own impressions and interpretations, and 
comments made for example in general conversation are seen as important 
for the insight which is given into ordinary day-to-day life in the West 
Bank. This, coupled with the military occupation, means that fieldwork 
methods were necessarily unstructured. 
Despite the limitations of time, language, and the situation on 
the West Bank itself, the fieldwork period did provide a wealth of useful 
material, both as basic information and in aiding my understanding of the 
meaning of occupation in the West Bank. 
A final note can be made on the geographical texminology used in this 
work. Many terms commonly used are implicitly political, and as clarifi- 
cation, 'Israel' refers to the State of Israel in its 1949 boraers. 
'Palestine' refers to the territory of Mandate Palestine irrespective of 
the time of reference. In other words the area which, in 1983 is the State 
of Israel, and the territories occupied in 1967 on the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. 
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Elite rpri se Activity 
MANUFACTUBLVIj 
Koor Industries Manufactures industrial products within Ceramics, 
Chemicals, Food, and Science-based Divisions, metals, 
appliances, electrical and electronic items. 
Solel Boneh Building and Public Manufacturing Division manufactures metal products, 
works Company building compenents, furniture etc. 
Te'us Development Areas Indust- Holding company of 17 individual enterprises located 
rialization in development areas which manufacture textiles, medical 
products, plastics, and electronic equipment. 
Kibbutz Industry Consists of about 200 industrial plants engaged in food 
processing, and manufactruing agricultural equipment, 
plastics, electrical equipment, footwear, furniture, 
wood, etc. 
iýe(jion, il 1-: nterprises 26 regional organisations, operating about 50 regional 
factories. 
Yukhin Hakal Inter ilia, operates 5 industrial plants which process 
citrus by-products, do canning, make pectin, and manu- 
facture citrus fruit boxes. 
Cr_x-)perative Centre of Producers Consists, inter alia, of 90 industrial enterprises 
which engage in printing, woodwork and baking, and 
manufacture electrical equipment, vehicles, metal 
products, gas containers, metal sash, metal office 
furniture, boxes for citrus fruit, forklift platforms 
etc. Includes Ha'Argaz, the largest industrial 
cooperative, which has a one-third interest in Amcor 
Industries. 
BUILDING AND CONTRACTING 
Solel Boneh Building and Public Engages in building and road construction, quarrying, 
Works Company overseas construction, as well as in the financing and 
planning of housing. 
Shikun Ovdim Plans, promotes, and finances the construction of popular 
housing and shopping centers and engages in their sale. 
WI1OII,, 'i1 Jj M/1/K/'1Z NC 
Ifamashbir flamerkazi Supplies at wholesale the Cooperative Movement 
(kibbutzim and other cooperatives in Israel) with items 
for agriculture, industry and the home, through five 
divisions: Grocery, Consumer, Agricultural, Technical 
dnd buildinq Materials. 
Tnuvd-Central Cooper, itive for llroct-., ifii-ýi and ijiiirki-ts vir-1-iflitit-il roid 1. ýiry jo-lii- Iti, 
Marketing of Aqri(--ij1tur, -i1 11t(, du,: Lf3 
MARKA"PING 
Hamashbir Lazarhan Supplies conswiiers, with basic consumer itf-m!; f-x(-Itj!; iv(, 
of food, through a chain of 13 department stores. Owned 
both by Hamashbir Hamerkazi and by the Consumers 
Association. 
Relationship 
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Consumer's Cooperative Union operates a chain of 220 supermarkets. 3 
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AGI? ICUI, 'I'UI? Al, 
Yakhin Hakal Cultivates and supervises groves and packages the 
product for the domestic and foreign markets. 
Tnuva Exports Sorts and packages fruit for export. 
Regional Enterprises The constituent regional organisations work in the field 
of sorting and packaging fruits and vegetables, operate 
slaughterhouses, serve as stations for heavy equipment, 
etc. 
EXPOW AND IMPOffl' 
Aida Offers full export and import services, the largest firm 
of its kind in Israel. 
Hamashbir Export and Import Serves as general export company for all sectors of the 
Israeli economy. 
WA T ER 
Mekorot Water Company Explores and develops water sources, supplies water to 
consumer and manufactures related industrial items. 
INSURANCF 
Hassneh Israel Insurance Company Offers comprehensive insurance and reinsurance services. 
TR, INSPORTATION AND TOURISM 
Arkia Airlines Operates a fleet of aircraft within Israel and serves El Al 
with flights to some points outside of Israel. 
11istour Offers comprehensive tourist and travel services to 
individuals and groups. 
The Development Company for Hotels Develops and operates chains of hotels, guest houses, 
and Vacation Centers vacation villages and restaurants. 
Public Carriers Several cooperatives, including Dan, Egged, and Shelev, 
which engage in hauling passengers and freight. 
BANKING AND FINANCING 
Investment Fund of Hevrat Ovdim Mobilizes funds for investment in enterprises of the 
Hevrat Ovdim economy. 
Bank Hapoalim offers full banking services to the public and serves as 
the financial arm of Hevrat Ovdim. 
Major Affiliates of Bank Hapoalim 
Ampal-Americal Israel Corporation Mobilizes capital in the United States for investment in 
Israel. 
Housing Mortgage Bank Finances housing activities of Hevrat Ovdim and offers 
housing mortgages to the public 
Gmul Investment Company Invests severance pay, pension funds and other funds. 
Japhet Bank Specialises in foreign currency and securities. 
Israel-American Development Bank Specialises in long term loans for industrial development 
PUBLISHING AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES 
Davar The Histadrut daily, which offers comprehensive newspaper 
services 
Cultural and Educational Enterprises Supplies cultural and educational services (books, records, 
motion pictures) on a community basis, produces films, 
operates recording studios, operates matriculation prep- 
aratory classes, conducts adult education programs, organises 
shows and exhibitions, etc. 
Am Oved Publishing House Publishes original and translated work, one of the 
largest publishing houses in Israel. 
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Source: "Hevrat Ovdim in the Israeli Economy", Economic Department, Hevrat Ovdim, Spring, 1973. 
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ISRAELI DEFENCE ARMY 
ORDER No. 854 
Order concerning Education and Culture Law Number 16 for the year 1964 (Amendment) (West Bank) 
In accordance with the authority vested in me by virtue of the law of 
Culture and Education, Law Number 16, for the year 1964 (hereinafter 
"the Law"), I hereby order as follows: 
Amendment to Article 2 of the Law: In the definition of "Institute" 
occurring in Article 2 of the Law, the phrase "on condition that the 
period of study should be less than four years" shall be deleted. 
2. Amendment to Article 8 of the Law: In Article 8 (c) of the Law, the 
phrase "and its duration is I-e-ss than four years" shall be deleted. 
3. Amendment to Article 20 of the Law: In Article 20 of the Law, the 
phrase "at intermediate level of specialization between secondary 
and university education" shall be deleted. 
4. Amendmen t to Article 26 of the Law: At the end of Article 26 the 
following shall be added: - "The-mentioned Ordinance may included 
regulations concerning teachers who are convicted of committing a 
crime in accordance with security legislation, or who are placed 
under administrative detention. " 
5. Amendment to Article 59 of the Law: 
Article 59 of the Law, the word "Ministry" shall be replaced by 
the following phrase, "the responsible official by virtue of the 
Order Concerning Powers Regarding Laws of Education (West Bank Area) 
(Number 11) for the year 5727 - 1967 (hereafter - the "responsible 
official") 
b) Paragraph (c) of Article 59 of the Law will be referred to by the 
letter (d) to be preceded by the following: 
C) "The responsible official may. in consultation with the District 
Chief of Police and the Military Governor of the area directly 
concerned, may take into account considerations of public order 
among other considerations, in granting the licence mentioned in 
this Article. " 
6. Transitional Provisions: Every educational institution operating in the 
Area mentioned at the end of this Order will be considered as having 
obtained a temporary licence, in accordance with the Law as amended in 
this Order, as of the date when this Order comes into force. 
7. Effective Date: This Order shall come into force as of 24th Tammuz 5740 
(8th July 1980 ). 
8. Name: This Order shall be called, "Order Concerning Education Law Number 16 
for the year 1964 (amendment) (West Bank) (Number 854) for the year 5740-1980". 
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ISRAELI DEFENCE ARMY 
EDUCATION AND CULTURE LAW NUMBER 16 OF 1964 
0 
Do 
,, gulation Regarding 
Teacher Certification Number 23 of 1965 (Amendment) 
0 
In accordance with the authority vested in me by virtue of Article 117 of 
the Education and Culture Law Number 16 of 1964 (hereafter - "the Law") I 
issue the following Regulation: 
Amendment to Article 8: The provision of Article 8 of the Regulation 
RegarUing Teacher certification Number 23 of 1965 (hereafter - "the 
Regulation") will be referred to by the letter (a), and to this the 
following will be added: 
b) The responsible official may cancel the teaching certificate 
granted to whoever was convicted of committing a crime in accord- 
ance with a security legislation, or to whoever was placed under 
administrative detention. 
Addition of Article 9: After Article 8 of the Regulation comes the 
f ol 1 owi ng: 
9. "No teaching certificate of whatever kind shall be granted to anyone 
who has been convicted of committing a crime in accordance with a 
security legislation, or to anyone who has been placed under admin- 
istrative detention except with the approval of the responsible 
official". 
3. Effective Date: This Regulation will be called the "Regulation Regarding 
Teacher Certification Number 23 and 1965 (West Bank) (amendment) for the 
year 5740-1980. " 
22 Tammuz 5740 
6 July 1980 
Benjamin Ben ElVezer 
Tat Aluf - Commander of the 
Area of the West Bank 
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ISRAELI DEFENCE ARMY 
ORDER CONCERNING CLOSED AREAS (WEST BANK) (NUMBER 34) 5727 - 1967 
GENERAL PERMIT TO ENTER (Inhabitants of the Administered Territories) (Number 5) 
(Amendment) (West Bank) 5740 - 1980. 
In accordance with the authority vested in me in my capacity as Commander of 
the Area, I issue the following declaration: 
Amendment to Article 2: 
al Article 2 of the neral Permit to Enter (Inhabitants of the Administered 
Territories) (Number 5) (Judea and Samaria) for the year 5732 - 1972 will be referred to by letter (a), and at its beginning the following phrase 
shall appear,, taking into account the contents of Paragraph (b): 
After Paragraph (a) of Article 2 this will follow: 
"(b) No one who enters the Area, from the inhabitants of any administered 
territory, may work as a teacher or principal of any educational institu- 
tion, or be a student of any educational institution unless he obtains a 
personal permit issued in writing by a military commander. 
C) Paragraph (b) is not intended to derogate from the provisions of any 
legislation or security legislation which imposes the requirement of 
obtaining a licence, or the acquisition of a pemit to reside or work, 
but it was included as an addition to any such provisions. 
2. Transitional Rules: This amendment does not apply during the scholastic year 
5740 (1979/1980)T-tlo a teacher or student who has already started teaching or 
studying as the case may be, at any educational institution, before the coming 
into force of this amendment. 
3. Effective Date: The Order shall come into force as of 24 Tammuz 5740 
(8 July 1980) 
4. Name: This declaration shall be called "General Declaration for Entry 
T-1-n-Fabitants of the Administered Territories) (Number 5) (Amendment) 
(Judea and Samaria) 5740 - 1980.11 
22 Tamuz 5740 
6 July 1980 
Benjamin ElVezer 
Tat Aluf - Commander of the 
Area of the West Bank 
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ISRAELI DEFENCE ARMY 
ORDER CONCERNING CLOSED AREAS (West Bank Area) (Number 34) for the year 5727-1967. 
GENERAL PERMIT TO ENTER (Number 5) (Israeli and foreign inhabitants) (West Bank 
Areas) 5740-1980. 
In accordance with the authority vested in me in my capacity as Commander of 
the Area I issue the following Order: 
Amendment to Article 2: In Article 2 of the General Permit to Enter 
ýNumber 5) (Israeli and Foreign Inhabitants) (West Bank Area) of 5730-1970 (hereafter - the General Permit to Enter), the following shall appear after 
Paragraph 9. 
10. a) No Israeli or foreign inhabitants entering the Area may work as a 
teacher or principal at any educational institution unless he obtains 
a personal permit issued in writing by a military commander. 
b) Paragraph (a) is not intended to derogate from the provisions of any 
legislation or security legislation imposing the requirement of 
obtaining a licence or the acquisition of a permit to reside or work, 
but it was included as an addition to any such provisions. 
2. Transitional Rules: This amendment does not apply during the scholastic 
year 5740 (197-9-/1980) to a teacher or student who has already started 
teaching or studying, as the case may be, in any educational institution 
before the coming into force of this amendment. 
3. Effective Date: This amendment shall come into force as of 24 Tammuz 5740 
(8 July 1980) 
4. Name: This Declaration will be called "General Permit to Enter (Number 5) 
JTs-raeli and foreign inhabitants) (Amendment Number 2) (West Bank) 
5740 - 1980.1' 
22 Tammuz 5740 
6 July 1980 
Benjamin Ben Eli 'ezer 
Tat Aluf - Commander of the 
Area of the West Bank 
APPENDIX FOUR 
Maps 
- 285 - 
The Middle East - Palestinian Refugees. 
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2. Israel and Israeli-controlled Territory, 1982. 
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The West Bank. 
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4. The West Bank - Population Distribution and Israeli Settlement. 
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